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 Abstract 
This paper surveys and compares national experience with performance manage-
ment in European public employment services (PES) in the form of ‘management by 
objectives’ (MBO). Part I of this paper reviews the relevant performance management 
literature and defines key terms. Part II presents the results of a stocktaking survey of 
the use of operational objectives, performance indicators, benchmarking and related 
managerial practices in all 15 EU Member States and Norway. Part III reports the re-
sults of a comparative analysis and more in-depth assessment of national experience 
with management by objectives in Austria, France, Great Britain, and Sweden. Part 
IV summarizes principal findings and presents main conclusions.  Ten of the 
eighteen PES organizations surveyed were found to use management by objectives: 
Austria, Denmark, the Flanders regional PES (VDAB) in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. In summary, the 
impact of MBO-systems depends strongly on design and implementation features. If 
based on principles of ‘good-practice’, MBO can improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of PES operations.  
 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Papier wird eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Verbreitung und Praxis der 
Zielsteuerung (Management by Objectives, MBO) in europäischen Arbeitsverwal-
tungen vorgelegt. Teil I rekapituliert die relevante Forschungsliteratur und entwirft 
einen analytischen Bezugsrahmen. In Teil II wird ein empirischer Überblick zur 
Steuerung mittels Zielen und Indikatoren in europäischen Arbeitsverwaltungen gege-
ben. Unter 18 Arbeitsverwaltungen sind Zielsteuerungsansätze für die zehn Länder 
Dänemark, Deutschland, Finnland, Flandern (VDAB), Frankreich, Großbritannien, 
Niederlande, Norwegen, Österreich, und Schweden nachzuweisen. Teil III vergleicht 
vertiefend die Managementansätzen in den Arbeitsverwaltungen Österreichs, Groß-
britanniens, Frankreichs und Schwedens. Für den Erfolg (oder Mißerfolg) der 
Zielsteuerung sind Design- und Implementationsfaktoren entscheidend. Wenn Prin-
zipien ‘guter Praxis’ beachtet werden, kann die Effektivität und Effizienz der Arbeits-
verwaltung mittels MBO gesteigert werden.  
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Executive Summary  
This paper surveys and compares national experience with performance manage-
ment in European public employment services in the form of ‘management by 
objectives’ (MBO). Part I of this paper reviews the relevant performance management 
literature and defines key terms. Part II presents the results of a stocktaking survey of 
the use of operational objectives, performance indicators, benchmarking and related 
managerial practices in all 15 Member States and Norway. Part III reports the results 
of a comparative analysis and more in-depth assessment of national experience with 
management by objectives in Austria, France, Great Britain, and Sweden. Part IV 
summarizes principal findings and presents main conclusions.  
Use of management by objectives in some form is widespread in EU public 
employment service organizations. This is a consequence, in the first instance, of the 
dissemination of performance management in the public sector in the 1980s and 
1990s. The spread of management by objective has also been promoted by 
European employment policy, which since 1998 requires Member States to submit 
annual ‘national action plans’ that document and measure progress toward 
achievement of the EU’s employment policy guidelines. Ten of the eighteen PES or-
ganizations surveyed were found to use management by objectives: Austria, 
Denmark, the Flanders regional PES (VDAB) in Belgium, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. This classification is based 
on two core criteria: 1) ex ante setting of goals, operational objectives and quantita-
tive performance targets; 2) measuring and reporting the actual level of performance 
of operating units against these objectives. Four other PES organizations, Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland and the Walloon regional PES (FOREM) in Belgium, have adopted 
elements of MBO, however use of ex ante quantitative targets is selective and/or 
there is no clear evidence that they actually play a central role in steering and con-
trolling the performance of PES operating units.  
Our study generally confirms the observations in the performance management 
literature on different prerequisites and pitfalls of successful MBO. First, the 
commitment of PES top management and government was found to be important for 
MBO success. In most cases the introduction of MBO in the PES was part of a 
broader commitment at the governmental level to modernization of the public sector. 
The existence of a strong central controlling unit has also proved to be an important 
condition for the success of MBO. Another is the necessary ‘relative autonomy’ of the 
PES from the ministerial level. In the case studies this relationship ranged from tight 
ministerial control (e.g. the UK) to considerable independence in the implementation 
of broad policy guidelines (e.g. Austria). In all the case study countries there was 
evidence for what we have termed ‘principal’ (i.e. in contrast to ‘agent’) problems. For 
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instance, there were several examples of government failure to agree some or all of 
the annual targets in a timely manner. Moreover, ad hoc interventions during the 
course of an annual agreement have repeatedly been disruptive for PES operations. 
These shortcomings in the practice of MBO are coped with pragmatically by 
experienced PES organizations; nevertheless they may at some point undermine its 
credibility and effectiveness. 
MBO is inconsistent with the high density of generally binding rules and 
regulations characteristic of traditional public administration. But management by 
rules still plays an important role in some types of specialized and highly regulated 
PES operations, for example, the administration of unemployment benefits in several 
countries. In this case there is not necessarily a conflict between MBO and rule-
oriented administration, since timely and accurate administration of benefit 
entitlements can be an additional operational objective. 
MBO entails costs as well as benefits, including the establishment of new types 
of organizational structures. In the first place it requires a major investment of time 
and organizational resources in an adequate management information and 
controlling system, although the technical standards of modern information technol-
ogy facilitate the collection and processing of data, implying lower costs and less red 
tape than would have been the case in the past. 
The relationship between classical management by objectives and quality 
management deserves special attention. Above all, the emphasis on quality 
management is an important response to the perceived shortcoming in the original 
quantitative emphasis in MBO systems (e.g. in Norway), and hence a useful 
complement to management by objectives. On the other hand, insofar as quality 
management relies mainly or only on detailed prescriptions of service standards and 
internal processes, it tends to standardize PES service delivery, which may impede  
local quality improvements and approaches more suitable to local needs.  
Design features of goals, operational objectives and performance indicators are 
critical for the smooth functioning of MBO-type PES management systems. PES or-
ganizations with MBO-type systems use a moderate number of operational 
objectives and targets (typically 8-10), which is consistent with the theoretical model 
of MBO in the literature. But one of the main practical problems of MBO 
implementation in PES organisations proved to be the development of good 
performance indicators. In addition to shortcomings in data availability, many 
countries reported problems finding easy-to-measure and understandable 
performance indicators for organizational objectives. 
Another key concern is the ‘right’ level of quantitative target levels. The general 
consensus is that targets should be ‘stretching’, i.e. challenging, but still realistic. In 
countries with more hierarchical management styles national targets are allocated to 
the regional level in a top-down fashion based on some combination of formulae and 
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bargaining. In other PES management systems with a more decentralized style, 
regional and local offices play a much stronger role in the setting of target levels.  
The appropriate time frame is another critical design feature of MBO. Our 
findings suggest that a combination of medium-term and annual planning in which 
annual operational objectives are agreed on the basis of medium-term goals is the 
most practicable solution for reconciling the need for strategic planning with short-
term flexibility.  
Under the heading of ‘decentralization and policy discretion’, two clearly different 
models of PES performance management could be identified: the more centralized 
and hierarchical agency model and the more decentralized self-administration model. 
Based on the evidence we have examined, neither the more centralized agency 
model nor the more decentralised labour market authority model can be regarded as 
being inherently superior. What is clear, however, is that the features of the two 
different model types cannot be arbitrarily combined. Moreover, the choice of a PES 
performance management must be compatible with the broader institutional context, 
for example, the style of public administration, existing patterns of decentralization in 
state institutions, and the role of the social partners in policy-making. 
Agency problems, especially moral hazard, are endemic to the performance 
management approach with its strong emphasis on achieving quantitative targets. 
Evidence from our case studies suggests that there is a strong incentive for ‘street 
level’ programme managers to find a practical solution to get the ‘numbers’ that are 
‘needed’. A high degree of staff acceptance of the performance management targets 
seems to be one of the best remedies against such opportunistic behaviour.  
In summary, MBO can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of PES 
operations. It should, however, be based on principles of ‘good-practice’ and avoid 
typical pitfalls. In light of our evidence, good MBO practice includes: 
• Use of a limited number of clear and understandable targets 
• Providing employee participation to guarantee the commitment of regional and 
local PES staff to the performance management system 
• Reduction in the density and complexity of administrative rules and directives 
• A reliable, flexible, and ‘real-time’ management information system for monitoring 
progress toward targets 
• Fair and transparent procedures for assessing and rewarding performance 
• Complementary quality management approaches. 
 

1 
Introduction 
This report surveys and compares national experience with operational targets and 
performance indicators in the management of European public employment services. 
Experience with these management tools is described and analysed within the 
broader context of new forms of ‘performance management’ in the public sector of 
which they are a part. Particular attention is given to ‘management by objectives’ 
(MBO), which is the element of performance management most closely related to the 
use of operational objectives and performance indicators. Since the late 1980s there 
has been a new surge of interest in this management approach in the context of the 
international trend towards public sector reform (‘New Public Management’) (OECD 
1993ff). 
Among European public employment services, Sweden and Norway are the 
countries with longest experience with operational objectives and performance indi-
cators in the context of MBO-systems, which were first introduced in the mid-1980s 
(Niklasson and Tomsmark 1997; Delander 1991; Naschold and Arnkil 1997). In the 
1990s the use of this type of performance management in European PES 
organizations has become more widespread. The practical purpose of this project is 
to facilitate exchange of experience between PES organizations and to examine the 
potential usefulness of this form of performance management about which no com-
prehensive information and very few comparative studies are available.1  
This report is divided into three principal parts: 
In Part I (‘Conceptual Framework and Research Design’) the broader theoretical 
context of performance management is discussed and key terms are defined. Princi-
pal attention is given to management by objectives (MBO). An analytical model of 
MBO is developed and the role of operational objectives and performance indicators 
in this system of performance management is described and analysed. On the basis 
of the existing literature, a typology of the potential functional problems related to the 
use of operational objectives and performance indicators is developed. This 
theoretical discussion serves as a basis for developing specific research hypotheses 
and an empirical survey instrument. 
Part II (‘Synoptic Survey of National Experience with Operational Objectives and 
Performance Indicators’) presents the results of a stocktaking survey of the use of 
                                            
1  Niklasson and Tomsmark (1997) examined experience with performance management in public 
employment services in Sweden, Finland and Norway in the early 1990s, is the only comparative 
study of which we are aware. 
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operational objectives, performance indicators, benchmarking and related managerial 
practices in all 15 Member States and Norway based primarily on a questionnaire 
submitted to all PES organizations, documentary sources, telephone interviews, and 
local consultants. It focuses in particular on: 
• PES policy goals, operational targets and performance indicators adopted and 
their level of application (national, regional, job office); 
• The process by which these targets and indictors are defined; 
• The monitoring system for measuring progress toward the operational targets in 
terms of the agreed performance indicators; 
• The assessment of the performance of regional PES operating units on basis of 
the agreed performance indicators and monitoring system; 
• The consequences of under- or over-performance for organizational units 
(budgets, salaries etc.). 
Part III ‘Country Case Studies’ reports the results of a comparative analysis and an 
in-depth assessment of selected aspects of this approach to PES management and 
benchmarking in selected countries with more experience that might provide policy 
models and transferable knowledge for other PES organizations. This part of the re-
port is based on more intensive case studies of PES management practices based 
on field interviews with PES personnel, national experts, and analysis of secondary 
sources. This two-step approach reflects the very uneven development of experience 
with MBO, performance indicators, and benchmarking in European PES or-
ganizations. 
Part IV summarizes principal findings and presents main conclusions and 
recommendations.  
3 
Part I: Conceptual Framework and Research Design  
1. Basic concepts and definitions of performance management 
Management by objectives (or ‘Management by results’), ‘controlling’, ‘benchmark-
ing’, and quality management are the most well known performance management 
approaches. Unfortunately, the particular meaning or interpretation of these catchy 
management phrases is not always clear.2 
First, management by objectives (MBO) is a management system led by 
quantified targets; its aim is continuous performance improvement. It puts emphasis 
on ex ante formulation of explicit operational objectives and ex post measurement of 
outputs and outcomes. The practical principles of MBO consist, in a nutshell, of 
target setting, decentralised operationalisation and implementation, monitoring of 
(ongoing and final) results, and practical conclusions based on a final performance 
assessment.  
Let us briefly discuss these basic elements of MBO:  
Setting of goals, operational objectives and performance indicators: First 
step of the management cycle is the establishment of clear goals, ex ante operational 
objectives (targets) and the development of corresponding performance indicators 
that measure the extent to which these targets have been achieved. Goals define the 
main thrust and direction of its activities in order to fulfil the ‘mission’ in a medium-
term or long-term perspective, and are usually not quantified. By contrast objectives 
(or targets) lay down performance expectations or benchmarks in a given time frame 
and are usually quantitative. Performance indicators specify how achievement of 
these objectives is to be measured.  
Decentralised implementation (delegation and policy discretion): Delegation 
and enhanced policy discretion - particularly at the implementation level - are also 
key features of MBO. In the model of management by objectives there is a low 
density of generally binding rules and procedures as steering instruments and 
operating units at subordinate levels of the organization (e.g. regional and local 
levels) should be free to allocate resources flexibly between budget items, to vary 
their policy mix, and even programme design features (e.g. eligibility requirements, 
implementation structures). In contrast to traditional bureaucratic administration, the 
emphasis is on outputs rather than on controlling inputs and adherence to rules.  
                                            
2  Mali 1986 provides the best overview on MBO; a review of different notions of benchmarking is 
given in Schütz et al 1998; the ‘classic’ benchmarking study remains Camp 1989; see Weber 
1994 and Hoffjan 1998 on controlling. 
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Monitoring of performance targets: Management by objectives requires so-
phisticated management information systems that regularly measure the progress of 
indicators toward agreed objectives as a basis for assessing overall organizational 
performance and that of individual operating units. Besides providing the information 
for regular reviews, ‘real-time’ monitoring enables managers moreover to intervene 
immediately in case of under-performance (i.e. stronger deviations from the ‘target 
track’).  
Performance assessment: Apart from regular reviews in the course of monitor-
ing, a final performance review at the end of a (annual) management period is 
another important ideal-typical component of MBO. At this stage the final 
performance of the operative units will be assessed by the superior level, i.e. as a 
rule the top management within an organizational context. Depending on MBO-type 
(see Mali 1986: 140), the performance results may be intensively discussed between 
the different levels; but it might also be the case in more hierarchical organizations 
that performance assessment is simply based on written information and data from 
the Management Information System. In a similar vein, assessment would - in an 
ideal-type model - entail rewards and sanctions for good or bad results, but 
organizational practice varies considerably in this regard.  
New policy cycle: On grounds of the assessment or evaluation, policy goals, 
operational targets and performance indicators will be redefined or adjusted. In other 
words, these practical conclusions and consequences represent the beginning of a 
new planning cycle.  
Second, controlling of which there are a number of different definitions and types 
in the literature. However, in our view, controlling, should be understood as a man-
agement concept of which the core meaning is the co-ordination of partial or 
separated management functions rather than guaranteeing the fulfilment of one 
particular management target. Conceived in this way, controlling can be usefully 
distinguished from the MBO approach. The aim of controlling is the (continuous) 
maintenance of information processing necessary to perform the goal functions of the 
entire system, which will be achieved through co-ordination instruments and 
methods. In this context, the functions of ‘system-building’ and ‘system-coupling’ 
controlling are typically distinguished (Weber 1994: 39; Horváth 1994). The system-
building function concerns the establishment of the necessary conditions for the co-
ordination of the management functions. The set-up, organizational planning and the 
linkage of partial management systems and functions are typical for ’system building’. 
’System coupling’, by contrast, addresses rather the solving of concrete and specific 
co-ordination tasks that may arise due to changes or ‘disturbances’ of the environ-
ment. Such concrete problem solving of ‘system-coupling controlling’ may include, for 
instance, co-ordination through plans, programmes, or also personal communication 
devices (Hoffjan 1998: 65; Weber 1994: 40). 
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Finally, benchmarking is in our understanding an evaluative approach to analysis 
and management in which empirical performance indicators for organizations are 
analysed and compared with the explicit aim of performance improvement through 
organizational learning (Schütz et al. 1998). In practical terms, benchmarking entails: 
(1) an analytical stocktaking to explain performance gaps between organizational 
units and identify best practice; (2) the translation of the results of this analysis into 
practical consequences for performance management in terms of performance 
targets to be achieved (quantitative and/or qualitative ‘benchmarks’). ‘Best practice-
benchmarking’ is the most famous variant of this approach.  
Controlling and MBO are rather ‘pure’ management approaches, whereas 
benchmarking has by definition a stronger analytical component. Furthermore, the 
emphasis of controlling approaches lies on satisfying co-ordination needs to achieve 
certain aims, which may include different types of instruments and implementation 
models, whereas MBO is much more focussed on a specific implementation model 
based on target levels and indicators; co-ordination is not explicitly stressed in the 
MBO ‘philosophy’. Moreover, benchmarking is a comparative approach, which is not 
always the case for MBO3 and plays no important role for controlling. In general, the 
conceptual framework of benchmarking and controlling includes a wider scope of 
themes and issues than the more ‘targeted’ concept of MBO. However, operative 
management variants of benchmarking and controlling apply often the MBO cycle of 
goal/target definition, implementation, monitoring, review and conclusions.4 A differ-
ent, but supplementary approach to these three types to managing performance is 
given by quality management, which will be thus briefly introduced. 
Quality management 
In the (advanced) debate of the 1990s on how to manage performance of (public) 
organizations, it is rather common sense that quality aspects have to be included; a 
good performance management system cannot be merely based on measuring 
results (as attainment of predefined objectives). Though intertwined or related, two 
different pillars of the quality debate have (at least) to be distinguished: The first and 
prominent debate addresses how quality in service delivery (output) can be achieved 
and measured. Most often, customer satisfaction serves as the reference framework 
here (see e.g. Morgan and Murgatroyd 1994). The second, perhaps not so famous 
debate addresses the role of quality control and management as a necessary com-
plement to results-oriented performance management, i.e. the approach of managing 
by objectives. In this respect, controlling (‘steering’) and improving the processes 
                                            
3  MBO might be organised as a simple ‘before-after’ performance comparison of and within the 
same organizational unit, whereas benchmarking always refers to distinct comparative units 
(products, standards, functions, organizations).   
4  In practice and in different contexts, partly due to a number of commonalities, the conceptual 
differences of the approaches sketched are often blurred. However, from an analytical 
perspective, the differences should be kept in mind. 
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necessary to attain certain performance targets is considered as crucial for validity as 
well as organizational stability of performance management (see Naschold 1995). 
For managing the performance of Public Employment Services, we assume that both 
of these principle aspects of the quality debate deserve attention. In practical terms, 
quality approaches in the public sector can be typically distinguished as variants of 
three approaches: quality control, quality assurance and total quality management 
(TQM) (Bovaird 1996; see Schütz et al. 1998: 9-12, for a brief overview). 
2. Key analytical issues of management by objectives in PES 
organizations  
The remainder of this section presents and discusses thematically key findings and 
issues from the existing literature on MBO performance management. Whenever 
possible or appropriate, special reference to PES organizations will be made. 
2.1 Prerequisites and pitfalls of successful MBO Commitment of top 
management and government  
In general, in both the private and the public sector, the commitment of the organiza-
tional top-level or central management for the MBO-approach is considered decisive 
for its success. This is one of the main findings of a review study of 70 MBO adop-
tions (of which 30 were in public sector organizations) (Rodgers and Hunter 1992). 
Since the MBO-process spreads from the top down, lack of personal involvement of 
top management would represent an only half-hearted introduction of MBO, which 
would ultimately fail (ibid.: 36f, cf. Al-Ani 1994 for a similar interpretation of Total 
Quality Management). The personal involvement of top-managers means ongoing 
face-to-face interaction with the subordinate levels, which enables them to directly 
monitoring as well as to provide guidance and advice, if necessary; effects not to be 
achieved with written monitoring devices (Rodgers and Hunter 1992: 29). 
Relative autonomy of the PES from the ministerial level 
A key issue is the extent to which the political level should be involved in the man-
agement system and how much control of the implementation process is desirable 
(‘politics vs. administration’).5 On the one hand, ministerial intervention should ideally 
take place only at the stage of formulation of goals and objectives at the beginning of 
a new MBO-cycle. On the other hand, the operations of MBO-managers should in 
principle always (i.e. during the whole management cycle) be transparent, which has 
                                            
5  According to the ‘managerialist’-variant of NPM, politicians should restrict themselves to defining 
policy goals and ‘let the managers manage’ which is problematic for several reasons (cf. Pollitt 
1990). 
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to be achieved primarily through the monitoring system and dissemination of its 
results.6 Ad hoc political intervention is clearly a threat to management by objectives, 
which requires a relative independence of the PES and a stable policy environment 
in which PES goals and resources remain constant over the annual or biennial policy 
cycle. Only in this way can the performance of the PES and its subordinate 
implementing levels be fairly assessed in terms of the agreed operational objectives.  
The extent to which this condition of MBO is fulfilled depends on the 
implementation system for labour market policy and on the national political-
administrative culture. However, there appears to be an inherent conflict between the 
logic of politics, which is primarily responsive to votes and election dates, and the 
predictable annual or multi-annual policy cycles that MBO presupposes. Thus the 
ministerial level may tend to avoid clear operational objectives at all since they have 
only an ambiguous interest in performance measurement (risk of open policy failure), 
or, might be inclined to intervene into operational performance management in case 
of high media visibility (Reichard and Wegener 1994: 30) or in response to electoral 
cycles (e.g. election-related increases in funding or new program initiatives). In other 
words, in contrast to conventional wisdom on MBO, which focuses on agency prob-
lems (see below), ‘principal-problems’ can also occur.  
MBO systems address this problem typically by granting the PES a relatively 
autonomous status vis-à-vis government as quasi-independent executive agencies. 
For historical reasons unrelated to MBO many employment services organizations 
have been established as independent bodies with tripartite forms of self-administra-
tion (see Mosley, Keller, Speckesser 1998). MBO requires the conclusion of an oper-
ating agreement between the PES and government at the beginning of a policy cycle. 
The agreement specifies both the operative targets and the resources to be made 
available to the PES and is in principle binding on both parties.  
Density of rules and regulations may conflict with MBO 
The transformation from a rule-oriented to a performance-oriented administration is 
an overriding goal of the standard NPM-approach (cf. Caiden 1991: 27). A necessary 
condition of establishing a promising MBO-system in public agencies is the effective 
reduction in number and density of laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. 
If a relatively high rule density persists, any MBO-type system inevitably breaks down 
over the medium term (Naschold 1995:136).  However, the policy domains in which 
MBO is to be preferred to traditional rule-oriented administration and the extent to 
which process-oriented regulations are incompatible with successful MBO is unclear; 
it can only be observed that there is also a tension between rule-oriented and goal-
oriented management practices in labour market policy. For example, almost all EU 
                                            
6  ‘Unlimited freedom’ during the operational management process would be in contradiction to the 
premises of public accountability. 
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countries base unemployment benefits on entitlements, which directly or indirectly 
affects the allocation of access to active measures. 
MBO can produce ‘red tape’ and bureaucratic structures 
Contrary to the thrust of MBO, it can be itself a ‘paper tiger’ captured by the monitor-
ing needs and claims that result in excessive paperwork and red tape. As MBO also 
includes strong elements of planning, in particular when combined with financial 
management, a certain formalisation of the process seems even inevitable. In order 
to avoid efficiency losses, monitoring information has to be tailored not to coverage of 
the performance goals but must also reflect the needs and capacities of the numer-
ous actors involved.  
2.2 Design features of goals, operational objectives and performance indicators 
Managing quantitative and qualitative performance of PES organizations requires 
clear goals that can be operationalised in terms of agreed performance indicators for 
which monitoring systems provide reliable data. The literature suggests a number of 
key questions and possible systematic problems in this respect in implementing MBO 
systems.  
Number of operational objectives 
The number of operational objectives and corresponding indicators should be limited: 
too many targets may undermine the purpose of MBO both as a tool of strategic 
management in setting organizational priorities and in controlling their realization by 
subordinate level of the PES organization. Although there is no apriori optimal num-
ber of targets to be used, each addition objectives competes to a certain extent with 
the other organizational targets (goal competition) and at some point may become 
counterproductive (goal ambiguity and goal conflict).  
Adjustment of targets to local labour market conditions  
The quantitative targets actually set should reflect regional or local labour market 
conditions in order to provide comparable standards for operating units otherwise any 
performance comparisons would be likely to be misleading, or even unfair. Moreover, 
the objectives should neither be set too high nor too low. Targets that are too low 
provide no real incentives for performance improvements; targets that are too high to 
be obtainable are demotivating and may even induce unintended side effects such as 
creaming, or even manipulative behaviour (see below). In order to avoid such 
problems, targets set for subordinate units usually also reflect the level of 
performance in the previous period. 
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Time frame  
On the one hand, the time frame of MBO may be too short. The MBO-cycle is usually 
set for a relatively short period (e.g. a year), whereas typical policy goals often entail 
a longer time span (e.g. reduction of long-term unemployment). This raises the 
question how short-term performance management and the pursuit of long-term 
goals are or can be (effectively) linked. On the other hand, longer planning cycles are 
more likely to be disturbed because of unanticipated changes in the labour market 
situation (e.g. business cycle or ad hoc events) and by instability in the policy 
environment (e.g. changes in government, shifting political priorities.) A possible 
solution to this dilemma is some combination of a medium term policy framework with 
more detailed annual business plans.  
Correspondence of goals, objectives and indicators 
The ‘fit’ between goals, objectives and indicators is a central issue in management by 
objectives. Thus indicators may not adequately represent the operational objectives 
or targets (Niklasson and Tomsmark 1997). Among other reasons, this may be due to 
measurement problems. Performance indicators (PI’s) often represent only proxies 
based on available information in an administrative system. This can be problematic: 
If managers in operating units do not recognise PI’s as a convincing representation of 
a particular goal or objective, this may undermine their commitment to the MBO-
process. In other words, in this case MBO can be expected to degenerate into an ‘as-
if process in which goals will be formally fulfilled but will not determine or guide the 
management activities. There are two principal solutions to this problem: 1) 
Development of a specialized monitoring system which provides appropriate and 
timely performance indicators; 2) involvement of all levels of the organization in 
process of setting operational objectives and performance indicators. It remains an 
open question how simple performance indicators ought be at operational levels.7  
Managing by objectives vs. evaluation  
However good indicators based on internal administrative data may be, they do not 
meet the standards of evaluation research for assessing the effectiveness of labour 
market interventions. Thus gross placement rates on PES job brokering activities 
provide no basis for statements about real labour market impact (net effects) be-
cause they need to be discounted for deadweight, substitution or displacement 
effects and, moreover, are sensitive to business cycle and structural effects (Walwei 
1995). Two questions arise: Firstly, how do Ministerial and PES officials interpret 
performance results of MBO; do they take full account of the inherent data limitations 
                                            
7  The typical (performance) management literature wisdom clearly advocates simple PI’s, see e.g. 
PUMA 1994a: 39-41. 
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or not? Secondly, do European PES supplement their MBO systems with insights 
from more systematic evaluation research?  
2.3 Decentralization and policy discretion, centralization vs. decentralization in 
target setting 
Because policy goals are necessarily general, they can be translated into operational 
objectives in a variety of ways and there are a number of possible indicators in terms 
of which performance can be measured. On the one hand, the specification of 
operational objectives and indicators needs to be centrally co-ordinated to a certain 
extent in order to prevent policy fragmentation. On the other hand implementation 
structures for labour market policy may concede a measure of policy autonomy to 
operational units at the regional and local level in order to permit adaptation of labour 
market policy to particular circumstance. Although the classical model of 
management by objectives has a centralist bias (e.g. the agency model in Great 
Britain), there are also more decentralized MBO mixed-models (e.g. Denmark).  
Agency costs and problems 
Performance management systems of the MBO-type are in principle construed as a 
principal-agent model in which the central or top level (the principal) defines goal and 
objectives that are to be implemented by lower-level operating units.8 Therefore, 
MBO-systems are particularly prone to agency problems that can be analysed in 
terms of the concept of moral hazard9 and, to a lesser extent, adverse selection10. 
The information advantage of the agent can be abused in MBO-systems in various 
ways: There is a vast range of options how the agent might manipulate statistics and 
cost accounting; for instance the number or personal characteristics of programme 
participants, or the success rate of a programme (e.g. to ‘forget’ some of those who 
quit before programme termination). Incentives to minimise agency problems might 
also be counter-productive. For example, monetary or career incentives for high 
placement or success rates (or quotas) may promote creaming (see e.g. Courty and 
Marschke 1995; Barnow 1992; Delsen 1996: 529). The monitoring or transaction 
                                            
8  This is true regardless of the degree of participation rights or  ‘flat’ hierarchies etc. 
9  Moral hazard refers to the (ex post) condition that the principal is not able to monitor or assess 
(fully) the activities of the agent which enables the latter to various forms of non-compliance with 
the contractual terms, e.g. so-called shirking.  
10  In contrast to moral hazard, adverse selection refers to the fact that the principal cannot know ex 
ante whether the agent tells the truth about decisive features related to fulfilment of  the contract. 
Thus, adverse selection is a prominent problem in insurance themes but does not play a major 
role in central-local relations.  
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costs of guaranteeing agents’ compliance to the contract (or performance agree-
ment) is thus an important issue in assessing MBO-systems.11 
Performance Incentives 
Put simply, MBO is expected to improve performances of organizations through re-
sults-oriented implementation and results-control. An important issue concerns 
whether additional performance incentives (monetary or other, immaterial resources) 
are needed to bring about the expected ‘steering effect’ of MBO. Individual perform-
ance incentives such as bonus payments are controversial in theory and practice. In 
the academic debate, some authors have pointed out that a mechanistic use of per-
formance pay should be avoided because of ambiguous impact of such incentives 
(Ridder 1998; Naschold 1995). In practice, furthermore, rejection of performance 
payments may be particularly strong in rather egalitarian organizational cultures, 
such as Scandinavian PES (see for a selective evidence from Sweden Niklasson and 
Tomsmark 1997: 224). 
3. Research design 
The empirical research in this project has pursued a two-step approach:  
1. A stocktaking survey of the use of operational objectives, performance indicators, 
benchmarking and related managerial practices in all 15 Member States and 
Norway based primarily on a questionnaire submitted to all PES organizations, 
analysis of documentary sources, and telephone interviews. This survey 
addresses the basic elements of these management systems: 
- PES policy goals, operational targets and performance indicators adopted and 
their level of application (national, regional, job office); 
- The process by which these targets and indicators are defined; 
- The monitoring system for measuring progress toward the operational targets 
in terms of the agreed performance indicators; 
- The assessment (benchmarking) of the performance of regional PES operating 
units on basis of the agreed performance indicators and monitoring system; 
- The consequences of under- or over-performance for organizational units 
(budgets, salaries etc.).  
2. A comparative analysis and in-depth assessment of selected aspects of this 
approach to PES management and benchmarking in four countries with more 
                                            
11 Transaction cost problems can be particularly a problem in cases of strong reliance in 
contracting-out solutions; among other things, prominent problems include fair options for market 
entry, collusion, lowballing (see e.g. Prager 1994; Miranda and Lerner 1995). 
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experience that might provide policy models and transferable knowledge for other 
PES organizations (Austria, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom). In these 
countries the study is based on more intensive case studies of PES management 
practices based on field interviews with PES personnel, national experts, and 
secondary analysis of available evaluation literature and monitoring data. This 
two-step approach reflects the very uneven development of experience with 
MBO, performance indicators, and benchmarking in European PES 
organizations.  
Following this research design, Part II of this report presents the summary of the 
survey results. Part III presents and discusses our case studies findings on Austria, 
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, followed by a comparative analysis of 
these findings [in Part IV]. Special reference will be made to the issues and hypothe-
ses outlined in the preceding section. 
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Part II: Survey of National Experience with Operational Objectives 
and Performance Indicators in EU PES Organizations 
Our survey of the use of operational objectives, performance indicators, and related 
managerial practices is based on two principal sources: PES documentary informa-
tion (e.g. annual reports, business plans, controlling reports) and a written 
questionnaire submitted to PES organizations. These sources were supplemented as 
necessary with telephone interviews and information from national experts. The 
questionnaire, the principal results of which are reported in this section and in Appen-
dix B, addressed in particular the following themes:  
- PES policy goals, operational targets and performance indicators adopted and 
their level of application (national, regional, local office); 
- The process by which these targets and indicators are defined; 
- The management information system for measuring progress toward the opera-
tional targets; 
- The assessment of PES performance and that of its operating units on basis of the 
agreed targets and performance indicators; 
- The consequences of under- or over-performance for organizational units 
(budgets, salaries etc.). 
The survey questionnaire was submitted to 18 PES organizations, including all 15 EU 
PES organizations and Norway.12 Separate questionnaires were sent to all three 
regional Belgian PES organizations. In reporting the results we focus in particular on 
the 10 European PES organizations with MBO-type management systems.  
1. MBO dissemination 
Use of management by objectives of some type is widespread in EU public employ-
ment service organizations. This is a consequence in the first instance of the more 
general dissemination of performance management in the public sector in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which has been vigorously promoted inter alia by the OECD. Moreover, 
since 1998 the Member States are required to submit annual  ‘national action plans’ 
that document their activities and measure progress toward achievement of the EU’s 
employment policy guidelines. The influence of the European employment policy 
framework has resulted in a situation in which almost all countries regard themselves 
as using MBO in their PES organizations. Thus in the responses to our survey all but 
three PES organizations (Luxembourg and the ORBEM (Brussels) and FOREM 
(Wallonia) regional organizations in Belgium claim to use management by objectives.  
                                            
12  We received responses to our questionnaire from 17 of the 18 PES organizations; the Greek 
PES did not responded to our questionnaire or to requests for information.  
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Definitional Problem  
In order to counter this inflationary use of the term we need to apply a more restric-
tive definition of ‘management by objectives’ in selecting countries for inclusion in our 
analysis. In order not to exclude borderline cases we have applied only two core 
criteria from our discussion of ideal typical MBO management systems (see above):  
- ex ante setting of goals, operational objectives and quantitative performance tar-
gets  
- measuring and reporting the actual level of performance of operating units against 
these objectives. 
In other words, countries are deemed to have an MBO-based management system if 
we have found evidence of ex ante formulation of quantitative operational objectives 
and ex post measurement of outputs and outcomes, for example, performance 
agreements with quantitative targets for operative units and regular controlling re-
ports on performance against targets. Ten of the eighteen PES organizations sur-
veyed clearly meet these criteria: Austria, France, the Flanders region in Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
Germany is included as a PES organization with an MBO-based management sys-
tem although 1999 was the first trial year of operations and it is not yet entirely clear 
whether the new ‘controlling’ system will be effectively institutionalised.  
Four other PES organizations (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the Walloon regional 
PES, FOREM, in Belgium) have adopted elements of MBO, especially elements of  
the EU employment policy guidelines and in the framework of the annual national 
action plans. However, the reliance on ex ante quantitative targets is selective and/or 
there is no clear evidence that they actually play a central role in steering and 
controlling the performance of PES operating units.  
Thus in Spain a system with some features of performance management was 
introduced in 1994 in the context of broader labour market reforms. The goals, opera-
tional objectives and indicators were originally formulated in an annual programme 
contract (‘contratos programa’) between the INEM, the public employment service, 
and the labour ministry. Since 1998 the Spanish National Action Plan for Employ-
ment submitted to the European Commission has become the central planning 
document. In addition to general priorities, the 1999 NAP specifies quantitative tar-
gets for the number of participants and target groups for the various types of labour 
market measures, especially the long-term unemployed, youth, and women. The EU 
employment policy process and guidelines appear to be particularly important in the 
Spanish national planning system, which is probably related to the high relative im-
portance of EU-financed programs in Spain. The extent to which the goals and 
indicators enumerated are actually the institutionalised basis for a target oriented 
management system with corresponding controlling and assessment remains un-
clear. 
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In Portugal too labour market policy is formulated in terms of goals and 
operational objectives but the use of ex ante quantitative targets appears to be 
largely limited to the adoption of the endorsement the EU employment policy 
guidelines (see Portuguese national action plan for numerous quantitative targets.) In 
many cases, however, priorities and objectives are formulated without indicators 
and/or quantitative targets. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether there is an 
institutionalised PES management system for co-ordinating and controlling of PES 
based on ex ante targets. (See annual „Plan of Activities“).  
In Ireland there is no PES-wide MBO- system with quantitative targets for the 
FAS and its subordinate units. „Performance indicators“ are used in assessing FAS 
organizational performance (see Annual Report), but - based on the limited 
information available - they do not yet appear to be integrated in a comprehensive 
management information and controlling system focused on ex ante operational 
targets. Nevertheless, there is what might be called a programme-specific use of this 
type of management tool in the area of labour market policy for the long-term 
unemployed (Action Plan for the Long-term Unemployed).  
Finally, in the Walloon region of Belgium (FOREM) a multi-annual management 
contract (contrat de gestion) for 1996-99 concluded between the Walloon govern-
ment and the FOREM defines a number of general goals, some of which are 
formulated as quantitative operational targets, e.g. a success rate for filling the regis-
tered vacancies or the time volume of training and educational courses (see Rapport 
d’Activité du FOREM 1997). Other targets stress quality of services, in particular 
customer satisfaction. However, like in Portugal and Spain, there is no clear evidence 
that there is a fully institutionalised management system in which regional and local 
operating units are directed and controlled based on ex ante quantitative targets. 
(See objectives 97 as given in Rapport d’Activites du FOREM 1998, p.3). FOREM 
now has plans to introduce a comprehensive system of management by objectives in 
the near future. 
The Brussels regional PES (ORBEM) has in the past attempted to introduce 
MBO. The attempt failed due to the lack of adequate monitoring system for 
performance data. ORBEM plans to introduce MBO again at the end of 2001, 
probably on the basis of a ‘balanced score card’ approach. The Italian public 
employment service (Servizi Publici per l’Impiego) is currently undergoing a 
fundamental transformation the central element of which is a  far-reaching 
decentralization of responsibility to the 20 Italian regions (together with a parallel 
integration of most labour market services in modernized “employment centres“). 
Since implementation of labour market policy is primarily a regional and provincial 
responsibility MBO-type management systems may be introduced at this level in the 
future (citation). Finally, Greece and Luxembourg have not yet moved toward MBO, 
relying on more traditional PES management systems. 
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There is no clear pattern to the spread of MBO-type management system, 
except that it is found predominantly in northern European and Scandinavian 
countries. There is, for example, no correspondence between the existence of 
management by objectives in a PES and tripartite self-administration in the 
organization of labour market policy. Although 4 countries with this traditional model 
based on ‘social partnership’ (Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, and France) use 
MBO in their PES management systems, five other ‘ministerial’ implementation 
structures (Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain) also use MBO in 
their PES organizations. In the later countries the necessary relative independence of 
the PES from the political level is institutionalised in some type of ‘agency model’. 
Date of Introduction 
The introduction of performance management in EU PES organizations has been a 
consistent trend since the mid-1980s (see Survey Question 1). The dates for 
individual countries reported in Table 1 based on our survey results are only 
indicative since MBO has undergone a process of development in all countries and in 
the early phases was not always effectively institutionalised. For example, although 
Sweden first introduced management by objectives in its PES in 1984, it had only 
limited impact because there were neither quantified target levels nor performance 
incentives. This situation changed only in 1997 when controlling was decisively 
improved and, most importantly, target levels were introduced. Similarly, in France 
performance contracts (‘Contrat de Progrès’) have been used to regulate the rela-
tionship between the government and ANPE since 1990 in which ANPE, the French 
PES, obligates itself to achieve the goals set forth in the contract and the state under-
takes to make the necessary financial resources available. However, MBO was 
meaningfully established within ANPE only with the establishment of a central 
controlling unit (direction du controle de gestion) in 1995.13  
                                            
13  Expert interviews in France and Sweden. 
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Table 1: Existence of MBO and year of introduction  
 
Country Existence of MBO and year of introduction 
Austria Yes , since 1995 
B-Forem No 
B-Orbem No 
B-VDAB Yes, since 1985 
Denmark Yes, since 1994 
Finland Yes, since 1992 
France Yes, since 1990 
Germany Yes, since 1998 
Great Britain Yes, since 1991 
Greece No 
Ireland Only some elements, since 1998 
Italy No 
Luxembourg No 
Netherlands Yes, since 1991  
Norway Yes, since 1987 
Portugal Only some elements, since 1990 
Spain Only some elements, since 1994 
Sweden Yes, since 1997 
Source: Question 1 in Appendix B. Questionnaire responses have been adjusted to reflect further 
other information collected as discussed in text. 
Scope 
MBO as a strategic management tool must be applied to all types of PES services, 
which is confirmed by the reported practice in EU PES organizations with such sys-
tems.14 However in some transitional PES organizations the use of quantitative tar-
gets tends to be limited to a few performance dimensions (Spain, Portugal) or 
specific programmes (Ireland).  
Reasons for Introducing MBO 
For most PES organizations the regulation of the relationship between PES and the 
ministerial level was a principal reason for the introduction of MBO (A, B-Flanders, 
Dk, F, N, NL, S, GB; Question 3). In most of these countries a formal agency-type 
                                            
14  In the French response MBO is limited to the types of services for which ANPE is responsible, 
primarily placement and related activities.  
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agreement is concluded between PES and the government or ministerial level (F, 
GB, NL, B-Flanders) but not in Denmark, Austria, or Sweden. By contrast, regulation 
of the relationship between the ministerial level and the PES was not an important 
consideration in Germany or Finland, which also lack such high-level performance 
agreements.  
The other most frequently reported reason related to relations to regional and 
local offices. Eight PES organizations with MBO systems cited „improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of regional and local offices“ as a principal reason (A, B-
Flanders, D, F, Fin, N, NL,S; Question 3). Seven countries cited „granting local 
offices greater freedom to adapt programmes to local needs“ (A, B-Flanders, D, DK, 
F, Fin, N), apparently seeing no conflict between these objectives. Interestingly, the 
Netherlands Sweden and GB reported no connection between decentralization in this 
sense (adaptation to local needs) and the introduction of MBO.15   
In general, the MBO concept has somewhat ambiguous implications for 
decentralization. It can be an instrument of improved central steering in an agency 
frame – not, incidentally, the PES-ministerial relationship was the principal and only 
reason for MBO reported for Great Britain; it may also be used in the context of a 
more decentralized and participatory management model. Thus the 1994 Danish 
reforms aimed at achieving a more decentralised organization of the labour market 
policy with a „regional anchorage.“ At the same time the influence of the social 
partners and the municipalities was increased through their participation in the 
regional labour market boards.  
Eight of the ten PES organizations reported that the introduction of the MBO-type 
management system was accompanied by decentralization and increased policy dis-
cretion for regional and local PES offices (A, B-F, D, DK, F, Fin, N, S), whereas only 
the Netherlands and Great Britain reported that this was not the case (Q12). When 
asked to detail the form increased decentralization had taken, eight countries men-
tioned increased budget flexibility for regional or local PES offices (A, B-F, D, DK, F, 
Fin, N, S). Six mentioned a reduction in detailed rules and procedures regulating the 
actions of local PES offices (A, D, DK, Fin, N, S), which was not the case in B-F or F, 
and five reported decentralization in the form of increased local discretion over 
programme (A, B-F, DK, F, N). Thus three PES organizations Austria, Denmark, and 
Norway, which report movement in all three dimensions, appear to be the 
decentralization leaders among the MBO type systems, whereas the Netherlands 
and Great Britain report no connection between the introduction of MBO and 
decentralization. This result reflects our findings from research on Austria and 
Denmark, on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other, which appears to have 
one of the most centralized MBO-type PES management operations based on an 
agency model. This finding is at first sight surprising for the Netherlands, but the 
                                            
15 At least in the case of Sweden, the respondent to the questionnaire may be referring to the 
second half of the 1990s rather than to the initial introduction of MBO in the mid 1980s. Thus in 
the response to question 12 decentralization is said to be one result.  
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Dutch response apparently reflects the linkage between stronger emphasis on MBO 
and the re-centralization of the PES in the course of the 1997 reforms, which sharply 
curtailed the autonomy previously enjoyed by regional PES offices. 
2. PES goals and operational objectives: similarities and differences 
This section compares and contrasts the goals, operational objectives, and 
quantitative targets in EU PES organizations with an MBO-type management system. 
Of particular interest here is inter alia the actual priorities set by EU PES organiza-
tions and how they are operationalised in terms of quantitative targets; the degree of 
convergence among EU PES organizations in the goals, objectives, and targets 
pursued, which might provide a common denominator for cross-national 
benchmarking of PES performance; the impact of EU labour market policy guide-
lines; the type of indicators chosen for defining quantitative targets. 
The principal sources for our survey are the performance agreements concluded 
between the PES and the ministerial level, annual business plans, and controlling 
reports. These documents were not always available or not available in one of our 
working languages (English, French, German), in which cases we rely in particular on 
the responses to our project questionnaire as well as interviews and other secondary 
material available to us. As a rule the information reported refers to the current 
period, i.e. 1999 or 2000. Our aim was to achieve a representative snapshot.  
Moreover, it should be noted at the outset that there is no clearly established 
usage in English for the terms goals, operational objectives, and quantitative targets 
and in the multi-lingual European context there is even more variation in usage. In 
general ’goals’ refer to very broad strategic orientations whereas ‘objectives’ 
represent more specific operational emphasis. While ‘targets’, the most distinctive 
element in MBO systems, are quantitative guidelines based on agreed indicators 
which are formulated ex ante to steer PES performance and set priorities as well as 
in ex post assessment of the performance of the PES organization as a whole and of 
its individual operating units. 
Table 2 groups the goal statements of the 10 MBO-based PES organizations in 
terms of a number of synthetic categories: 1) combating social exclusion; 2) improv-
ing labour market matching; 3) improving PES services; 4) combating youth unem-
ployment; 5) other miscellaneous goals.  (These analytical results are based on the 
text summary of the actual goals and operational targets of these MBO-based PES 
organizations reported in Appendix A.) At this very general level of formally ex-
pressed PES policy goals there is a clear convergence on two dimensions: (1) com-
bating social exclusion and (2) improving the functioning of the labour market. Im-
proving PES services and combating youth unemployment are also given special 
priority by several PES organizations. Under the broad heading of social exclusion, 
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the actual forms emphasized vary considerably, with long-term unemployment being 
the most general concern; in some countries minorities, women, the disabled, or 
older workers are a special concern.  
Table 3 presents a synthetic summary of the actual operational objectives 
(quantitative targets) grouped by broader PES goals currently in use in the 10 EU 
PES organizations with MBO-type management systems. In contrast to these in 
some cases merely verbal goal commitments, this inventory of operational objectives 
summarizes the criteria in terms of which these PES organizations assess the per-
formance of the organization as a whole and of individual operating units.  
Thematically, these operational objectives (targets) reflect of course the 
predominance of the same four goals noted in the goal statements: 1) combating 
social exclusion; 2) improving labour market matching; 3) improving PES services; 4) 
combating youth unemployment. Under social exclusion there is a strong 
convergence on targets related to long-term unemployment, although the actual type 
of performance indicator used is very diverse. Although not shown in this section of 
the table, Great Britain has as a functional equivalent a very strong target groups 
orientation in the provision of placement services. The strong emphasis on combat-
ing long-term unemployment may reflect the influence of EU employment policy 
guidelines on national PES organizations, although only one organization in the 
Flanders region of Belgium actually explicitly adopts the EU guideline. In other policy 
areas, five of the ten PES organizations compared use placement levels and four use 
labour market indicators of youth unemployment as a performance indicator. The 
actual convergence in operational indicators is otherwise very low. This may indicate 
strong national differences in priorities, but it may also be a result of the fact that 
operational objectives reflect not only PES goals but also areas of activity in which 
the PES management (and government) see a need for improved performance; 
operational objectives may never be included or may be dropped because 
management regards current performance as satisfactory.    
It should be noted parenthetically that in this as in other cases the concrete 
definitions of the indicators used are extremely diverse because they are based on 
national administrative data sources and we have therefore not included them in our 
analysis. This means that even where there is broad agreement among the member 
states on goals and operational objectives the underlying indicators used are in most 
cases so diverse that cross-national comparison is not possible. 
Characteristics of operational objectives (targets) 
Table 4 summarizes a number of characteristics of the operational objectives (tar-
gets) reported in Table 3. First, MBO in PES management systems is based on a 
relatively small number of targets, usually between 8 and 10. This is because a larger 
number tends to be counterproductive: targets compete for organizational attention 
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and resources and the use of too many targets dilutes their impact as an orientation 
for the activities of individuals and operating units. In almost all PES organizations 
objectives and targets are formulated at the national level, with varying degrees of 
involvement and influence being exercised by the regional levels of these 
organizations. Only in Austria and Denmark do the regions play a special role in 
setting PES targets. In Austria 2 regional targets supplement the 8 national opera-
tional objectives,16 whereas in Denmark the goals and objectives are agreed at the 
national level but the actual targets are, in many cases, set at the regional level. 
Differences in the range and distribution of PES operational objectives reported 
in Table 3 also reflect national differences in the types of activity for which the PES is 
responsible. Thus the German PES is also responsible for placing youth in 
apprenticeship positions and for combating illegal employment as well as for admin-
istering unemployment benefits and uses operative objectives to control performance 
in these areas too. Although the PES has comprehensive responsibility for the main 
functions of labour market policy (placement, management of active programmes, 
benefit administration) in many countries (Austria, Germany, Norway), this is not 
always the case. In Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
separate agencies are responsible for the administration of unemployment benefits. 
In Great Britain the PES is primarily responsible for placement (and in the future for 
benefit administration) but not for active programs whereas ANPE in France is 
primarily responsible only for placement services. 
In almost all cases the performance targets are based on information available 
from local administrative data, which makes it possible to produce real-time data on 
local performance. In many cases absolute figures from process data (e.g. number of 
registered vacancies) are more transparent for local officials than are percentages. 
More sophisticated indicators that require special surveys (e.g. customer satisfaction 
surveys) or other data not available from local process data (e.g. market share) are 
by contrast only available at infrequent intervals and with a considerable time lag. 
MBO systems use a mixture of labour market indicators (the true objectives), place-
ment and programme indicators, including process indicators. In a surprising number 
of cases indicators on programme outcomes as well as uptake are used.  
All but two PES organizations (N, NL) report that their targets have changed in 
comparison with the previous planning period (see Question 5). The pattern of 
change is, however, incremental as existing targets are adjusted to take into account 
shifts in government priorities (e.g. GB, Fin, VDAB) or to changes in labour market 
conditions. Changes in the levels at which targets are set (in contrast to the objective 
itself) are of course a regular part of the policy process as are adjustments in the 
definition of indicators (Sweden).  
                                            
16  More precisely: 1 ‘Land’ and 1 ‘regional’ target. 
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When asked to name indicators that had proved ‘most useful’ (see Question 7) 
PES organizations emphasized that they should be ‘related to areas of real influence’ 
and ‘concrete and measurable’ and not be based merely on quantity of services’ 
(DK); that they be ‘simple measures (that are) easy to communicate’ (S); that they be 
‘quickly available and understandable’ derived from administrative data (GB); that 
they be ‘immediately comprehensible and well accepted.’ Some noted major prob-
lems in finding acceptable and understandable indicators. Among the ‘least useful’ 
mentioned are: purely quantitative targets (Fin); indicators sensitive to other factors 
(outside control of PES; DK); simple outflow objectives (because of danger of 
creaming: VDAB).  
3. Process of formulation of goals, operational objectives, and 
targets 
In all MBO systems the specification of operational objectives, targets, and indicators 
is the subject of a formal agreement (see Question 11), in most cases between the 
PES and the ministerial or higher governmental level. The existence of such an 
agreement is one of the key characteristics of MBO systems, in addition to a 
corresponding controlling process and report. In Austria and Germany, countries with 
formally self-governing PES organizations, the national agreements are concluded by 
their tripartite Administrative Councils, in which the Ministry is represented. In several 
PES organizations (A, B-VDAB, D, F), the MBO planning process is reported to be 
part of a process of multi-annual or medium term planning (Q6). This is not the case 
in DK, FIN, N, NL, S, and GB where the planning process is on a purely annual 
basis.  
All PES organizations face the task of allocating national targets to subordinate 
levels of the organization. In allocating targets to their subordinate units, in most 
countries on the basis of a national formula, all PES organizations give attention to 
the circumstances at the regional and local levels, especially labour market 
conditions and past performance (see Question 13). Past performance (e.g. previous 
year) is used on the grounds that it is usually not realistic to expect large leaps in 
performance, for example in Great Britain a 5% ‘limiter’ is used. In Austria, Denmark, 
and Germany regional target levels are agreed in a decentralized procedure rather 
than being assigned on the basis of a national formula.  
The establishment of national targets and assignments to the regions in the MBO 
planning cycle are based on data and estimates about the labour market situation 
from the previous year. All PES organizations with MBO-systems thus face the 
problem of whether target levels should be adjusted to respond to unanticipated la-
bour market changes, which might make the agreed target levels unattainable (or, 
alternatively, too easy). The ideal target in an MBO-system would seem to be a 
‘stretching target’, i.e. one that induces a maximum effort but is attainable and per-
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ceived as being ‘fair’ in terms of the resources available and the labour market situa-
tion. Nevertheless, only three countries (Fin, NL, N) report that they adjust opera-
tional targets during the MBO-cycle to take account of such changes (see Question 
14). Other countries apparently respond to such changes only by taking them into 
account in the stage of performance assessment. 
The annual (or in some countries multi-annual) MBO planning cycle is sensitive 
not only to unanticipated changes in the economic and labour market context but 
also to short-term shifts in government policy that may be disruptive for 
implementation process. For example, new ministers or new governments or the 
prospect of an upcoming election may introduce unexpected policy changes. Four 
survey responses suggest that this is frequently a problem: Four of 10 MBO-based 
PES organizations reported having experienced such problems (B- VDAB, D, NL, 
GB; see Question 15).  
Another key element of MBO-type systems is the management information or 
monitoring system. Without comprehensive and timely data that permits ‘real time’ 
controlling of organizational performance, MBO cannot be an effective instrument of 
‘hands-on’ management and systematic performance assessment. All PES organi-
zations report full coverage of targets, an essential prerequisite (Question 16). How-
ever only 6 PES organizations (B-VDAB, D, F, S, GB) report that their management 
information system report progress toward targets on a monthly basis, which would 
seem to be a minimum for ‘real time’ intervention. In four others this information is 
reported on a quarterly basis (DK, Fin, NL, N; see Question 17). 
All management information systems are computerized, although sometimes it is 
necessary to resort to additional administrative records; especially to response to 
changes in the definition of targets (e.g. in GB; see Question 18/19). Moreover, all 10 
MBO-systems report that monitoring data on progress toward targets is available at 
all levels of the organization.  By contrast the integration of performance data with 
cost controlling that would enable expenditure to be related to service outputs at the 
regional and local level is reported in only two countries (A; NL). The integration of 
performance data with data on costs would seem to be the next frontier in manage-
ment information systems, which would enable PES organizations to systematically 
control efficiency as well as performance.  
All countries with MBO-type PES management systems except Finland report 
using the monitoring system as an early warning system leading to policy intervention 
in case of underperformance (see Question 21). The most frequent kind of 
intervention reported is increasing funding to under performing units or reallocating  
funding to units able to better utilize resources in achieving. Since the management 
information system in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway also provides only 
quarterly reports (see Question 17), the potential for using it as an early warning 
system would appear to be limited. Furthermore, all countries report that the MBO 
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system includes an obligatory stage of performance assessment on the basis of the 
final results for performance against targets (see Question 22).17  
The MBO-type management system entails, as a rule, not only performance 
assessment but also consequences in some form for individuals and operating units. 
The actual practical consequences reported in response to the questionnaire are 
quite diverse (see Question 25). The most frequent response (A, B-VDAB, Fin, F, 
GB) is bonuses for successful work units, and three countries also report using 
individual based performance pay (F, NL, GB). The other most frequent type of 
practical consequence reported is the use of non-monetary achievement awards (A, 
B-VDAB, D, GB). It should be noted that some countries use more than one 
response to good performance. France uses both individual performance based pay 
and bonuses for work units; Austria and the Flanders region of Belgium report using 
both bonuses for work units as well as non-monetary achievement awards and Great 
Britain employs all three main types of rewards reported. Surprisingly, both Norway 
and Sweden report that there are no specific consequences at all for good or bad 
local PES office performance (!).  
In all MBO-type systems the results of performance assessment are publicized 
throughout the organization and in most cases are available to the press and public, 
except in Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden (see Question 26).  All MBO-type 
organizations report undertaking systematic efforts to identify, publicize, and transfer 
‘best practice’ between the subordinate units of their organizations, except Finland 
and France (see Question 27).  
                                            
17  Even though the German answer to question 22 was ‘no’, the stage of performance assessment 
is mentioned and described in the answer to question 10.  
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Table 2: PES Organizational Goals in 10 MBO-based management systems, 
1999-2000 
 A B-F DK FIN F NL N D S GB 
 
1. Combating social exclusion 
 
 
A 
   
FIN 
 
F 
     
 
Long-term unemployment 
 
 
A 
 
B-F 
 
DK 
 
FIN 
 
F 
 
NL 
 
N 
 
D 
 
S 
 
GB 
 
Minorities 
 
    
FIN 
  
NL 
    
 
Disabled 
 
 
A 
 
      
N 
   
GB 
 
Women 
 
 
A 
     
NL 
  
D 
  
 
Older 
 
 
A 
  
DK 
       
 
Irregular employment 
 
         
S 
 
 
Employability 
 
  
B-F 
 
  
FIN 
      
GB 
 
 
2. Improving labour market 
matching 
 
 
A 
  
DK 
 
FIN 
 
F 
 
NL 
 
N 
 
D 
 
S 
 
GB 
 
 
3. Improving PES services 
 
 
A 
 
B-F 
 
 
DK 
  
F 
 
NL 
 
N 
 
D 
  
GB 
 
 
4. Combating youth 
unemployment 
 
 
A 
 
B-F 
   
F 
   
D 
  
 
 
5. Other 
 
          
 
Support structural change 
 
 
A 
   
FIN 
      
 
Combating illegal employment 
 
 
 
       
D 
  
 
General labour market goals 
 
    
FIN 
    
 
 
S 
 
Note: Classification of declared general PES goals based on information from documentation and 
questionnaire results summarized in Appendix A. The table is meant to provide only a general 
overview of the distribution of formal organizational goals in the 1999-2000 period.  
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Table 3:  PES operational objectives in 10 MBO-based management systems, 
2000 
Objectives Target definition A B-F DK FIN F NL N D S GB 
1. Combating social exclusion 
Long-term 
unemployed 
(reduce) flows into long-term unemployed A       D   
 Reduce number very long-term unemployed     F    S  
 Exits from long-term unemployment     F      
 (Reduce) number long-term unemployed    FIN   N  S  
 Flow long-term unemployed into work A       D   
 EU guideline: adult job offer>12m  B-F         
 Uptake of special measures   DK  F  N    
 Reintegration number through special measure     F      
Disabled Stock unemployed handicapped in measures A      N    
 Stock occupationally disabled or handicapped in special 
measures 
      N  S  
Women / Gender Flow unemployment women into employment after 
qualification 
A          
 Placements w/m into part-time jobs (>7 days)        D   
 Placements of labour market re-entrants        D   
Older persons Flow older unemployed into employment A          
 Lowering unemployment rate of older workers   DK        
2. Improving labour market matching 
Levels Placements A B-F   F NL N   GB 
 Number of counselling services     F      
 Registered vacancies    DK  F      
 Vacancies filled A          
 Vacancy fill rate      F  N D   
 Market share      NL     
 ALMP entrants       N    
 ALMP participants = 20% (EU-guideline)  B-F         
 Training referrals     F      
Clientele Long-term unemployed % placements          GB 
 Personal action plan for all long-term unemployed         S  
 Very long-term unemployed placements     F     GB 
 Placements of disabled unemployed          GB 
 Placements of lone parent program participants into work          GB 
 Placements youth program participants          GB 
 Target group share of referrals to jobs   DK   NL     
Market segment Temporary job placements       N    
 High end vacancies filled     F      
 Interregional placement A          
 Vacancies registered by new employer-customers   DK        
 Share of regionally oriented employment action plans   DK        
Process Duration of vacancies   DK FIN       
 Response time for referral to vacancies      NL   S  
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Objectives Target definition A B-F DK FIN F NL N D S GB 
3. Improving PES services 
 Processing time for applications A*       D   
 Processing Time unemployment benefits       N    
 Correct procedures in benefit administration          GB 
 Customer service delivery rate          GB 
 Post intervention outcome rates for activated persons   DK   NL     
 Effectiveness training/post programme status    FIN     S  
 Cap on subsidisation rate for wage subsidies         S  
 Employer satisfaction rate      NL     
 Jobseekers satisfaction rate      NL     
 Existence of initiatives for the disadvantaged   DK        
4. Combating youth unemployment 
 Number unemployed youth       N    
 (Reduce) youth flow into long-term unemployment (#) A       D   
 Reduction long-term unemployment youth     F      
 Entrants into youth programme  B-F         
 EU guideline: youth offer>6 m  B-F       S  
 Registered apprenticeship offers (#)        D   
 Flow into apprenticeships (#)        D   
5. Other Workplace controls (#)        D   
Source: Based on info from PES documentation and questionnaire results summarized in Appendix 
A. Note*: 1999 still in use, 2000 dropped. 
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Table 4: Target characteristics in 10 MBO-based PES management systems 
 A B-F DK FIN F NL N D S GB 
 
PES Level of target definition / setting 
          
 
National targets 
 
 
8 
 
4 
 
10 
 
4 
 
11 
 
7 
 
11 
 
10 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Regional targets 
 
 
2 
       
2 
  
 
Regional target levels 
 
 
10 
  
4 
 
4 
    
12 
  
 
 
Target type (national targets only) 
 
8 
 
4 
 
10 
 
4 
 
11 
 
7 
 
11 
 
10 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Placement-related/ levels 
 
 
2 
  
1 
  
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
  
1 
 
Placement-related/ clientele 
 
   
2 
  
1 
 
1 
  
2 
  
5 
 
Placement-related/ process 
 
   
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
Other process indicators 
 
 
 
  
1 
   
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
Programme uptake/ services provided 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
  
3 
 
 
 
3 
  
1 
 
 
ALMP uptake 
 
  
3 
     
 
  
2 
 
 
ALMP clientele 
 
       
 
   
 
Programme outcomes 
 
 
1 
  
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
  
1 
 
 
Labour market indicators 
 
 
4 
  
1 
 
1 
 
3 
  
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
Expressed in absolute numbers / local admin. data 
 
 
8 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
9 
 
1 
 
8 
 
7 
 
5 
 
6 
 
Expressed in percentages / local admin. data 
 
  
3 
 
9 
 
3 
 
2 
 
6 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
Source: Based on information from PES documentation and questionnaire results summarized in 
Appendix A. 
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Part III: Country Case Studies 
This section describes and analyses the performance management systems of four 
countries that were the object of more depth case studies, including expert interviews 
at various levels of the PES organizations concerned.  
1. Austria: PES performance management profile 
1.1 The organizational context 
Labour market policy in Austria is based on the Austrian variant of corporatism 
(‘Social Partnership-Model’) and a strong PES organization. The Arbeitsmarktservice 
(AMS, Labour Market Service) integrates the three main functions of job placement, 
active measures and administration of unemployment benefits. The AMS (set-up in 
1994) is an independent, self-governing ‘service enterprise’ under public law and 
comprises a national headquarter, 9 Federal States offices (Land offices), 95 regional 
offices18 plus 13 branch offices and 50 career information centres. The AMS bears 
the main responsibility for design and implementation of labour market policy (and 
not the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs; BMAGS), which is reinforced by 
its institutional autonomy from the Ministry. In addition to framing the general policy 
goals and guidelines of employment and labour market policy, the Ministry confines 
its role in labour market policy mainly to supervision and evaluation of the AMS. The 
AMS began early to develop a goal-oriented performance management system, 
which is still under continuous development. Noteworthy too: the AMS-reform (1994) 
also entailed the transfer of not less than 11 tasks (previously carried out by the 
labour administration) to other organizations in order to enable the newly-established 
AMS to concentrate on the core tasks of labour market policies (see inforMISEP no. 
49, pp. 5-6).19 
1.2 The AMS performance management approach 
The performance management approach of the AMS can be best characterised as 
‘strategic management’, since it exhibits a medium-term goal perspective, the 
management of its operational activities (MBO of the various sub-policies) is co-
ordinated in an integrative manner (‘Controlling’), and there seems to be consider-
                                            
18  In the context of this study, the PES offices of the Austrian Federal States (Länder) are either 
termed ‘Land offices’ or ‘regional’ offices. The employment offices below this intermediate level 
are termed ‘local’ PES, although they are called regional offices in Austria. However, for 
international comparison, our terminology seems to be more useful, as it uses the same 
descriptive labels for equivalent institutions or organizational levels in different countries. 
19 Legalization of private placement agencies was co-incidental with the AMS reform.  
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able scope for policy discretion for the decentral units, in particular the nine Land 
organizations.  
The ‘strategic’ orientation has been recently reinforced: Now the annual MBO-
cycle of the AMS has to reflect not only the goals of the Ministry and the medium-
term plan of the AMS, but also closely co-ordinated with the Austrian National Action 
Plan as well as the ESF planning (see inforMISEP No. 65: 9-10; No. 66: 9-11). The 
medium-term AMS goals (97-99 resp. 99-2002) constitute the framework on which 
the annual plans have to be based.  
The MBO process in the AMS is in fact relatively centralised, although in the first 
years the MBO-system tried to follow the principles of the co-operative ‘counter-
stream approach’ (Gegenstromverfahren), which represents a combination of ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ planning. In practice, this was not feasible, and there is now 
little room left for bottom-up inputs, given the strong determination of goals and tar-
gets through the ‘concerted’ medium-term plans (see above). 
Service and customer orientation is an important principle of the AMS activities 
and performance management, although the development of a quality management 
system applying the TQM-EFQM-standards is a recent development (inforMISEP 
67/68: 32-33).20 The latest innovation is the introduction of a Client Monitoring System 
(CMS), which surveys the customer opinion regarding the defined quality standards 
immediately after receiving or utilising a particular AMS service and not, which was 
the case in the previous customer satisfaction surveys, only after a ‘completed 
service’. 
Moreover, it has to be emphasised that the Austrian performance management 
approach is still in flux (‘systems-development’). For instance, benchmarking of AMS 
activities is under way: ‘Good practices’ in regional PES offices are currently being 
identified and the introduction of ‘regional model offices’ is in preparation. Probably 
the most important development is, however, in the principles of the performance 
management system as a whole: It is currently being discussed and planned to intro-
duce a so-called ‘Comprehensive Controlling System’ (Gesamtsteuerungssystem), 
which is more complex and comprehensive than the labour market targets of the 
MBO-system.  
The MBO-system as implemented since the mid 1990s, is now regarded as 
being too ‘biased’ or dominated by the goals and targets of one activity area, the 
‘counselling and placement service’ (Beratungs- und Vermittlungsservice, BVS). In 
order to lessen its dominance and to give more emphasis to the targets of the other 
activity areas, the new comprehensive system is to include also (inner-) 
organizational targets which may relate to results and processes alike. By reducing 
                                            
20  Model-like implementation of such a quality management model can be, however, traced back to 
1995 (see Buchinger 1998). 
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the dominance of labour market policy objectives (in the narrow sense) in the target 
structure of the performance management system, it is expected and hoped to in-
crease the acceptance and ‘anchoring’ of MBO in other specialised departments (e.g. 
personnel, public relations, purchase). By providing own sub-target targets to these 
departments, the responsibilities for target attainment should become clearer and 
more transparent than before. In other words, activity-related targets are to be 
integrated into the annual targets (of the AMS-MBO system), regardless of target 
levels to be achieved.  
At this preliminary stage of planning, to include three types of targets are being 
considered for inclusion in the new MBO-system: 
- labour market policy targets (definition/ planning as before) 
- organizational targets related to main activity areas of the AMS (i.e. services for 
jobseekers, services for employers, services unemployment insurance, foreigners; 
to be defined by the units responsible) 
- organizational targets of the support-units (such as personnel, support administra-
tion, marketing etc.), as (either) supportive targets of the main LMP targets or as 
‘own’ targets. 
In addition, these targets of the various ‘business’ areas should be developed and 
structured according to four target pillars, which are business targets, customer tar-
gets, efficiency targets, management targets. 
After having defined all targets, the organizational responsibility for their 
implementation has to be clarified. As an organizational benchmark, each unit should 
not be responsible for more than seven targets. If this number is exceeded, the 
business and customer targets should have priority. Important: Within the structure of 
seven targets for each unit, all the targets have the same importance. The particular 
relevance of a target is expressed in the (quantitative) target level set in comparison 
with the levels previously attained.  
The successful operationalisation of targets is to be secured through concrete 
work programmes. Each organisational level of AMS (i.e. local and Land offices, or 
national head office) has to participate in the development of work programmes, 
target levels (Zielvorgaben) and concepts of controlling for implementation. These 
operationalisation processes will be integrated top-down, i.e. the national head will 
check the working programmes of the nine regions (Länder); and the Land offices 
examine the implementation concepts of their local offices. 
This new planning model aims at a much stronger inclusion of the specialised 
departments (Fachabteilungen) in the PES, since these were not only involved in 
developing the targets, but also responsible for the operative controlling of their 
respective business areas (e.g. counselling and placement units are responsible for 
controlling all targets related to jobseekers and employers). The previous central 
controlling units could then concentrate more strongly on co-ordination of the sub-
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systems, respectively the controlling of the whole goal and target system. Further 
changes of the new MBO conception notwithstanding, the ‘Comprehensive 
controlling system’ is to be fully implemented in the AMS in 2002. 
1.3 Inventory of goals, objectives and performance indicators21  
For the medium-term period 1999-2002, the Labour Ministry has defined the follow-
ing framework of goals22 (Zielvorgaben), relating to both the labour market and to the 
organizational development in the AMS: 
Labour market goals: 
- Prevention of youth unemployment (>6m) and support of disadvantaged youth. 
Until end of 2002 halving of entries into LTU of youth should be achieved. 
- Prevention of adult LTU (>12m) und support of elderly workers. Until end of 2002 
halving of entries into LTU should be achieved. 
- Support of women with special employment problems, in particular those returning 
to work 
- Improvement of qualifications of female job seekers 
- vocational rehabilitation of unemployed disabled people 
Organizational goals: 
Among other things, the organizational development of the AMS should serve to: 
- guarantee continuous ‘coaching’ (Betreuung) of firms/companies 
- comprehensive counselling plans that determine rights and duties between AMS 
and its customers 
- reinforced AMS-‘penetration’ into the labour market 
- extension of AMS services 
- utilisation of potentials for rationalisation (e.g. extension self-service, automati-
sation, streamlining of work organization) 
On the basis of these Ministerial goals, the AMS has defined the following (strategic) 
goals of labour market policy for the planning period 99-2002: 
- Promotion of equal opportunities as an overarching goal (EU-terminology: 
‘mainstreaming’ equal opportunities) 
                                            
21  If not stated otherwise, all information of this section is based on AMS Vorstand 1999. 
22  Initially, these goals trace back to goals defined in 1998. 
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- Prevention of social exclusion from the employment system 
- Optimisation of labour market matching 
- Optimal service delivery  
- Supporting the adaptability of the labour force to structural change 
In order to attain these goals, the AMS considers 5 (more general) management 
„strategies“ and various bundles of measures, the latter being concentrated on the 
years 1999/200023 (see Table 5). These strategies and measures refer all to the AMS 
activities and should thus not be confused with the annual objectives of the MBO-
system, which will be discussed below. 
                                            
23  These measures are in constant flux, i.e. they will be annually revised, extended and 
supplemented. 
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Table 5: Austrian Labour Market Service strategies and measures 99/2000 
 
Strategies Measures 
Build-up of a service organization 
with differentiated service offers 
according to customers segments 
- analysis of counselling and placement services in 
order to develop concepts for better services and 
resource utilisation 
- revision of the ‘service catalogue’ 
- development and quality assurance of ALMP 
instruments 
- improvement of information on vocational guidance 
and training 
Extension of self-services in all 
business areas for employers and 
employees 
- development Internet-services 
- set-up of data-base on further training 
Continuous organizational 
development/reinforcement of 
innovation and flexibility 
- set-up of a ‘information logistic system’ 
- development of management information system 
- development of working time models 
- further development of system of personnel’s 
development  
Implementation of a quality 
management system 
- based on model of TQM-EFQM (i.e. organizational 
self-assessment of activities, processes and results is 
to be introduced) 
- implementation of quality standards through regular 
‘clients monitoring’ 
Increasing transparency of costs 
and economy in all business 
areas 
- several rationalisation measures 
- further development of integrated cost accounting 
Source: AMS 1999  
In order to understand the AMS performance management system, the following 
points and premises should be noted: 
The medium term national goals (the AMS calls them also ‘strategic foci’/ ‘main 
points’) shall be kept constant, and the medium term goals represent the ‘menu’ for 
the selection of annual goals (or ‘annual foci’). Strategic and annual foci are being 
operationalised in (more or less) concrete objectives (referring to AMS activities), and 
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for each objective only one performance indicator is applied24. These performance 
indicators are used for quantifying the objectives for which performance agreements 
between the national headquarter (BGS) and each of the nine AMS Land Offices 
(LGS) are being settled. At this national stage, there is not any hierarchical order of 
goals and objectives, but the national goals/objectives are obligatory for the Land 
Offices (for more details on processes, see section 4 below). Table 6 integrates the 
medium-term and annual (1999) perspective, displaying goals, objectives and PI’s for 
both dimensions.  
                                            
24  In addition, ‘observation indicators’ are used as supplementary information source. 
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Table 6: Performance management in Austria (national level): Medium-term 
and annual strategic goals and objectives, 1999 
 
Strategic main goals Objectives/targets Indicators 
Prevention of social 
exclusion from the em-
ployment system 
 
• prevention LTU 
• bringing long-term unem-
ployed back into work 
• stabilisation of vocational 
rehabilitation on the 1997 
level 
∗ number of entries into LTU 
(>1y) 
∗ outflow from LTU (>1y) into 
work (absolute number) 
∗ average number of participants 
in vocational rehabilitation 
measures 
Supporting the adapt-
ability of the labour force 
to structural change 
• Raising the LM-chances of 
women through 
qualification 
∗ outflow of women into work 
after qualification measures 
∗ of those the share of which 
measures were longer than 3 
months 
Optimisation of labour 
market matching 
• maintenance of AMS 
utilisation 
∗ absolute number of registered 
vacancies 
 
• Improvement of use of the 
employment potential in 
Austria (inland) 
∗ successful placements in the 
tourist sector across the 
boundaries of the Federal 
States 
Optimal service delivery  
 
• immediate payments of 
benefits 
∗ number of undelivered 
application forms ready for 
payment at the 20th of the 
subsequent month 
Prevention of youth 
unemployment 
• Securing the integration of 
young people and 
registered apprenticeship 
seekers into labour 
markets and vocational 
training 
∗ number of youth (< 25y) 
entering long-term unemployed 
(> 6m), including registered 
apprenticeship seekers (>6m) 
Source: AMS Vorstand 1998, Tab. 5.2.3, p. 16.  
Notes: Shaded sections represent annual focus of 1999. As ‘mainstreaming equal opportunities’ is a 
cross-sectional goal, it is not explicitly displayed in any of the boxes above. 
The quantification of the indicators (in other words: the operationalisation of the 
target levels) is based on negotiations between the national head office and the nine 
Land Offices, embedded in the complex planning procedure as a whole (chap. 4). 
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Size and problem structures of the Länder (the Austrian Federal States) vary to some 
extent and so do, accordingly, the target levels for each state. The targets and 
targets levels are the basis for differentiated regional priorities that are worked out by 
the Land offices in co-operation with their regional offices. Moreover, in this context, 
each of the Land offices and also the regional employment offices have to define its 
own additional (Land or regional) target (see also chap 4). 
Target change  
Because of the medium-term and particular planning structure of the Austrian MBO-
system, the targets for the year 2000 do not differ fundamentally from 1999; only 
small changes and some rather subtle variations of the main emphases can be ob-
served. The only remarkable change: the target of immediate benefit payments 
(measured by undelivered application forms) is no longer used in 2000, because 
performance is now considered satisfactory. This continuity of the target structure is a 
striking feature of Austrian PES performance management.25  
The target achievement varies according to year, targets and across the regions 
(Länder). Some target levels aimed at seem to be very ambitious, others set as too 
low. For instance, in 1999, the target of women’s job entries after qualification meas-
ures was already exceeded in the third quarter.  
Lessons and Problems 
Some in the Austrian AMS argue that in the past too much weight was given to 
reaching the quantified targets, on the expense of process quality and customer 
satisfaction. Moreover, an overemphasis on placement and counselling targets and 
indicators was also an object of criticism in AMS. A number of responses to these 
observed shortcomings have been developed at different levels of the organization. 
At national level, as was already pointed out, a ‘comprehensive controlling system’ 
(Gesamtsteuerungssystem) shall replace very soon the results- and place-
ment/counselling-biased MBO-system. Furthermore, since 1999, process-related 
targets and indicators for the main policy area ‘counselling and placement’ were 
concluded in consensus between the respective units of the National and the nine 
Land PES offices (see Table 7). Finally, experiments with more comprehensive 
                                            
25  This can be also confirmed by ‘looking back’: In 1997 (before implementing the 97-99 multi-
annual plan),the now strategic, medium-term goals were already applied as annual objectives. 
The quantified indicators included (AMS Geschäftsbericht 1997: 8): Number of registered 
vacancies; participants in training measures; bringing the long-term unemployed back to work; 
integration of social assistance beneficiaries in the employment system; integration of women 
returning to work; prevention of LTU (adults: >1y; youth: > 6m); integration of apprenticeship 
seekers in employment system; immediate filling of vacancies; reduction of delayed payments. 
38 
management approaches can be found in the Federal States (for instance the 
Balanced Score Card model in Upper Austria, see section 1.6 for details). 
Table 7: Agreed AMS process targets in the area of ‘counselling and 
placement services’**  
(Beratungs- und Vermittlungsdienstleistungen) 
 
Services for jobseeking persons:  
1. Improving the setting and complying with customer datings 
2. Intensified, continuous contact with persons at risk of becoming long-term unemployed 
3. Guaranteeing necessary counselling services and quality of counselling for persons at 
risk of becoming long-term unemployed and long-term unemployed persons 
4. Improved processing and securing of placement-relevant data in order to increase 
placement efficiency 
Services for employers: 
1. Intensification of personal contacts with employers 
2. Improved compliance to agreements with employers 
3. Intensified co-operation with employers regarding vacancy filling and apprenticeships 
4. Improving the accuracy of placement attempts by AMS 
Source: Internal document provided by the BGS-AMS. ** Due to sometimes very technical 
definitions, the related indicators are not presented here. 
Some of the targets and indicators based on the National Action Plan/European Em-
ployment Strategy have been also intensively debated in the AMS. A (relatively) ‘hot’ 
and particular controversy relates to long-term unemployment (LTU): Some voices 
argue that it was contradictory to have the target ‘preventing the entry in LTU’ on the 
one hand, and on the other hand the target ‘reduction of LTU stock’. The possible 
perverse effect: In order to get good results in reducing LTU stocks, the officer had to 
allow the entry into LTU - instead of placing them into a job or measure. In other 
words: A registered person would not get a treatment before she/he entered LTU. 
However, different voices in the AMS reject this point of view; for them these targets 
are just complimentary rather than contradictory. If relevant at all, the ‘perverse’ effect 
is in their opinion very small.  
When major shortcomings of indicators are identified, they may be abolished. 
For instance, the former target ‘Increasing the labour market chances of women with 
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limited mobility’ led initially to different interpretations of the criteria ‘limited mobility’, 
and a considerable increase in the number of persons in this target group in admin-
istrative records. When the statistics reported a higher rate of job entries (after pro-
gramme treatment) for women with ‘limited mobility’ than those without this indicator 
was abolished. Another example of an unsuitable indicator: The definition ‘average 
number (stock) of benefit recipients at day x’ induced short-term activities, but not 
efforts for (durable) labour market integration (Q8). 
1.4 Process analysis: definition and implementation of policy goals, objectives 
and indicators 
As in the Scandinavian countries (Niklasson and Tomsmark 1997), the planning 
process of the MBO-system in Austria is rather complex and takes itself almost about 
a year (for the successive year), including the preparatory stages (hereafter: Wilk and 
Galehr 1999; Galehr and Haider 2000). In short, the whole national planning process 
is organised by a working group comprising delegates (‘planning co-ordinators) from 
the PES head office and all Land offices, plus one delegate from the Ministry. This 
working group is mainly responsible for reflecting (assessment) on the past year, 
preparation and development of the contents of the targets as well as their (later) 
quantification. The preliminary results or working proposals of the planning group are 
then submitted to, discussed and co-ordinated with the various decision makers 
involved; i.e. - depending on the planning step - the AMS Board (Vorstand), the AMS 
Administrative Council (Verwaltungsrat), the (conference of) directors of the PES 
Land offices (Landesgeschäftsführer), and since 1999, the ‘strategy committee’ (see 
below). 
The first decisive stage of the planning process takes place in an initial meeting 
of the ‘planning working group’ in spring at which the contents of the (quantifiable) 
objectives are prepared, based on an assessment of the the experience and results 
of the previous year(s)26 and on the relevant planning framework and documents (see 
chap. 2). Until 1998, the conclusions of the working group were then communicated 
to the executive managers of the LGS as well as the AMS Board (Vorstand), and the 
Board had to give an immediate feedback concerning the objectives proposed. In late 
summer, at a second meeting of the planning work group, the contents and the trend 
estimates of the objectives were discussed in detail, bringing about finally a 
conclusion (or: consensus) on the possible benchmarks (target level) for the 
objectives. This proposal was submitted to the AMS Board, which, in turn, came to a 
conclusion on the target levels. The Board’s conclusion was then to be discussed at 
the conference of the LGS. Finally, in autumn - maybe after the possible additional 
stage of conflict mediation - the quantification of objectives was concluded as an 
agreement between LGS conference and the Board, taking into account ‘bottom-up’ 
(planning) feedback from the organizational units of the Länder and regions. At the 
                                            
26  Each of the working group’s delegates are responsible for co-ordination in their (sub-) 
organizations and will bring in their respective proposals of changes. 
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very end, the AMS Administrative Council (Verwaltungsrat) decided formally on the 
annual objectives (including target levels); thereafter the Land offices concluded their 
working programmes. 
This planning procedure at national level was somewhat changed in 1999. A 
major shortcoming of the ‘old’ procedure was that the contents of targets were 
actually concluded late in autumn just prior to the beginning of the new business year 
in January, leading to planning uncertainties. A second shortcoming was the fact that 
the AMS Board was somewhat overloaded with tasks and issues. Mainly for these 
reasons, a ‘strategy committee’ was established in 1999. Briefly stated, this expert 
commission took over the former functions of the AMS board and decides (at least in 
principle) the contents of targets already in summer.27 In other words, the definition of 
the contents of the targets and the quantification of the targets are now ‘decoupled’. 
This brought about the intended result: the Land organizations now have more time 
for planning. Once the target level for their Land is known (or can be anticipated), the 
Land PES works out a proposal for allocation to the regional offices; after feedbacks 
from all the regional offices, there is a meeting in which the final shares will be 
negotiated and settled.  
The national planning process is also decisively anchored at the regional level, 
since the Länder have the important task of transforming the national targets into 
operative programmes with differentiated priorities and a suitable policy mix, in co-
operation with their local PES offices.28  
Furthermore, as already mentioned, each Land (LGS) and each local office 
(RGS) defines an additional target, supplementing the national framework. The 
additional objective of (each) of the Land PES offices is settled through their Land 
Directorates; at local level, the employment offices (RGS) consult their regional 
councils (Regionalbeiräte).29 The planning process of these Land and regional targets 
runs parallel to the national planning process. Finally, it should be noticed that in the 
course of the whole planning procedure, the Land offices (LGS) and their Land 
Directorates have also feedback functions on targets and their quantification. 
During the implementation stage in the course of the year, the targets and target 
levels are not revised in case of unanticipated larger labour market changes. How-
ever, within the Länder, target levels may be ‘exchanged’ between individual local 
offices (RGS), without changing the overall target level of their Land office. For in-
stance, a local office (RGS) A may have already placed 30 long-term unemployed in 
                                            
27  A third function of the strategy committee addresses evaluation issues of the performance 
management approach; evaluation is to be strengthened.  
28  Remember: At the national level, all targets are treated as equally important; it is at Land level 
where targets receive different weights or priorities.  
29  The Land Directorate is headed by the director of  the Land PES and includes his/her deputy plus 
representatives of the social partners. The regional council of the local employment offices (RGS) 
includes the local PES director an delegates from the social partners, too. 
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April, with a total target level for the whole year of 50 long-term unemployed. As this 
office can anticipate that the target level (a rest of 20 persons over 8 months) will be 
easily accomplished, it may offer to ‘take over’ some (e.g. 25) of the long-term un-
employed of another local office B which ‘lags behind’ in placing this target group. 
The target level for office A will be then 45, and the target level for office B will be 
reduced by 25 persons, but the Land target level remains unchanged.  
1.5 The management information system 
It is not surprising that all goals/operational targets of the Austrian MBO-system are 
fully covered by the monitoring system. The technical standards of the AMS monitor-
ing system as a whole are being continuously improved, along with proceeding 
development of a comprehensive controlling system (see chap. 2) and also the in-
ternal ambition to become a ‘learning organization’ (cf. AMS Vorstand 1999: 5). In-
vesting in the development of the information technology is an important topic of the 
medium-term plan 1999-2002 (AMS Vorstand 1999: 23-26); process optimisation, 
and developing management information system and self-services are the key 
projects. Of outstanding importance is probably the transfer of all monitoring sources 
in a so-called ‘Data-Warehouse’ (which is the catchy phrase for integrating all data 
resources of an organization into one system).  
The implementation of the operational objectives - in form of the working pro-
grammes - is the responsibility of the LGS (Land offices), and so, accordingly, the 
‘controlling’ (here: monitoring) of regional target attainment during the MBO-cycle. 
Even though there is a ‘Controlling Unit’ at the National AMS (attached to the 
executive office of the AMS Board (Büro des Vorstandes)), this unit does not 
exercise any sort of centralised (permanent) control vis-à-vis the Land offices and 
carries out mainly co-ordination functions. Although it is the national controlling unit 
which produces the quarterly ‘Labour Market Policy Controlling’, providing 
information about target attainment for the nine Federal States and for Austria as a 
whole (see AMS 1999), it checks as a rule only once a year (respectively on grounds 
of the quarterly controlling reports) whether the working programmes of the regions 
are adequately implemented. The main functions of this unit are rather ‘strategic’, 
e.g. in developing, moderating and co-ordinating policies (information screening 
function across the Länder!) or as head of the planning working group. By contrast, 
the Land offices check at least monthly (sometimes more) the results of their local 
employment offices.  
Besides monitoring of the MBO-targets as a whole (based on one key indicator), 
controlling of specific policy areas has become an increasingly important issue of 
performance management, too. For instance, there are separate controlling 
approaches and (corresponding partial) management information systems for unem-
ployment insurance benefits and for the area ‘counselling and placement services’ 
(BVS). The controlling approach of unemployment benefit administration can be re-
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garded as a good example of a successful combination of strongly improved monitor-
ing devices (here: introduction of IT in the mid 1990s) and a strong implementation of 
related and ambitious MBO-targets. In a nutshell, the long-standing, conspicuous 
problems of undelivered or unsettled application forms (and delayed or erroneous 
payments as well) could be reduced to a minimum (or even eliminated) within a 
couple of years after these problems were consequently addressed through the 
MBO-targets.  
In the counselling and placement area, on the other hand, the Austria-wide 
introduction of process related indicators (see section 3 and Table 7 above) is con-
ceived of as a management device for (guiding) AMS managers (in the Land offices): 
The ‘crux’ of this partial controlling of placement/counselling is that it provides aggre-
gate performance scores for each of the performance dimensions included as well as 
an aggregate score for the overall performance (as the sum of all indicators of 
services for jobseekers plus all services for employers). For instance, in the pillar 
‘services for jobseekers’, three performance areas were used in 1999, comprising 14 
indicators for counselling, 9 indicators for placement and 6 indicators relating to 
‘labour market promotion’, i.e. 29 indicators for the whole performance dimension 
(services employers 28 indicators). This seems to be a powerful instrument, which, 
for instance, stimulates debates on useful indicators and exchange of ideas in the 
sense of the benchmarking at AMS managers’ meetings.  
1.6 Performance assessment and benchmarking Performance assessment 
within the MBO approach 
Austria’s performance assessment for the last period or budget year is being dealt 
with at the outset of the new planning cycle for MBO, i.e. in the first meeting of the 
‘planning working group’ in Spring (see chap. 4). The reflection on the previous 
period addresses assessment of target attainment, including unintended side effects. 
As a second pillar of this debate, the indicators used will be scrutinised. The insights 
of this review will be then fed into the new planning process. The inclusion of the 
stage of performance assessment at the outset of the new planning period is 
apparently a ‘speciality’ of the Austrian MBO-system; in other countries, institution-
alised forms of separate ‘final review meetings’ seem to be common.  
Furthermore, as in the vast majority of the other countries in this study, 
evaluation of MBO is not an issue in Austria.  
According to interview statements, evaluation studies (impact analyses) on the 
MBO-system have not been carried out so far. AMS officials argue that aggregate 
impact analyses could not substitute insights of practical relevance such as provided 
by, for instance, the Client Monitoring System. Moreover, careful trend calculations in 
order to get ‘proper’ target levels is said to be preferred to ex post analyses. 
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Performance Pay  
In the Austrian AMS, an annual bonus payment supplements the salaries of the em-
ployees, of whom today only a minority still have the status of traditional public 
servants. This bonus payment includes a ‘target-oriented’ component and a ‘per-
formance-based’ component. The target-oriented bonus is allocated from the top 
down, i.e. from the national head office to the Land offices, and from Land offices to 
their respective local offices, depending on achievement of target levels. Different 
rules of distribution may apply: for instance, at local level, all employees can get the 
same share of the target-oriented component; in other offices, this share might be 
unevenly distributed since the contribution of the various operative units might be 
weighed differently. However, it is generally the case that the bonus payment is 
relatively small, and the target component is the lesser of the two components. But 
even the performance-based bonus payment - the second component - is not a 
strong financial incentive, in relation to the regular fees. The performance-based 
bonus payment is in any case individualised, that means the supervisor bases it on 
the individual assessments. Annual, compulsory ‘employee conversations’ are being 
used for these assessments. Albeit the bonus payment is largely symbolic, the ‘signal 
effect’ of it is very strong, including even some ‘irrational excitements’. Nonetheless, 
the acceptance of the bonus system would partially depend on individual managers’ 
personalities and styles, too. However, as the bonus payment is not high and only 
once a year, it seems to be quite established and accepted.  
More controversial are proposals for bonus payment for placement success, i.e. 
per capita bonus payments. Coming up from time to time, this theme was inserted 
into the public debate during the coalition talks of the new centre-right government, 
but it seems to have been dropped now. There is strong opposition to the idea in the 
AMS. 
Benchmarking  
In Austria benchmarking is currently being established at the intermediate PES level 
of the Länder rather than at the national PES level. The national head office of AMS 
considers itself as having a role in the benchmarking issue, if at all, by providing a 
platform for information screening rather than as a protagonist role. This may be an 
understatement since the BGS has put forward, for instance, the controlling model for 
placement and counselling services (see above), which could also be interpreted as 
a Benchmarking tool. However, the most experiments with Benchmarking can be 
found surely in the 9 Länder regions. On the other hand, as benchmarking is rather a 
recent trend in the Austrian labour market policy, it is far too early to expect to find 
(competitive) benchmarking models across the Land PES.30  
                                            
30  This is obviously true regardless of vague information that benchmarking between AMS offices is 
being prepared and regional ‘model offices’ will be set up. 
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An interesting example for a practical benchmarking approach (or advanced 
controlling model) is currently being tested in the Land Upper Austria: The LGS 
started to experiment with a balanced-score card model suited for the needs of the 
LGS on its own initiative.31 Following the main categories of the balanced score card 
model as originally conceived of by Kaplan and Norton (1997; 1992),32 the Upper 
Austrian Score Card includes the following performance categories:  
- ‘Counselling and Placement Services’ (BVS) 
- Services on Insurance Benefits (SVL = Service Versicherungsleistungen) 
- ‘Labour Market Promotion’ (ALMP programmes except the BVS) 
- Personnel 
- ‘Purchase and real estates’ (material support infrastructure)  
- Customer satisfaction 
- Personnel satisfaction (not yet introduced) 
The main goal of this score card approach is to balance the various performance 
dimensions in a way which optimises the overall performance of the LGS Upper 
Austria, or, alternatively, of the regional PES offices. In other words: the score card 
system should avoid a dominance of particular goals or targets at the expense of 
other targets, which would result in a lower (or worse) overall aggregate perform-
ance. In general, the key to a successful scorecard model is the identification of the 
critical success factors or ‘performance drivers’, given a strategic (i.e. embedded and 
long-term) orientation. As the drivers may change over time, it is also necessary to 
re-consider and reinvent the assumptions and indicators used periodically (according 
to the double-loop learning approach, see Kaplan and Norton 1997: 15-17). 
In practical terms, the Score Card includes an aggregate performance indicator 
that can, however, be decomposed into its parts. It aggregates and transforms ‘real 
values’ of performance indicators into aggregate scores that are measured against 
the maximum scores in a partial performance dimension or in the overall 
performance. The electronic application of the Score Card displays deviations from 
the benchmark, indicating ‘early warnings’ or intervention needs. 
In other words, the aggregate single scores in each of the four core dimensions 
(financial perspective, the internal business, the innovation and learning and the 
customer perspective) are summarised in a single indicator. By providing ‘alarm 
values’ and concrete potentials for improvements, the Balanced Score Card is con-
sidered as an „integrated benchmarking-system“ (interview quote), not just as a 
                                            
31  To be more precise, the initiative goes back to one of the top managers in the LGS. 
32  Kaplan and Norton use four general performance categories in their Scorecard-Model: the 
financial perspective, the internal business perspective, the innovation and learning perspective 
and the customer perspective. 
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monitoring device. Furthermore, the Upper Austrian PES management points out that 
the Balanced Score Card was a further development of Total Quality Management 
approaches (in particular the EFQM-model), but somewhat more concise and 
stringent in handling. The Balanced Score Card would deliver continuously quantified 
benchmark results (as the score represents performance against the benchmark set 
in advance). 
At the time being, the Score Card for the PES Upper Austria is still in 
development; at the local PES level it is being tested and not yet introduced 
systematically. However, according to its leading advocate manager, the Score Card 
should be an instrument used at all levels and, moreover, for all PES employees as a 
personal management tool. Although for this manager the Score Card is a top-down-
instrument for central control, local PES managers do not necessarily share this 
position. For instance, one local PES manager interviewed opposed the compulsory 
introduction of the Balanced Score Card, even though she was in favour of it as a 
voluntary management tool in her office.  
In sum, this ‘Balanced Score Card-model’ tries to integrate assessing 
performance of the PES business areas and of the PES personnel, combining 
process- and results-oriented indicators. At the same time, the ‘scores’ are 
operationalised as standardised benchmarks, whose maximum values are derived 
from the (average of the three) best performing PES units. This makes it an attractive 
management tool, which can be further developed. 
However, it should be recalled that the Balanced Score Card in Upper Austria is 
just one example for an ambitious approach to performance management and 
benchmarking in Austria; quite likely, there may be other ambitious benchmarking 
approaches in other Austrian States of which we are not aware. Nevertheless, in light 
of the presented plans for the upcoming ‘Comprehensive Controlling System’ (see 
section. 2), at least components of the BSC approach will probably play a future role 
in the Austrian AMS. 
2. Great Britain: PES performance management profile33 
2.1 The organizational context 
The Employment Service (ES) is primarily responsible for providing placement 
services and assistance to disadvantaged persons in the labour market, especially 
welfare recipients. The ES also monitors its clients’ eligibility for unemployment 
benefit (Jobseeker’s Allowance) in collaboration with the Benefit Agency. The ES is 
                                            
33   The Employment Service  is responsible for service provision in England, Scotland, and Wales but 
not for Northern Ireland.  
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an executive agency within the Department for Education and Employment. As such 
it has more managerial autonomy than a government ministry, although its employ-
ees remain public servants. Each year the Secretary of State for Employment sets 
performance targets in an annual „Performance Agreement” concluded between the 
ES and the ministry, which also specifies the resources available to the ES for 
achieving its tasks. The Employment Service delivers its services through 9 regional, 
127 district and over 1000 local jobcentre offices. Training and most other active 
measures are currently the responsibility of the employer-led Training and Enterprise 
Councils (TECs). However, from April 2001 the Employment Service will take 
responsibility for adult training from TECs. Later in the summer the ES will be merged 
into a new agency with a large part of the Benefit Agency to provide comprehensive 
responsibility for labour market and benefits services and programmes for all people 
of working age. This will include the adult work-related training component of the 
TEC system, services with a labour market focus, and the administration of 
Jobseeker’s Allowance and other working age adult welfare benefits. This 
organizational change is a continuation of the trend marked by the Single Work-
Focused Gateway (later called ‘ONE’) for the creation of comprehensive and 
coherent welfare-to-work services.  
2.2 The PES performance management approach 
The British Employment Service has been an executive agency with annual 
performance targets and a system of management by objectives since it was estab-
lished as a ‘next steps’ agency in 1991-92. The ES, whose experience with MBO 
actually goes back to the 1980s, is thus one of the PES organizations with long ex-
perience in performance management. ES targets are now primarily labour market 
targets relating to the reintegration of its principal clientele of unemployed benefit 
claimants. Recent policy changes under the Labour government (‘New Deal’) have 
made the agency much more client-oriented in contrast to its previous orientation 
toward finding and filling vacancies. The ministerial level (Dept. of Education and 
Employment), with which the ES targets are agreed, plays a dominant policy role and 
the ES is primarily an implementing agency with only limited autonomy. The ES’s 
management cycle is on a purely annual basis and shifts in government policy, for 
example, the introduction of the ‘New Deal’ programme with its own earmarked 
resources and separate organizational structures, have placed heavy demands on 
the adaptability of the organization.34 The ES is a highly focused, ‘target-driven’ or-
ganization. The ES itself is a highly centralized organization in which national targets 
are allocated to the regional and lower levels of the organization in a more-or-less 
top-down manner. Moreover, quality management plays a strong role and national 
standards for customer service and administration of unemployment benefit (Job-
seeker’s Allowance) further limit regional discretion in policy or implementation. A 
well developed management information and controlling system for monitoring 
                                            
34 As noted above, the ES is now to be merged into a much larger new agency. 
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regional performance on a current (weekly) basis and responding in real time to per-
ceived shortfalls.  There are, furthermore major efforts to develop benchmarking tools 
with which jobcentre performance can be systematically compared with similar units 
throughout the country. Unit performance assessment also has important con-
sequences for individuals since it is one basis for performance pay differentials. Staff 
members frequently describe the management style of the ES as being a ‘checking 
culture.’ 
2.3 Inventory of goals, objectives and performance indicators 
The objectives and targets from the 1999-2000 Annual performance agreement are 
summarized in Table 8. The targets A1 to D represent a hierarchy in which primary 
emphasis is on the labour market targets under objective A, whereas objectives B, C, 
& D relate to processes and service quality in dealing with clients. The labour market 
targets are outcome-oriented (job entry) rather than focussing on programme uptake, 
although target A1 is defined in terms of job entries that occur through two 
programmes (New Deal and Employment Zones) rather than being a generic labour 
market target – as is the case for A2 to A6. This programme emphasis in the 
formulation of targets reflects the fact that ‘New Deal’ in particular is the ‘flagship’ 
labour market programme of the Labour government of very high political 
importance. This is also reflected in the fact that staff and programme funding are 
also earmarked for ‘New Deal’ activities. It is interesting to note that the A1 to A5 
labour market targets are ’nested,’ i.e. the categories overlap. Thus target A2 also 
includes New Deal for the Disabled participants; target category A3 includes A1 and 
A2 job entries plus adult (>25) JSA recipients unemployed for more than 6 months;35 
and A4 includes A1 to A3 plus unemployed claiming JSA for less than 6 months: 
finally, A5 includes all persons in categories A1 to A4 plus the jobless not in receipt of 
benefit. In effect, the typical ES emphasis on placement of problem groups, which 
has been strengthened by the introduction of the ‘New Deal’ is reflected in the use of 
‘sub-targets’ A1 to A4 within the more comprehensive A5 labour market target. In-
ternally and for its own planning the ES has a further breakdown of the components 
of target A1 by type of New Deal activity. 
This very complicated structure of target ‘nesting’ seems to an external observer 
to be overly complicated for non-statisticians and hence possibly not transparent 
enough for line staff in jobcentres (for example, in comparison, with using simply 
ratios of target groups in PES placements).  
In 1999-2000 the ES was able to meet or exceed 7 of its 8 principal targets. It 
was slightly below target only in “correct application of Jobseeker’s Allowance 
processes” (90% vs. 96% of cases). There is a pattern of incremental changes in 
targets in response to changing political and organizational priorities. Thus of the 12 
                                            
35 And working age benefit recipients in the ONE pilot areas.  
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principal ES performance targets in 1996-97 only 3 were still targets in 1999-200036. 
Between 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 4 of 8 targets were changed not just in level but 
also in their definition. Thus while the overall labour market target of “placing 
unemployed people into work” again remained unchanged, all three sub-targets 
changed and a new customer service level target for employers was added.  
Lessons 
Use of placement targets may lead to systematic distortions in organizational out-
comes, for example, creaming, i.e. concentrating efforts on short-term, easier to help 
clients. In the British employment service this is counteracted by a heavy emphasis 
on disadvantaged groups both in earlier and in the current labour market targets, 
which has been strengthened by the current government’s policy focus on the New 
Deal programme, which is particularly aimed at labour market problem groups.  
A potential shortcoming of the current placement indicators is that they do not 
take job quality into account (a job is defined merely as more than eight hours of 
work over a seven day period). This may give operating staff an incentive to pay less 
attention to job quality in filling their placement targets, although the Employment 
Service sees no evidence of such behaviour. Moreover, use of a placement indicator 
without controlling for job quality may also lead to distortions in comparing the per-
formance of jobcentres since this type of target is easier to achieve in labour market 
segments with high job turnover, for example, retail trade and personal services. The 
ES has responded to this problem by introducing “sustainability” as an additional 
qualitative placement target on a pilot basis in two regions. Sustainability is defined 
as still being in employment 13 weeks after the initial placement.  
A shortcoming of the target definitions from a theoretical point of view is that like 
all monitoring data they represent gross job entries but do not provide a basis for 
assessing the net impact of ES activities in comparison with a counterfactual 
situation. This is of course a limitation of all performance data drawn from administra-
tive records. The Employment Service’s very strong focus on labour market target 
groups can be expected to have enhanced the real ‘value added’ of PES placement 
activities.  
Quality targets 
The Employment Service puts strong emphasis on its customer service commit-
ments, which reflects the customer-service orientation in the British public service. 
The quality standards for jobseekers include: 1) vacancies are displayed and up-to-
date; 2) customers with an appointment are seen on time and those without an 
                                            
36 Two additional targets not included concern prompt response to queries from ministers of the 
Department for Education and Employment.  
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appointment are seen within 10 minutes; 3) telephone is answered within 20 
seconds; 4) full reply to letters within 10 working days or provide the customer with 
an explanation for the delay; letters to be answered in clear and plain language. An 
independent research company anonymously ‘tests’ local PES service performance 
at the jobcentre level. Previously service standards were applicable only to job-
seekers. For the first time, in the Annual Performance Agreement for 2000-2001, 
service standards for employers are being introduced.37 Given the importance of 
vacancy acquisition for achievement of ES performance targets, this is a welcome 
development.  
Labour market activity 
Finally, labour market activity, i.e. adherence to the schedule for activation of the 
unemployed is a key quality emphasis in ES targeting. National standards require a 
series of interventions of different intensity at progressive stages of the unemploy-
ment spell: 1) New jobseeker interview and conclusion of a jobseekers agreement, 2) 
thereafter fortnightly interviews at the Jobcentre with more intensive interviews in the 
13th week, the six month-interview, and subsequently at six month intervals. Adher-
ence to these standards is systematically controlled at the local jobcentre level. The 
ES has also adopted the Business Excellence model as a quality standard and is 
preparing for a full internal assessment in 2000-01. 
                                            
37 Although the setting of quantitative targets for performance measurement has been delayed. 
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Table 8:  Employment Service Annual Performance Agreement, 1999-2000, 
Performance requirements 
 
Goal A 
To help people into work by providing appropriate advice, guidance, training and 
support either directly or in partnership with others. 
Target: 
! To place 1,25 million unemployed people into work 
 
Goal B 
To concentrate efforts on helping people improve their employability and move from 
welfare to work particularly if they have already spent long periods without a job. 
Targets: 
! To place 190,000  long-term (6 months plus) JSA claimants into work. To place 38,000 
JSA claimants out of work for 2 years or more, including New Deal for 25 and over 
participants, into work. 
! To place 100,000 New deal for Young People participation into work. To place 15,000 
New Deal for Lone Parents participants into work 
 
Goal C 
To involve people with disabilities in the world of work by helping them to find and 
retain jobs and encouraging employers to open more opportunities to them. 
Target: 
! To place 85,000 unemployed people with disabilities into work, including New Deal for 
Disabled People participants. 
 
Goal D 
To set out clearly the rights and responsibilities of people who claim Job-seeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) and ensure that throughout the period of their claim these rights and 
responsibilities are fulfilled. 
Target: 
! To ensure the correct application of the JSA process in at least 96% of cases checked in 
quarter four of 1999-2000 
 
Goal E 
To provide a courteous and professional customer service to all jobseekers 
Target: 
! To achieve an 87% customer service delivery rate 
 
Goal F 
To deliver these services cost effectively (no target specification) 
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2.4 Process analysis: definition and implementation of policy goals, objectives 
and indicators 
The Annual Performance Agreement between the Employment Service and the Dept. 
of Education and Employment, which establishes the PES’ objectives and targets for 
the coming fiscal year, is the result of prolonged negations between September and 
February between experts from the ES and the ministry.  Although there is a clear 
division of labour in which the ministry is responsible for policy and the ES as an 
executive agency for implementation, the negotiations are difficult because of the 
problem of agreeing on targets. In general the Ministry pushes for higher (‘stretching’) 
targets ES-concerned to achieve realistic (lower) targets. From the viewpoint of the 
PES, the political level of the ministry always expects improvement and is extremely 
reluctant to accept lower targets, even when warranted by changed labour market 
conditions. If an agreement cannot initially be reached at a staff level – as has 
occurred in the recent past – the issue has to be referred to the minister for decision. 
Noteworthy in the British context too is the role of the Treasury, which must approve 
the agreement.  
As a rule the negotiations proceed as follows: 1) First an agreement on a labour 
market assessment between ES and ministry has to be reached on the basis of  
Treasury economic estimates. This includes in particular estimates of inflows into and 
outflows from unemployment and other factors that affect employment service 
placement levels. Disagreement comes from the uncertainty about future develop-
ments when relying on data from the mid-point of the previous year. 2) Second, on 
the basis of the labour market assessment an agreement on target levels has to be 
reached. The objectives themselves are largely politically set and also influenced by 
government-wide considerations, for example, the emphasis on customer service. 3) 
Finally, the Treasury has to accept the agreement reached between the ES and the 
Ministry, since it also entails an expenditure commitment. It plays a strong role, and is 
reported to have on occasion even injected its own policy preferences.38 
Negotiations on the 2000-2001 targets were particularly difficult because of the 
number of new targets to define and negotiate (five of eight) and the increasingly 
tight labour market. New targets are more difficult to negotiate in contrast to 
objectives continued from the previous years for which only an adjustment in target 
levels is required. In the case of the latter there is a track record and accepted model 
on how performance is related to labour market factors. In principle the previous tar-
get only needs to be revised to reflect the labour market estimates for the coming 
year.    
In the view of the ES, quantitative labour market targets with a placement focus 
are ironically more difficult to achieve at the current relatively low levels of unemploy-
                                            
38  The special interest of the Treasury in ES policy may be explained in part by the fact that a 
former Employment minister, Andrew Smith, is now a senior Treasury minister.  
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ment. This is because both inflows and outflows from claimant unemployment, i.e. 
the principal clientele of the ES, are strongly counter-cyclical and have reached very 
low levels at the peak of the current business cycle at the end of the 1990s, although 
vacancy notifications to the ES are to a lesser extent pro-cyclical as employers have 
more difficulty filling vacancies through other search channels. Moreover, at the peak 
of the business cycle the claimant count is said to include a higher share of hard to 
place jobseekers. There is clear evidence, for example, that the success rate of ES in 
filing vacancies fell from 70% to 80% in the economic trough of the early 1990s to 
around 50% at the end of the 1990s. In sum, improved labour market conditions 
make it easier for individuals to find jobs but more difficult for the ES to achieve a 
given level of placements.  
PES and the regions 
The ES decides on its own procedures for allocation of national targets to its regional 
and local offices. Process targets related to correct procedures in dealing with benefit 
claimants and customer service standards are the same throughout the country. By 
contrast the allocation of labour market targets to the regional level is currently based 
on a combination of labour market estimates, individual models for allocating each 
target, and past performance. Since the overall national performance targets (A1 to 
A5) are given, the allocation of shares to the regions from the ES head office in 
current practice follows a relatively automatic technical procedure. For each labour 
market target there is a model consisting of a combination of key ‘drivers’ based on 
past performance and projections. Thus for the key target “unemployed job entries” 
regional forecasts of new vacancies and inflow into unemployment are input into a 
model based on the historical relationships of vacancies and unemployment flows to 
placings, differentiated by five Jobcentre size categories. Finally, there is on practical 
grounds a 5% ‘limiter’ or upper limit on any regional increases in targets in 
comparison with the previous year. Although expressed in a mathematical model, the 
allocation formulas are based on art as well as science. For example, ad hoc 
adjustments are made for jobcentres with ‘nurse banks’ or a high level of vacancies.  
Regions and districts have more leeway in allocating targets to their subordinate 
units, although they are constrained by the need to meet the regional or district goals 
set by higher organizational levels.  
Targets are not revised during the course of the annual MBO cycle. 
Unanticipated changes in the labour market context are, however, taken into 
consideration in assessing the results. Since the models of ES performance used in 
negotiating national targets and allocating targets to the regions are largely based on 
labour market factors, they also provide an implicit basis for explaining under (or 
over) performance due to changes in the labour market conditions in comparison with 
the estimates used for the setting and allocation of targets at the beginning of the 
planning cycle. This is done by re-estimating the national or regional targets based 
on revised (current) data.  
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2.5 The management information system  
The management information system to support the process of setting targets and 
controlling performance against targets is well developed, although there are prob-
lems with respect to the adaptability of the system in responding to changing 
ministerial priorities. Key management information in the ES is the responsibility of a 
special monitoring and reporting team, the Jobcentre Performance Unit, which is also 
responsible for performance reporting at the national level. Regional and district 
offices have their own performance managers.  
The management information system provides comprehensive and real time 
information on progress toward the key targets. Head office Information on regional 
and national progress toward the principal labour market targets  (A1-A5) is updated 
weekly, enabling the MBO system to be used as a hands-on management tool. More 
formal monthly reports to the chief executive include additional detailed information 
on customer service targets and additional supporting information (e.g. vacancies, 
referrals, unemployment flows, expenditure, unit costs etc.).  The ES submits 
quarterly reports on performance against targets to the Dept. of Education and Em-
ployment as required by the Annual Performance Agreement.  
A principal shortcoming of the existing labour market information system as a 
management tool is its relative inflexibility. Changing political priorities (e.g. the 
introduction of the ‘New Deal’ or changes in targets) require flexible and short-term 
changes in the information system. In the annual policy cycle targets for the new fis-
cal year beginning in April are not agreed until February, which means that only two 
months are available to make the necessary changes in the MI system. The existing 
IT system is regarded as being too inflexible, i.e. it cannot be quickly adjusted to 
meet changing data requirements. As a consequence the ES must frequently resort 
to ad hoc solutions, including manual reporting of data. The ES is undergoing a major 
modernisation of its operational and management information systems and expects 
to have a fully comprehensive and flexible MI system in place by 2004. 
Validation  
MBO systems are highly dependent on the quality of data collected. Moreover, be-
cause the data used to assess the performance of operating units (and individuals) 
are also largely collected at the same level, agency problems of adverse selection 
(e.g. creaming) and moral hazard (e.g. over-reporting) are a problem that requires 
appropriate controls. A particularly sensitive indicator in all PES organizations is re-
ported placements in employment. In Great Britain placements are currently defined 
as “confirmation from an employer that a jobseeker has started a job which is for at 
least 8 hours in a 7 day period.” In 1997 the public employment service experienced 
problems in being able to fully validate its job placement results, which  may be in-
structive for other PES organizations that have not yet instituted appropriate controls 
54 
on management information, especially placements. In that year the validity of the 
performance data on placements became an important issue after it was determined 
that there was not sufficiently robust evidence to support a significant number of re-
ported placements. As a consequence of this experience more stringent controls on 
placement data were introduced in the 4th quarter of 1997-98, with independent re-
views by the National Audit Office. Based on a re-examination of 44,000 randomly 
selected recorded job entries, the ES has attained a validation score of around 94% 
in the fourth quarter of 1999 for overall placements of the unemployed into jobs, the 
most general ES performance indicator.  The ES is making efforts to further improve 
the quality of placement data. There continue to be problems in the recording of 
subcategories of placements. For example, validation teams report that in a large 
number of cases of placements of persons with disabilities there was  insufficient 
health information to support that status.  As noted above, a shortcoming of the exist-
ing key performance indicators (targets) is that they relate solely to job entry but not 
to stable employment, which may encourage ES staff to focus on short-term or 
marginal placements. The Annual Performance Agreement for 2000-2001 takes this 
problem into account by introducing on a pilot basis in two regions an additional 
target of ‘sustainability,’ defined as the percentage of long-term benefit claimants still 
off benefit 13 weeks after starting a job.  
2.6 Performance assessment 
National level 
The Annual Performance Agreement requires quarterly reports by the chief executive 
on performance against targets, initially within 15 working days and a fuller report 
within 25 working days on progress toward targets and variance from profiled 
performance and expenditure.  
In the current fiscal year the ES has been falling short of key national labour 
market targets, which it attributes largely to the increasing difficulty of meeting its 
placement targets in tight labour markets due to the lower number of claimants and 
reduced inflows into unemployment. In accounting for performance shortfalls a key 
role is played by the ES’s research department; for example, the impact of revisions 
in the original labour market estimates used to set placement targets can be 
calculated as a possible explanation for shortfalls.  
Although the head office deals primarily with the 7 English regions and Scotland 
and Wales, there is a trend toward increased direct monitoring of district and 
jobcentre performance. This is a consequence of improvements in the management 
information system in recent years, on the one hand, and of the high political visibility 
of the ‘New Deal’ programme, which leads ministers to show a strong interest in 
performance at the operational level.  
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ES and the regions 
Within the ES there are monthly discussions with the Chief Executive and Director of 
Jobcentre Services on progress toward targets and joint meetings of senior man-
agement from head office with the regional directors at which performance and 
progress towards targets are discussed. This is also an occasion at which information 
on performance generated by the management information system will be discussed 
with regional officials but intervention may also take the form of formal or informal 
intervention in response to regional shortcomings in performance detected by the MI 
system. This has, for example, occurred in the recent period in which regional 
managers have sometimes been requested to report on problems with meeting 
targets in some districts of their regions. In the first instance though, the head office 
deals with the regional offices and not directly with districts or jobcentres, which is a 
regional office responsibility. Improvements in the management information system 
have, however, increased the level of information available at the head office about 
variation in district and jobcentre performance against targets and, especially in the 
case of the politically prominent New Deal programme head office and even the 
ministerial level has increasingly scrutinized performance even at the implementation 
level.  
The Jobcentre Performance Unit at head office in Sheffield also has a so-called 
Business Achievement Team (BAT) that visits local jobcentres in response to re-
quests and routinely, but also makes targeted visits in response to perceived per-
formance problems. The BAT team examines and comments in a written report on 
the strengths and weaknesses of Jobcentre performance by individual target areas, 
to which the local business manager makes a written response. 
Regional and district offices have their own staff concerned with performance 
assessment and, as necessary, intervene at the district and jobcentre level.  For ex-
ample, performance is a central topic in the weekly telephone conferences and 
monthly face-to face meetings between the regional director and the district manag-
ers in one of the English regions visited. Performance assessment is, of course, a 
central concern of the management team at the jobcentre level. 
Performance pay 
Like the public service as a whole, the ES pays performance pay based on annual 
assessment ratings of each staff member, who are classified according to 
performance ratings from A to D. All ES staff members have an annual Performance 
and Development Profile in which a number of operational objectives are agreed, for 
example, placing X people a month into work either individually or as part of a team. 
This means that achievement of these targets can influence performance pay. 
However the assessment is based on overall performance, not just on what people 
have done, but as much on how they did it. For managerial and professional staff the 
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performance bonus is not large, representing more of an honour than a strong 
financial incentive. The bonuses are individual rather than group-based, although the 
performance assessment for managers and team leaders will be based largely on 
their unit’s performance. A cross government report has recommended higher levels 
of bonus based on success but this will take some time to implement. 
Another pay-related problem is the lack of ES pay differentials that take regional 
labour markets and costs of living into account. This is apparently one explanation for 
very high staff turnover rates in many jobcentres, especially in metropolitan areas, 
affecting both clerical and executive level positions. Like in most countries, the rules 
of the civil service make it difficult to terminate even personnel with consistently 
unsatisfactory performance. Managers with deficient performance can, however, be 
reassigned and early retirement programmes have also been used to deal with 
deficient performance. 
Although performance assessment takes place predominantly in a hierarchical 
context in the ‘checking culture’ of PES management in Britain, horizontal contacts 
and learning from other districts and jobcentres is encouraged. This takes place 
through frequent national conferences: ‘cities network’ links managers from the 
largest cities, an Assistant Regional Directors network, and a New Deal Co-
ordinators network. There is also, for example, a ‘mentoring programme’, which 
enables successful managers to spend time in jobcentres with performance 
problems. Finally, the ‘Diagnostic Tool Kit’ described below, which is also used as a 
basis for performance awards, represents a major effort to promote benchmarking as 
a tool of self-analysis and problem solving at the jobcentre and district levels.  
Benchmarking  
During June 1998, management consultants developed a Diagnostic Toolkit to help 
District and Business Managers in the British Public Employment Service improve 
placing performance in Jobcentres. The Toolkit is based on a simple model of the 
basic processes in all jobcentres. Making use of existing management information, 
10 key indicators were identified that show the office’s potential (inputs), processes 
(activity) and effectiveness of that activity (outputs). A revised version of the Toolkit 
was prepared in 2000 in which the number of indicators was reduced to five, but no 
new indicators have been added.  
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Table 9: ‘Diagnostic Toolkit’ indicators, 2000 
 
Input-Indicator: 
! Vacancies notified/persons registered 
 
Activity-Indicators: 
! Unemployed submissions / Vacancies notified 
! Unemployed submissions / Unemployed job entries 
 
Output-Indicators: 
! Unemployed job entries per staff person per week 
! Unemployed job entries / Vacancies notified 
Because it systematically relates input, activity, and output indicators based on a 
simple model of the placement process, the diagnostic tool shows the relationship 
between ES activities and meeting targets: It can thus help to identify the reasons for 
shortfalls in performance and possible areas for improvement. In this respect the 
‘Diagnostic Toolkit’  represents an advance on the management information system 
described above, which is designed merely to control performance against targets 
but cannot explain shortfalls, except for changes in labour market conditions. For 
example, if the target level is 100 job entries per week and the historical submissions 
ratio (referrals to job entries) is 15, then 1500 referrals per week are required to meet 
the target. One also knows that if, for example, the number of unemployed claimants 
is 2000, then 75% of the client group must be referred to a job in a week, or more 
than one submission needs to be undertaken for some jobseekers, in order to meet 
the target.  
The indicators are calculated on the basis of 5 core variables that have to be 
input monthly by the local jobcentre (register size, vacancies notified, unemployed 
submissions, job entries, staff in person weeks). Results are transmitted on a monthly 
basis to the district and head office levels, and the kit also contains pages for district 
and regional level analysis. 
Office size was found to be the most important determinant of performance in 
terms of productivity in converting clients and vacancies into placings. Therefore and 
for valid comparisons, offices are currently split into four office size categories based 
on the size of the register of unemployed clients, ranging from small (0-499 clients 
register size), small/medium (500-999), medium (1000-1999), to large (2000 and 
more persons registered).39 
                                            
39  In the 1999 version, five size bands were used, with an additional size ‘medium/large’ (2000-
3000), and the large category was defined as 3000 and more persons registered. 
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The assignment of jobcentres to the size bands in based on an average for the 
first quarter of the budget year (April to June) rather than on the previous month in 
order to avoid disruptive movement between different size categories due to small 
shifts in the number of clients or, for example, seasonal factors. 
National benchmarks for each of the indicators for each of the office size 
categories have been produced. The benchmarks are based on quarterly 
performance during the previous year on the key indicators in the various size 
categories. This represents an improvement over the original version of the 
benchmarks, which were based on annual data, which did not adequately reflect the 
seasonality of ES business. In order to display the results and make the 
benchmarking more intuitive jobcentre and district benchmarking results are colour-
coded according to their quartile ranking in their respective size categories.40  
The Diagnostic Toolkit itself is a series of interrelated Excel spread sheets that 
supplies national benchmark values based on performance in the previous year. It is 
designed in the first instance to be used by the local office Business Manager (office 
head), although the local data is passed on to the district and regional levels. Each 
local office can thus examine its results and compare them with the national bench-
marks in order to improve its activities. If a lack of effectiveness is recognized, each 
bureau has to check the local measures and (if necessary) to adjust them. The tools 
also show the progress made on each of the Indicators over a period of time. Supple-
mentary functions can produce bar graphs that show the percentage improvement 
needed to reach the next quartile, i.e. the lower, upper and top quartiles.  
The benchmarking results are also used as a basis for determining performance 
awards to jobcentres, which are based primarily on placings per staff member per 
week in each of the five size categories. 
Discussion 
The ‘benchmarking Toolkit’ is a user-friendly instrument for benchmarking perform-
ance at the local jobcentre level, and at higher levels of the organization. Because it 
is based on a simple but appealing model of jobcentre performance, it is useful not 
only for ranking performance within comparable size categories but also for analysing 
PES activities and labour market factors that might explain performance shortfalls. 
The original Toolkit is being continually revised in response to experience and 
criticism.  
                                            
40  Different colours in the graphs indicate where the office lies in terms of the National Benchmarks. 
Within one office size category, there are different colours used for the bottom quartile (0-25%), 
the lower quartile (25%-50%), the upper quartile (50%-75%) and, finally, the top quartile (75%-
100%).  
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Surprisingly, the clusters of jobcentre types used in the benchmarking tool reflect 
only size bands but not labour market types and conditions, although - interestingly - 
‘New Deal’ program performance analysis is based on clusters of delivery units of 
similar size and labour market. The lack of a similar clustering design in the Toolkit 
makes it difficult to interpret whether performance shortfalls are due to local imple-
mentation or to circumstances beyond the control of the local PES. Jobcentres may 
regard themselves as not competing on a level playing field (for example for per-
formance awards), which might even have a negative effect on motivation.  
The 2000 version of the Toolkit is based only on the comprehensive placement 
target (A5) and does not include the other four placement sub-targets for specific 
target groups. This is because the time frame was too short to include the numerous 
changes in the labour market targets: There were, moreover, problems in obtaining 
reference data for some of the new targets. This is not per se a shortcoming of the 
Toolkit but of the problem of maintaining such an analytical tool in an annual MBO 
cycle with a high rate of change in targets and therefore data needs.  
We found it surprising that information on which jobcentres are the best 
performers nationally within each size band is not publicized within the organization. 
Identifying and learning from ‘best practice’ seems to us to be an important element 
of benchmarking. Moreover, it gives the participants more insight into the 
benchmarking process. 
3. Sweden: PES performance management profile  
3.1 The organizational context41 
Overall responsibility for Swedish labour market policy rests with the Riksdag (the 
Swedish parliament) and the government. The Labour Market Administration (AMV) 
implements labour market policy on behalf of the cabinet or the Ministry of Labour, 
respectively. The AMV comprises the National Labour Market Board (AMS), 21 
County Labour Boards (LAN), 418 local employment offices and more than 100 
employability institutes for vocational rehabilitation. 
General guidelines for PES’s activities are laid down in the Labour Market Policy 
Activities Ordinance. Overriding annual targets for the labour market policy are estab-
lished in Riksdag resolutions on the government’s budget bill. More specific 
objectives or quantifiable operational targets of AMV are given in the government’s 
appropriation warrant and in other directives. 
                                            
41  See Behrenz, Delander and Niklasson 2000 on which this summary is largely based. 
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AMS is the central office of AMV and responsible for managing, co-ordinating 
and developing Swedish labour market policy to comply with the guidelines set by the 
Riksdag and the cabinet. AMS establishes goals and guidelines for the county labour 
boards and also monitors and evaluates their activities. The county employment 
boards manage, co-ordinate and develop labour market activities in the counties. In 
each municipality, the county labour boards have organised a local employment 
service committee, a joint body charged with shaping labour market policy to suit 
local conditions.42  
3.2 The PES performance management approach 
According to official statements (e.g. ISEKen 1999, No. 9) and conventional wisdom, 
MBO has been the main (and traditional) pillar of the Swedish performance manage-
ment approach since about the mid 1980s (see also Delander 1991). Paradoxically, 
PES officials argue in interviews (carried out in 2000) that MBO did not play an im-
portant role for managing performance until 1996/97 (see below)43. Furthermore, the 
functioning of the MBO-system has been criticized and debated in recent years (see 
Behrenz, Delander and Niklasson 2000). Among other things, due to the economic 
crisis of the early 1990s, doubts were expressed as to whether the MBO system was 
the appropriate means to combat the then high levels of unemployment. Since 1999 
the labour market situation has improved rapidly, and although the MBO system is 
now fully implemented with a strong emphasis on reaching the target levels set, PES 
performance management in Sweden is confronted with new problems. For example, 
during the last five years the government and AMS tried to simplify the number of 
programmes and regulations concerning ALMP, but the introduction of various new 
and detailed ALMP measures in 2000 has again complicated the situation.44 How-
ever, on the whole, the MBO system has been recently consolidated and 
strengthened, even though its function and targets may still be in part controversial 
between the present government and the PES. 
                                            
42  The members of the committee represent the county labour board, the employment service, the 
municipality, local employee organizations and the local business community. The chairman and 
a majority of the committee’s members are appointed upon the recommendations of the 
municipal government, which thus enjoys a decision-making majority. The work in the 
committees is guided by the targets and objectives of national labour market policy and by the 
powers with which the committees are vested by the county employment boards. 
43  According to another conventional wisdom, the Swedish MBO approach in labour market policy 
represents the prototype of the ‘co-operative and evaluative’ type, which can be juxtaposed to the 
hierarchical and centralised type of MBO. Critical Swedish voices in PES argue, however, that 
the negative side of dialogues and evaluation without sanctions (= the system until the mid 90s) 
favoured an organizational culture of ‘creative finding of good excuses’. 
44  A related, though somewhat different theme concerns one large programme, which was just 
recently introduced, the ‘activity guarantee’. In short, it is contested whether this programme is 
too inflexible with respect to processes; and whether it may indicate a withdrawal from the 
traditional labour market focus of the PES towards concentration on the most disadvantaged 
target groups.  
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Another - complementary - pillar of performance management (besides MBO) 
has been customer satisfaction, which was particularly emphasized in 1998 and 1999 
when the AMS ‘pushed’ this theme through additional ‘internal’45 AMS targets. How-
ever, in order to simplify the performance management system, the AMS did not use 
such internal targets for the year 2000. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the 
Swedish PES started to deal with quality issues comparatively early (in international 
comparison): In the mid-1990s it attempted to introduce a quality concept according 
to the principles of the Swedish Institute for Quality (SIQ) and the Swedish Quality 
Award46 (cf. AMS 1995). However, according to interview statements, this was never 
fully established due to implementation and acceptance problems. The same holds 
true for some other experiments with quality approaches. Thus, presently, at least at 
the national level,47 quality issues and approaches are not a main item on the 
agenda. This appears to be somewhat against the international trend, since various 
countries proceed and stress the quality components in their performance manage-
ment systems, for instance Austria, France and Norway.  
3.3 Inventory of goals, objectives and performance indicators 
For 1999, three „overarching objectives“ (or: labour market policy goals) were stated 
in the „appropriation warrant“: 
- Limiting job vacancy times 
- Reducing long-term unemployment 
- Counteracting long periods without regular employment. 
These three goals were maintained for the year 2000. The small number and the 
general character of these goals are typical for Sweden as well as the MBO-
approach in general (for goals of previous years see e.g. Henriksson 1996). 12 
operational objectives in the narrow sense were in effect in 1999 (see Table 10), plus 
two additional ones relating to the development of the employment service.48 Most of 
these targets are also being used in 2000 (8 out of 12; targets No. 2-8, plus no. 11 in 
a slightly modified form), of which only the absolute numbers or target levels have 
sometimes been changed. The service-related targets of 1999 (internet use; 
customers’ satisfaction) are not used in 2000, or, at least, are not mentioned any 
longer as national objectives. Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 10, the 
majority of national targets will be adapted to county needs and operationalisation.  
                                            
45  i.e. set by the PES itself, not by government. 
46  This is a modified adaptation of the famous Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award; see 
Löffler 1996 for details on these and other quality awards. 
47  At county and local level, however, quality management seems to play a significant role 
[interview SW4]. 
48  These relate to PES staff’s ‘computer driving licenses’ and staff’s involvement in the 
organizational development process of the PES (Employment Service in the 21st century) 
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Target change 
Considered in a longer perspective, there is a rather strong component of continuity 
in the operational objectives, given the fact that „four operative targets have been 
more or less unchanged from 1997 to 2000“ (Q5) (which are the number of LTU, 
number of long-term enrolees, number of LMP for disabled and the wage 
subsidisation rate). On the other hand, changes of targets and indicators have also 
been implemented in the past few years. For example, the number of participants 
and the share of disabled in LMP programmes, which had been targets in 1997 and 
98, were abandoned in 1999. The same is true for the 1998’ target in which it was 
said to use LMPs to combat gender segregation in the labour market. Another inter-
esting change is the withdrawal of internal PES targets by AMS; such supplementary 
AMS-targets were a common feature in 1998 and in 1999. 
Lessons and Problems 
Most of the problems relate to usefulness, practicability and operationalisation of 
targets and indicators. There are quite a number of examples for changes or can-
cellation of targets and indicators due to observed strong shortcomings (hereafter: 
Q8 und Q7). For instance, the (in 1997 and 1998 exclusive) placement target to re-
ferring applicants (referrals of good quality) to at least 90 % of reported vacancies 
was abandoned for a number of reasons. First, increased support and emphasis of 
the self-service instruments undermined the plausibility of this target. Second, the 
quality of the referrals (jobseekers proposals) seemed to deteriorate over time 
(maybe even as impact of the quantitative focus of the PI) and creaming tendencies 
were being observed, too. 
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Table 10: Operational targets and performance indicators in Sweden, 1999 
Operational targets Performance measurement and indicators 
1. Suitable applicants/jobseekers should be 
proposed („referred“) to at least 90% of 
registered vacancies  
percentage of registered vacancies outflow 
(vacancies filled), to which applicants had 
been proposed („referred“) county targets 
apply 
2. At least 80% of all employers using the 
PES for vacancy filling, shall have received 
suitable applicants which enables hiring 
within an agreed time 
monthly random telephone surveys 
national targets 
3. Continuous increase of the share of 
persons who find a job within 90 days after 
completing a vocational training course; in 
the 4th quarter, at least 70% 
percentage share of training participants 
entering employment within 90 days; 70% 
share applies for all counties 
4. Average monthly number of long-term 
unemployed is to be below 50000 
number of long-term unemployed divided by 
the number of completed months of the year; 
county targets apply 
5. Job offers (all types) to all young persons 
under 25 within 100 days after entering 
unemployment 
percentage of people aged 18-24 leaving 
unemployment after that job offer, in relation 
to all  unemployment leavers plus the 
remaining long-term unemployed among 
young people 
6. Average number of ‘long-term enrollees’ 
shall not exceed 75000 at end of year;  this 
target group are persons who have had not 
a regular job for the past two years, i.e. 
only short spells of employment, if any.  
number of „long-term enrollees“, divided by 
completed months of year; county targets 
7. An average of at least 55000 persons 
occupationally handicapped should receive 
special programme (‘A3’) 
number of participants divided by months 
completed; county targets 
8. Level of subsidies paid to employers shall 
not exceed 60% of the wage cost 
measured by data from the PES-economic 
register, national target  
9. At least 22000 employers should use 
internet service of PES (internal PES 
target) 
number of employers registered as users of 
the ‘Jobseekers Bank’; county targets apply 
10.Employers’ satisfaction with the PES shall 
be at least 65% (internal PES target) 
employers satisfied or very satisfied 
according to service audit; county targets 
11.Individual action plans for all long-term 
unemployed (internal PES target) 
percentage of long-term unemployed with an 
individual action plan, divided by all long-term 
unemployed 
12.Jobseekers’ satisfaction with the PES 
shall rise to 50% (internal PES target) 
jobseekers’ satisfied or very satisfied 
according to service audit; county targets 
Source: ISEKen 1999, No. 9, and questionnaire response 
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Another example is the target of an annual average number of labour market 
programme participants, which was abolished in 1999. On the one hand, the target 
gave the wrong signal, that is, to provide as many places at low cost. On the other 
hand, the target was not giving any useful guiding signals for the employment offices, 
since it did not take into account the influence of funding and programme rules.  
Targets or indicators that cannot or are not monitored continuously are also of 
doubtful utility. This is the case, for example, with the recent employers telephone 
surveys to measure the percentage of suitable job applicants. Results of these 
surveys are only available quarterly, which makes the data rather useless from a 
‘hands-on’ management point of view. The same shortcoming applies to the indicator 
for the subsidisation rate for programmes targeting disabled persons. 
Target levels have also sometimes been criticized for being unrealistic, e.g. the 
1999 target on turnover into work after a vocational training programme (target No. 3 
in Table 10).49 Targets with maximum levels (such as a job offer for all unemployed 
under 25 within 100 days) are questioned for the same reason; demanding, but still 
realistic target levels should be preferred.  
This is only a selection of some typical target and indicator problems in Sweden. 
In sum, measurement problems, including creaming and distortion effects, are 
probably most important. Failure to be an effective tool for steering actual behaviour 
in implementation is a second important issue. 
3.4 Process analysis: definition and implementation of policy goals, objectives 
and indicators 
The overarching policy goals are defined by the Riksdag (Parliament) and the 
government. The government also sets a number of quantitative operational targets, 
which are subsequently transformed into regional and local targets by the AMS. The 
regional targets are based on dialogues between the National Labour Market Board 
(AMS) and the County Labour Board(s); and the local offices and the County Labour 
Boards for the local targets, respectively. 
Within government, the department of industry (the equivalent of the labour 
ministry) and the department of finance deal together with broad planning of labour 
market policy. Their internal discussion is fed by annual inputs of from the AMS, 
including budget proposals (for a three-years time frame) as well as policy issues 
debated or arisen at the various levels of PES. Once the preliminary goals and 
operational targets are decided and communicated by the government, a discussion 
process across all PES-levels is initiated which may affect or influence the final 
                                            
49  The same target is also criticized for assessing a follow up participation in another (second) 
training shortly after programme end, as a failure, given its measurement logic. 
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document concluded by the Ministry of industry in collaboration with the Ministry of 
finance.  
The funding process (budget allocation) and the MBO planning process at the 
national level are very closely connected (see for details Niklasson and Tomsmark 
1997: 226-228). As in several other countries, the entire planning process needs a 
whole budget year. In the past, some problems occurred when the final budget allo-
cation deviated from the planned or preliminary budget as the latter is the base for 
the operational planning of policies.   
On the other hand, the level or volume of (regional and local) budgets allocated 
is not directly linked to MBO: Budget allocation to the county offices is based on a 
national allocation formula which takes several factors into account, but not, for in-
stance, performance results of the previous period. The allocation key seems to have 
changed during the course of the 1990s (compare Niklasson and Tomsmark’s 
description with ISEKen 1999 No. 9, p.12). 
As the decision of the national MBO-document is usually presented not before 
mid-December, there is as a rule only very limited time to establishing regional 
targets, „especially if there are late changes of the national target levels (which 
occurs)“ (Q 10). Based on initial proposals of the AMS, the target levels for each 
county will be discussed, negotiated and finally agreed upon. A similar process is 
carried out for the Employment offices within each county. 
In the counties, the target levels for the local employment offices will be 
determined in a process between the county PES and each of their local offices 
similar to the national procedure. The planning results will be settled between the 
directors of the county boards and the local PES directors in formal performance 
agreements on target levels. In organizational terms, these agreements are based on 
telephone conferences (with variable participants) and on „ordinary meetings of the 
county labour boards in December“ (Q11). The negotiations in this phase are 
characterised through a considerable time pressure; they have to be finished before 
the end of January - „since the MBO-following up process begins with presenting the 
results for January already in the beginning of February“ (Q10).  
The forecasting and allocation of target levels is being prepared in the 
Controlling units of AMS and the county offices, respectively. The methods vary, 
depending on the targets: sometimes „strict mathematical formulae“ are used, and 
sometimes not. At national level, relative target levels (in %) are not discussed at all 
as they apply for all units. On the other hand, whenever a national target has to be 
divided (i.e. targets in absolute numbers), AMS may immediately consult the counties 
to discuss the division. The market conditions in different parts of the country and the 
past performance of the counties within these areas will be also considered to find a 
fair and adequate ‘distribution’ of the target figures.  
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At regional level, furthermore, implementation issues may be more emphasised 
for some of targets instead of a ‘rigid’ calculation of levels. For instance, if a target 
addresses also quality standards of services (as in the case of 80% satisfied em-
ployers), different implementation options to achieve the target may be 
recommended by the County office in the planning document, (even though imple-
mentation options are in principle to the discretion of the local managers).  
Finally, it should be noted that local managers have to check the plausibility of 
the county projections on target levels though their own short-term forecasts, 
projecting six quarters ahead like the county. This may be a good example for the 
competence of the AMS staff managers as well as the technical devices of Swedish 
MBO planning and implementation.  
3.5 The management information system 
Based on the operational targets, a set of core results indicators is being used for 
ongoing, as a rule monthly monitoring (some results are only available on a quarterly 
basis). These indicators are completely given to all executive managers in the PES 
and can be thus used for cross-county comparisons. Deviations from the expected or 
planned performance will immediately lead to contacts between the County Labour 
Board Director and the AMS Directorate. 
The cornerstone of performance monitoring is the computerised LEDA 
management information system. It can, among other things, display the operational 
targets for the various levels and organizations of the PES (national, regional, local 
PES plus employability institutes) on a yearly, quarterly or monthly basis. The system 
enables current comparisons of performance with targets. Access to the system is 
open to all employees of the PES who are, therefore, able to follow-up their (running) 
performance from any PES workstation. In addition, operative financial management 
(in terms of budget planning and spending) at employment services level is being 
supported by the IT system PRESTO.50 However, despite high technical IT standards 
(by international comparison), all the relevant performance management information 
is not yet integrated into one electronic information system. It is planned to overcome 
this shortcoming by introduction of a data warehouse system in the next few years. 
Finally, customer satisfaction of both jobseekers and employers is monitored in 
regular annual intervals, by surveys (service ratings) at central and local levels. 
                                            
50 According to official information (ISEKen 1999: 9, p. 14), Presto provides financial data (out-
payments etc) per cost-centre, but data could be also broken down into their sequence of 
operations. 
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3.6. Performance assessment and benchmarking 
In Sweden, (similar to France) a variety of regular follow-up meetings and arrange-
ments supplement the permanent performance monitoring process through LEDA 
and other devices described in section 5. For instance, there are regular ‘result 
conferences’ between the AMS directorate and the County Labour Directorates. 
Typically, these consultations take place monthly as telephone conferences. At about 
every 15 months, county reviews will be organised to discuss the situation and the 
results between the AMS Directorate, the County Labour Director and the directors of 
the local employment offices in personal dialogue, finally leading to agreements on 
future activities. In addition, the respective boards of the AMS, the County Labour 
Boards and the Local Employment Services Committees discuss quarterly the 
progress of activities on the basis of written reports. Finally, at national level, four 
times a year, the AMS directorate meets the Ministry of Economy for half-day reviews 
of general market results and development. 
In addition to the frequent follow-up checks of the counties’ performance, there is 
also a „final summing up of the performance for the whole year“, even if each target 
area is usually followed up separately (Q 22). These so-called annual county ‘exams’ 
are probably the most important form of performance review. Performance pay 
schemes do not play a role in Sweden so far. For all the follow-up activities 
throughout a given year the same set of a limited number of core performance indi-
cators is used, which was agreed prior to the start of the new fiscal year (cf. 
ISEKen1999: 9, p. 13).  
Moreover, a recent, but important change: since April 2000 the County labour 
offices are obliged to report performance monthly to AMS; before, they had to 
provide their reports only in quarterly intervals. From the county point of view, 
however, the new obligation is considered a heavy burden, not only because of the 
workload but also due to data limitations. In fact, the new reporting obligations were 
enforced by government, which is now even demanding weekly reports for some 
issues. Like the counties, AMS officials interviewed were not happy about these new 
demands, even though AMS has to implement them.  
One of the most important findings of the Swedish case study is that the MBO 
system seems to have existed in rather formal terms before 1996/97, without any 
target levels definitely to be reached and without an effective controlling of results. 
Thus, according to one expert interviewed, the older ‘MBO-system’ existed merely on 
paper: „...you carried on with your work as usual - ‘business as usual’ - and you 
never looked back and compared what was accomplished [in terms] of the targets“. 
Two factors then led to an effective (or ‘real’) implementation of the MBO-approach in 
the Swedish PES: First, the introduction of the LEDA system (see section 5), which 
made it much easier to follow up target levels reached and to implement a real 
feedback process, second, a stricter implementation of the results of the county 
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performance reviews, which in some cases even led to the replacement of County 
PES’ directors for not seriously implementing the MBO-approach. 
Quality management and benchmarking issues 
In Sweden (like in France), the aim of becoming a learning organization has been 
recently (in 1998/99) emphasised. Among other things, a PES internal 
communication and discussion process (that involved all working teams at all work-
places) about the future role, means and competencies of the PES in the 21st century 
was implemented in 1998. However, this initiative (and successors51) as well as 
related topics such as quality management, and service-related targets (e.g. 
customer satisfaction) lost momentum this year (2000) after the Swedish government 
increased pressure on AMS to pursue its main goal of reducing unemployment (to 
bring the unemployment rate down to 4% by the end of 2000). Due to this political 
pressure (passed on from AMS down to the counties and from there to the local 
offices), the changes in the management system through LEDA, and a generally 
more consequent follow-up process since 1997, the PES internal climate seems to 
have changed significantly towards serious performance comparisons, favouring also 
benchmarking in the sense of awareness or looking for and at the better practices. 
This, however, has been at the expense of the ‘softer’ emphasis on organizational 
culture and communication. 
Even though the ‘new’ generation of managers52 at both county and local level 
can be expected to fully support the management principles in force, there are 
different views or disagreements regarding the targets, or the weighing of targets, 
and even the programmes and means to achieve these targets. The same is true for 
the views and perspectives on benchmarking. Some critics criticize new programmes 
as being too regulated and complex that pre-define too many processes and rules to 
be met, which they regard as being in contradiction to MBO and implementation of 
their own local best-practices. Others argue that process control in line with quality 
management principles has to be strengthened; and that the previous emphasis on 
quality policies (which can be traced back until 1994) has to be strengthened, thereby 
promoting the benchmarking culture which has been alive at the ‘bottom level’ any-
way53. In summary, the (personnel of the) Swedish PES seems to be a very vivid 
organization in which ‘benchmarking’ does not follow any formal models, but gets 
rather a meaning through open minded debates across the different levels and 
positions. This benchmarking potential in the Swedish PES might be threatened 
through political ambitions to ‘shrink and stifle’ the PES to a ‘mere’ governmental 
                                            
51  For instance, the last output of these discussions and activities is the ‘workbook 2000’ which 
represents some sort of interim conclusion on new professional roles of the PES personnel etc. 
52  After the introduction of target levels in 1996/97), some directors who did not adhere to the new 
management requirements (hence producing rather bad results) were replaced.  
53  It should also be noted that the counties were enabled in 1996 (by governmental degree) to 
choose or develop their own organizational model for the county and local offices in their area. 
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agency largely deprived of its own voice and decision competencies. Even though 
this is not the case yet, some voices in the AMV (Swedish PES as a whole) see 
recent indications for such ambitions in government. 
4. France: PES performance management profile 
4.1 The organizational context 
Responsibility for the implementation of labour market policy is highly fragmented in 
France. The main French employment service institutions are ANPE (French National 
Employment Office), AFPA (Adult Professional Education Association), UNEDIC 
(National Union for Industrial and Commercial Employment), and the Employment 
Ministry (organized at different levels). Of these institutions ANPE and AFPA have 
tripartite structures in which the social partners formally share authority with public 
representatives. UNEDIC is, by contrast, in form a purely bipartite institution based 
on a national agreement between representatives of the social partners. 
ANPE (Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi) is the national employment office and 
the central organization of the public placement service. The ANPE has two principal 
missions. First, it has to assist people in seeking employment, training or professional 
counselling. At the same time, it has to assist employers in recruiting personnel. 
Established in 1967, it is a national public body with an independent legal status but 
under the authority of the labour minister, who appoints the Director-General of 
ANPE. In 1980 a tripartite board of management was introduced, which however has 
only limited independence vis-à-vis the state.  
ANPE is organised in 22 regional offices (DRA, Directions régionales ANPE), 
120 delegated offices (DDA, Directions Départementales ANPE) and 738 local 
employment offices (DALE, Directions Agences Locales pour l’Emploi). The ANPE 
board defines the institution’s strategic orientation with the Ministry of Employment 
and Solidarity. It provides regional offices with the resources to carry out their policies 
and is responsible for follow-up. 
AFPA (Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes) is the 
National Association for Adult Vocational Training. The policies of this formally 
independent training organization, which carries about 40% of training for the 
unemployed, are determined by the labour minister and nearly 70% of its resources 
comes from public sources. 
ANPE and AFPA are both attached to the DGEFP (Délégation générale à 
l’Emploi et la formation professionnelle), the General delegation for employment and 
vocational training, which is attached to the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity.  
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Although ANPE itself is a highly centralized organization, in 1997 a new, more 
decentralized approach was tested in France with respect to the active policy meas-
ures managed by the DGEFP: In 22 territorial departments (6 regions) the DGEFP 
offices autonomously manage the funding for seven reintegration measures. Use of 
these measures is dependent on a territorial diagnosis agreed by the different agents 
intervening in the department’s labour market, that is, ANPE, AFPA, and the 
decentralised services for work, employment and vocational training DDTEFP (see 
inforMISEP, No. 65, 1999, p. 23) This strategy produced positive results and was 
therefore extended a year later to other regions. The development of local policies 
facilitated the access to the labour market for those who are difficult to place. The 
use of block grants instead of earmarked allocation of funds for the individual meas-
ures helped to adjust tools to local conditions (Simonin 2000). 
The UNEDIC (Union Nationale d’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce), the 
French unemployment benefit system, is a non-profit association established in 1958 
by interprofessional agreement, i.e. by the social partners. UNEDIC is governed by a 
bipartite council that every two years appoints a managing board from among its 
members. Its chairman is alternately a representative of the employers’ associations 
and a union representative. UNEDIC is organized at the national level and controls 
ASSEDIC. ASSEDIC (Associaction pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce), 
the Association for industrial and commercial employment is comparable to UNEDIC 
and is organized at territorial level. ASSEDIC has to join UNEDIC. Yet, the real role 
of social partners in the unemployment system functioning is more ambiguous, as the 
state continuously intervenes in its activities. 
4.2 PES performance management approach 
The MBO approach based on ex ante policy objectives and quantitative targets has 
been used in France since 1990. The introduction of this management system was 
supposed to set clearer priorities in labour market policy, strengthen public 
responsibility as well as improve the efficiency and effectiveness of regional and local 
employment offices. In addition, the policy discretion of local employment offices was 
to be increased to enable a better adjustment of programmes to local needs (see 
questionnaire).  
There were two immediate reasons for the introduction of MBO in the ANPE: 
1. The ANPE has often been viewed very critically in France: and regarded as being 
inefficient. ANPE had to modernise its administration, to demonstrate that it was 
trying to be efficient and to increase its legitimacy. 
2. Furthermore, rising unemployment necessitated a restructuring of ANPE. 
The MBO system used by the French labour administration developed in two phases: 
first its introduction in 1990; second by that establishment of a ‘controlling’ 
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department: In 1995, ANPE’s system of target steering was considerably improved. 
By introducing a ‘controlling’ department (Direction du Controle de Gestion), a close 
link was formed between the allocation of funds, the targets and the results. Further-
more, since establishment of the controlling department, for the first time the circum-
stances in the regions and départements have been considered in setting targets. 
The entire organization has become very strongly target-driven as the target-
orientation has been fully institutionalised.  
MBO at ANPE appears to be very hierarchically organised in comparison with 
some other PES organizations. The objectives of the ANPE are formulated and 
quantified at national level and allocated in a strongly hierarchical negotiating context 
to the regional and local levels, although there appears to be no automatic allocation 
formula for passing on mandatory national targets to the regional level.  
4.3 Inventory of goals, objectives, performance indicators 
A „progress agreement“ (Contrat de Progrès) for a period of five years is concluded 
between ANPE and the French state. This agreement specifies the strategic 
orientation of the labour administration. ANPE strives to achieve those goals and the 
state is under the obligation to furnish ANPE with the necessary financial means to 
achieve them.54 The third progress agreement which runs from 1999-2003 empha-
sizes in particular the modernisation of the ANPE, integration of youth into the labour 
market, avoidance of long-term unemployment, and the struggle against exclusion 
(inforMISEP, no. 66, 1999, p. 11). ANPE develops an annual programme of 
objectives with quantitative targets (e.g. ’Programmation 2000’) based on the 
progress agreement. The indicator system of the annual programme is very closely 
based on the goals and indicators developed in the progress agreement. 
Both strategic and operational goals are formulated. The strategic goals 
represent overall labour market goals (e.g. reduction of long-term unemployment or 
market share of the ANPE), whereas operational objectives provide ANPE staff with 
guidance on how these overall goals are to be reached through ANPE’s activities. 
Thus the former are more prominent in ANPE’s public relations and internal priorities. 
In the course of the development of the MBO-based management system the 
number of annual goals has been systematically reduced from 20 in 1996 to 12 in the 
year 2000 (see ANPE 2000a, p. 18). 
At ANPE the changes in political priorities have led to changes in indicators. The 
first two progress agreements placed political priority on the increasing market share 
of the ANPE. This was then also the main indicator in practice, although other indica-
tors existed as well. For example, 30% to 40% of all vacancies were to be registered 
by the ANPE. The official results at the time were good. It is however difficult to 
                                            
54  The first progress agreement was made in France for the years 1990-1993. The second progress 
agreement covers the years 1994-1998. 
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measure market share in vacancies or placements, and there is therefore a certain 
unreliability in the figures. Nevertheless, ANPE did increase its market share, though 
it remains unclear to what extent. Surveys carried out independently of ANPE 
indicate that only 14% of all former job seekers had found a new job with the support 
of the ANPE, considerably less than the 30% to 40% reported by ANPE (Simonin, 
2000).55 Meanwhile, the reduction of long-term unemployment has become a political 
priority. 
Currently the goals of the ANPE are particularly concentrated on three points: 
First, one of the top goals of the ANPE is fighting long-term unemployment and youth 
unemployment. The second priority is placement, i.e. the registration of open 
positions and filling them. Thirdly, the ANPE is trying to refer unemployed people to 
AFPA, the institution for adult vocational training. 
ANPE uses a relatively small number of goals. Between 1999 and 2000, ANPE 
reduced the number of goals from 15 to 12, in this context four goals were 
eliminated, one goal newly developed and one goal was reformulated. The goal of 
allocating at least 25% of all measures to RMI-recipients (social assistance) was 
completely eliminated for the year 2000 as was the goal of an average of 10 days 
staff participation in further training. The previous goal on quality management (95% 
of all employment offices to receive a quality certification by 1999) was dropped for 
the year 2000, although ‘only’ 77.1% of all offices had been awarded the certification 
by the end of 1999. The goal ‘strategically changed’ was the one which defined for 
1999 that the number of very long-term unemployed (>2 years) be reduced by 5%: in 
2000 the 5%-goal was replaced by a concrete figure of 40 000. Furthermore, 55% of 
the participants in training measures were supposed to have found employment in 
the year 1999. In the year 2000, this goal was defined more concretely so that it only 
applies to the participants of the new-start programme and is no longer measured in 
percentage but in absolute figures instead. Finally, one goal was newly introduced for 
2000. While in 1999 only the number of people referred to the AFPA was counted, in 
2000 the percentage of new-start participants among these people will be recorded 
additionally. 
                                            
55  Quite similar ‘placement-gaps’ between official PES estimates and independent assessments are 
also reported in other countries. 
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Table 11: ANPE strategic and operational goals, 1999 and 2000 
 
GOALS 1999 2000 
Strategic goals: 
Registered vacancies 2 850 000 2 925 000 
Percentage of anonymous vacancies to be filled 65% 66% 
Number of long-term unemployed (>2 years unemployed) -5% -40 000 
Youth long-term unemployment  -25% -15% 
Exits from long-term unemployment (>1 year unemployed) 1 260 000 1 120 000 
Percentage of RMI recipients in individual measures 25% - 
Operational goals: 
Vacancies filled 2 500 000 2 550 000 
Placement of managers and professionals  30 000 30 000 
Percentage of participants in training programmes going on to employment 55% - 
Entrants ‘new-start programme’ 850 000 1 100 000 
Percentage of leavers in the ‘new-start programme’ who either found 
employment or who have worked at least 78 hours 
 
- 
 
550 000 
Number of persons who are referred to AFPA to participate in measures 
there 
80 000 130 000 
of which are participants in the ‘new-start programme’ - 90 000 
Number of participants in a service offered  750 000 850 000 
Percentage of qualified local employment offices in quality programme 95% - 
Average time in further-training per member of staff 10 days - 
Percentage of voluntary workers who participate in a progress conversation 100% - 
Source: Programmation 1999 (ANPE), Programmation 2000 (ANPE) 
Some indicators have proved more useful than others. The indicator ‘number of 
vacancies registered’ has turned out to be very useful because it is easy to under-
stand and has been immediately accepted by staff of the labour administration. This 
indicator helped to increase the number of placements, which in turn benefited com-
panies recruiting. The goal ‘reduction of long-term unemployment (>2 years)’ needed 
start-up time in the beginning until the correct usage of the indicator was established, 
but it is now well accepted (see questionnaire). Over a long period of time, the 
increasing unemployment made it very difficult for the ANPE to achieve the goal of 
reducing long-term unemployment. Due to the improving labour market situation this 
goal can be achieved more easily today. 
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Target achievement in ANPE has been uneven. For example, for the year 1999, 
the goal of registering vacancies was reached in 11 regions, the remaining 11 
regions fell only slightly short of the goal. All in all, the ANPE was able to register 2 
839 272 vacancies and therefore only just missed its national goal (2 850 000). The 
results were similar for the goal „filling 65% of the anonymous vacancies offered”. 
Only 4 regions reached their goal, but the other 18 regions just barely missed it, so 
that on a national level 64.4% of the anonymous vacancies offered could be filled. 
Another ANPE goal successfully achieved, was „decreasing the number of long-term 
unemployed (>2 years unemployed) by 5%”. Here, a decrease of 7% was reached. In 
general, most regional objectives were barely missed (see Tableaux de bord), which 
might be interpreted to mean that ANPE uses appropriately ‘stretching’ targets that 
provide an incentive for enhanced performance but are not unrealistic to attain. 
4.4 Process analysis: definition and implementation of policy goals, objectives 
and indicators 
Twice a year the ANPE Director General meets individually with each regional 
director. The first meeting for planning the targets of the following year takes place in 
the middle of the year. In this meeting an analysis of the current results is made and 
one begins to plan what can be achieved in the following year. For this, the circum-
stances of the region, the current results and potential for improvement are taken into 
consideration. 
The second meeting takes place at the beginning of the following year, for 
example in January or in late December. Here, the targets for the coming year are 
set out and in this context, the targets from the previous year are re-examined. 
Similar discussions also take place between the regional directors and delegation 
directors and between the delegation directors and the directors of local labour 
administrations. Therefore all four levels of the ANPE play an important role in the 
definition of targets (Direction Générale, Directions Régionales, Directions 
Déléguées, agences locales) 
The goals and the indicators are documented and operationalised in so-called 
programme dossiers on a regional level and in local action plans on a local level. The 
responsibility for these plans lies with the individual actors involved at the different 
levels. The individual employment offices can set up local action plans in which they 
work out their office’s strategy for achieving the targets, however, they are under no 
obligation to set up these plans. Each local labour administration makes an effort to 
meet the goals negotiated with the next higher level.  
The regional target levels are set out in several steps: 
- June/July: The ‘controlling’ department and the region make a diagnosis 
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- July/September: The director-general of the ANPE meets with every regional 
director to develop an initial action framework 
- Beginning of November: the regional directors specify their proposals. 
- January/February: The director general decides on the final plan with each 
regional director. 
The target levels are set at delegation and local levels as follows: 
The process as described above also takes place between regional and delegation 
directors. Within the region, the planning takes place between September and 
January each year. It is completed as soon as the general director decides on the 
final method to proceed with the region. Each level fixes its contribution in relation-
ship to goals set for the next higher level (see ANPE 2000a, p. 19). Consequently, 
the room for manoeuvre of local employment offices is relatively small when setting 
the target levels. The delegation directors take on the task of explaining the 
objectives to the directors of the local employment offices and of discussing those 
goals with them. Even if the level of goal achievement has been set high for the local 
employment offices, the directors of the local offices are supposed to understand the 
reasons for this. 
Example: At the national level, the target was set that 2850000 vacancies were to be 
registered in 2000. The regional directorate „Ile de France“ was to register 700000 of 
those vacancies, the delegation directorate „Villette“ was supposed to register 35000 
and the local employment office „St. Georges“ 10000 vacancies. The negotiations 
begin with discussions between the regional directors and the director general to set 
the regional target levels. Then the delegation directors negotiate with the regional 
directors to fix the targets on the delegation level. Finally each individual local 
employment office negotiates its contribution towards achieving the goal on the 
delegation level. There are 5 local employment agencies in the delegation „Villette“. 
The target to be achieved on the delegation level was fixed and negotiated with the 
regional director of „Ile de France“ before the local employment office directors 
negotiated their targets. Consequently, the scope of discretion for „St. Georges“ is 
small because it only consists of the local employment office negotiating its 
contribution towards achieving the goal on a national level. Should a certain em-
ployment office contribute less, then another employment office in the same 
delegation will have to balance this out. The local employment office directors will 
have to agree on what percentage of the quantified target each of them will take on. 
The delegation directors negotiate their target figures under the same conditions with 
the regional director. 
4.5 The management information system 
The management information system in France encompasses all operational targets 
and performance indicators. The local and regional employment agencies have to 
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report monthly to ANPE’s national controlling unit on the extent to which targets have 
been reached using the agreed indicators. The monitoring system is computerised 
and organised as a data base system on an internal network. The results of the on-
going monitoring of progress toward targets is completely accessible for all levels 
and units. 
The central element in the French management information system is the so-
called ‘Tableaux de bord’ produced by the controlling department. These documents 
depict the monthly results in the regions and the results for the whole of France. 
Furthermore, regional controlling managers produce such reports within the regions 
at delegation level, containing the local results. Thus the continuous achievement of 
targets is monitored by a regional team as well as by a team on the delegation level. 
The regional team includes the delegation directors, the deputy regional director and 
the regional director of a region. 
Within a delegation a similar process takes place: All local employment office 
directors also meet with the delegation director on a monthly basis to view the 
results. 
The monitoring system is being used as an early warning system in France. 
ANPE must report monthly to the Ministry on the achievement of the targets with 
respect to long-term unemployment; for all other targets ANPE is required to report 
only on a quarterly basis. ANPE’s head office monitors the performance of the 
regional offices, which in turn control their subordinate units etc. In case of low 
(continuous) target achievement, policy intervention occurs at each subordinate level. 
Intervention may take the form of organizational measures, training, or provision of 
additional staff. 
The Controlling Department: 
The French labour administration ANPE has various controlling institutions on both a 
national and regional level. The national „direction du controle de gestion” consists of 
10 people and reports directly to the deputy Director-General for future development, 
controlling and international affairs (Directeur général adjoint Prospective Contrôle 
International), who in turn reports to the Director-General of the ANPE. The 10 staff 
members include a head of department, an assistant and 8 members of staff. In 
addition, regional administration controllers (Contrôleurs de gestion régionaux) work 
at regional level. Each regional director appoints a regional controller in his region. 
This way, a network of regional controlling managers is set up who are regularly in 
contact with each other and with the controlling department at the national level (see 
ANPE 200a, p. 6-16). 
The controlling department has various tasks. For one, they have to keep a 
record of the results and draw conclusions. On the other hand, they are also 
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responsible for carrying out client surveys and for co-ordinating the entire planning 
work at ANPE. The controlling department is, in other words, the ‘heart’ of the MBO 
at ANPE. It helps on different levels with the quantification of the targets, it follows up 
reports about the results and it develops methods to analyse the results. 
4.6 Performance assessment and benchmarking 
There are several tools for performance assessment. Among those are especially the 
evaluation of the multi-annual progress agreement, the certification in quality 
management, the assigning of awards to staff members and units of the ANPE and 
the meetings of directors on the various levels, as well as continuous managerial 
surveillance of subordinate units. 
Evaluation of ‘progress agreement’ 
An evaluation committee is assigned to assess compliance with the progress agree-
ment. It consists of the Director General of the ANPE, the general delegates for em-
ployment and vocational training, the Budget-Director, a representative of the 
Economic and Social Council and a representative each of the Planning Agency and 
the General Inspection Agency for Social Issues. The evaluation is based on the 
monitoring of results (quantitative approach) and on studies as well as surveys re-
garding the quality of the labour administration. At the end of the year 2000, the 
evaluation committee will submit an interim evaluation report which will contain the 
first results of the progress agreement for the years 1999-2003 (see ANPE 1999c, p. 
36). 
Meetings of directors 
The performance assessment is being ensured through several actions (see ANPE 
2000a, p. 20): 
- Quarterly meetings of the administration council 
- Monthly meetings of regional directors 
- Monthly meetings of the General Directorate  
- Annual discussions on progress toward and setting of targets between the General 
director and the regional directors. 
At the local level, the performance assessment takes place in monthly meetings be-
tween the local employment office directors and the delegation directors. These 
meetings simultaneously serve the purpose of reporting on the continuous achieve-
ment of targets. At the delegation level, the same process takes place between the 
delegation directors, the deputy regional director and the regional director.  
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Comparison of performance/benchmarking 
Regarding the expansion of ‘best-practice’ examples and the development of a 
learning organization, some initial modest steps have been taken at ANPE. In the 3rd 
progress agreement of 1999 a recommendation was made to change the institution 
to a learning organization and to support the staff in becoming more professional 
(see ’progress agreement’). Furthermore, the monthly meetings of the local directors 
with the delegation directors entail an exchange on ‘best-practice’ examples. The 
harmonisation of actions on a local level regarding target steering, however, is the 
prime goal of such an exchange. 
Moreover, some individual employment policy programmes contain in addition 
tools for identifying ‘best-practice’ examples, for example, the „emploi-jeunes” 
programme. The ‘best-practice’ approach is given little emphasis by the French 
labour administration and is not strongly institutionalised. Finally, systematic 
comparison of performance across ANPE operating units does not exist nationally 
and is practiced only informally by regional and district managers.  
Quality management and performance incentives at ANPE (awards) 
The former Director General of the ANPE Michel Bon introduced quality management 
at ANPE, confronting ANPE with management methods used in industry. Two types 
of performance pay awards were introduced: a) „la prime d’intéressement“ b) „la 
prime de responsabilité“ (for managers). 
The first pay award (prime d’intéressement) is a reward for the staff’s collective 
efforts for the realisation of the annual targets. But not all the national targets are 
taken into consideration for this award. Only the achievement of the following three 
objectives has an impact on the award allocation: 
- Increase of the number of registered vacancies 
- Reduction of the number of long-term unemployed (>2 years unemployed 
- Increase of the number of entrants in the “new-start programme” per staff member 
This award focuses on the assessment of two things: first the reward for the 
achievement of the national objectives and second the reward for the achievement of 
the local objectives. The local objectives are complementary to the national 
objectives (see above), but here the local contribution to the achievement of the 
national goals should be rewarded, too (in addition to the reward for the achievement 
of the national goals). 
The distribution of the award is based on four levels of achievement: 
- “not reached”: if less than 95% of the goal is achieved 
79 
- “partly reached”: if between 95% and 100% of the goal is achieved. 
- “reached”: if between 100% and 102% of the goal is achieved 
- “surpassed”: if more than 102% of the goal is achieved. 
These criteria are applied not only to the achievement of the national objectives but 
also to the achievement of the local objectives. The condition for an award  is, that 
the goals have been at least partly reached. The pay award for each staff member of 
the ANPE is composed of the reward for the achievement of the national goal (2/3 of 
the pay award) and the reward for the achievement of the local objectives (1/3 of the 
pay award). The amount of the award for the national target achievement is the same 
for all staff members of ANPE. On the other hand the award for the local target 
achievement differs from one local ANPE-office to another. In case that ‘only’ two of 
three objectives are achieved, the amount of the award is lower than in case of the 
achievement of all three objectives. 
The total amount of the annual award does not surpass 2% of the total amount of 
the salaries of ANPE (in regard of the budget of the public employment service). The 
price is paid to the staff in the first quarter of the year and refers to the performances 
of the previous year. The amount of the award given to the staff members of a local 
employment office is the same for all. But the amount of the award can vary from one 
local employment office to another depending on the achievement of the local 
objectives.  
The second award (prime de responsabilité) is intended for management at the 
different levels, including the local level (e.g. team leaders). The manager at the next 
higher level assesses each manager or team leader’s performance. The four criteria 
for the valuation of the performances of the staff are: 1) insufficient performance (no 
prize is given) (‘level a’) 2) performance to improve (‘level b’), 3) satisfactory (or 
good) performance(‘level c’), 4) extraordinary performance (‘level d’). 
Managers must have reached at least level b, in order to receive the pay award. The 
managers are divided up into two groups: 
a) Managers with a higher position in the hierarchy: regional directors, delegation 
directors, local employment office directors  
b) Team leaders or leaders of a certain service at local level 
The amount of the pay award depends both on the group, to which the manager be-
longs and on the level of performance. The higher the level, the higher the amount of 
the award; ANPE has developed a special distribution key for this system. On the 
basis of the division into these two groups and on basis of these levels points are 
allocated and these points indicate the amount of the award. 
There is, furthermore, a third staff performance assessment, but this award is not 
connected to the achievement of the implemented goals. It refers to the so-called 
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„prime de fonction“ (pay award for the individual performance). Here, too, the staff 
member at the next higher level assesses the performance of each staff member. 
Example: This award is presented twice per year on the local level. The director of 
the local employment office evaluates the way the staff work in their dealings with 
colleagues and clients. The bonus amounts to half a month’s salary at the most. The 
assessment of the staff by the director should ideally show a lot of variation and the 
range should be fully exploited. This also means that this award can be distributed in 
the range of 0-3 „parts variables“ of the salary. 
Another important element of quality management at ANPE is the awarding of 
the quality certification to local employment agencies. If a local employment office 
has received such a quality certification, it seems to be guaranteed for the time being 
that the services provided by the office meet a certain standard. „The objective is a 
transparent, rich, diversified, fair and accessible offer” (inforMISEP, No. 60, 1997, p. 
16). The quality certificate is valid for three years. To receive it, it takes a year of 
preparatory time and the mobilisation of the entire staff. 
The current services will have to be examined, improved service must be put in 
place and the action must be evaluated. There are, in particular, 108 points to be 
dealt with which can be summarised in 9 major goals: 
 
Improved  service for people seeking employment: 
! As soon as a person seeking employment enters the employment office, he should be 
received and directed towards the respective service. 
! From the very beginning of counselling, one should try and offer the person seeking 
employment an individually tailored way to develop. 
! The vacancies should be described precisely and displayed in a comprehensible way. 
! The vacancies should be updated regularly. 
! The equipment of the free service area (as e.g. the photocopier) should be in a good 
working condition. 
 
Improved service for companies: 
! Each company should have a personal consultant from the employment office 
assigned to it. 
! Each company should be offered the kind of services that are most likely to fulfil its 
requirements. 
! The consultant from the employment office should give the company a written  
confirmation of its request. 
! Each company has the right to be informed about the further proceedings regarding 
 the handling of its request. 
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The quality certification, which is awarded if all 9 service goals are met, does not 
comply with the ISO-norm but was largely inspired by it. The improvement in services 
will be evaluated from 4 sides, the client (the one seeking work, the one offering 
work), the personnel of the ANPE, the executives and one external observer who 
comes from the ANPE management of another region. These assessments will be 
acknowledged by a quality commission which consists of: 1) the deputy regional 
director; 2) a representative of the general directorate of the ANPE; 3) the delegation 
director (as external observer); 4) the head of another local employment office; 5) 
and a representative from the regional directorate. 
The quality commission then writes a report on the results of their observations 
and qualifies the employment office with the certification, either with distinction or 
with recommendations or with reservations. There is an annual check-up to see 
whether the obligations are still being complied with and if the quality of the service is 
still ensured. By the end of 1998, 31% of all ANPE agencies had received the quality 
certification. By the end of 1999, 90% of all agencies had qualified (see ANPE 
2000b) and at the beginning of the year 2000, all local agencies had qualified 
(inforMISEP , No. 66, 1999, p. 12). 
5.  Comparing performance management in Austria, France, Sweden 
and Great Britain 
This section discusses similarities and differences in the PES performance manage-
ment systems. We consider in particular:  
1. The PES performance management approach in general  
2. Goals, targets, indicators and their respective pros and cons  
3. Planning and Implementation process (incl. quality management) 
4. Performance assessment and benchmarking  
This comparison focuses in particular on PES performance management in the four 
countries that were the subject of more intensive case studies: Austria, France, 
Sweden, and Great Britain. Some comparison is also made to Germany, which is an 
interesting transitional case because it has just recently begun to introduce MBO-
principles in its PES.  
5.1 The PES performance management approach  
What are the main characteristics of the PES’ performance management systems in 
Austria, France, Sweden and Great Britain? In all four countries (some type of) MBO 
represents a major component of performance management. Moreover, all have had 
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quite ‘mature’ MBO systems that were either introduced in the 1980s or early 1990s 
or, as in the Austrian case, have developed rapidly. The most complex approach is 
probably that in Austria: the annual MBO-cycle of the AMS has to be closely co-
ordinated with the different pillars of Austrian labour market policy goals (i.e. the 
Ministerial goals, the Austrian National Action Plan, the ESF planning, and the 
medium-term planning of the PES itself). Since the annual plans have to be based on 
the medium term goals, continuity in labour market policy is given; on the other hand, 
these co-ordination demands constrain planning options. Moreover, the ambitious 
‘Comprehensive Controlling System’ (Gesamtsteuerungssystem) currently being 
introduced will further increase the complexity of the management system in 
comparison with the (relatively) traditional MBO-approach pursued thus far. In sum, 
Austria’s performance management is being continually developed and is driven by 
committed actors at both the national and the Land level. 
France has a multi-annual approach of MBO at the national level, too, within 
which ANPE develops annual business plans. ANPE’s management style and 
system of management by objectives has been strongly influenced by models from 
the business sector. This is manifest in particular in the establishment of a strong 
central controlling department and in the use of performance-related pay, in a highly 
centralized organizational structure. Furthermore, in 2001, multi-annual plans are to 
be introduced for each region separately. This diversification shall enhance the 
capacity and transparency of controlling. Management by objectives plays an 
important role in France not only in directing PES activities but also in documenting 
performance and legitimising the ANPE vis-à-vis government and public opinion.  
In Sweden the regular MBO cycle is an annual process; but at least since a 
couple of years, ‘system stability’ is maintained by retaining some (or most) of the 
goals and targets for several successive years in the context of rolling three-year 
budget planning. In recent years performance management in Sweden’s PES has 
undergone some major changes. Among other things, these changes have strongly 
affected the relationship between the Ministry and the PES at central and county 
levels. In particular,  there appears to be a movement toward increased ministerial 
intervention in the relative autonomy previously exercised by the AMS, although the 
no clear trend has yet emerged, Furthermore, and perhaps most important, it was 
only in the second half of the 1990s that achievement of quantitative target levels 
really came to play a central role in the PES, albeit MBO was formally introduced in 
the mid 1980s.  
Like Sweden, the British Employment Service has an annual MBO cycle. The 
British system represents the prototype of the ‘agency model’ in the standard NPM-
framework; i.e. a clear separation between policy-making, which is the responsibility 
of the Ministry, and service delivery through the implementing agency, the 
Employment Service. The second feature of this model is the use of a quasi-contract 
or performance agreements between the ministry and the PES that stipulates the 
outputs to be accomplished and the resources to be made available. These targets 
83 
are passed on to the regional and lower operative levels in a series of quasi-
contracts within a relatively centralized organizational context. Strong emphasis is 
placed on the management information system in a ‘checking culture.’ Horizontal 
networks to exchange ‘good practice’ mitigate the hierarchical features of the system. 
Finally, in Germany, performance management according to the MBO-principles 
has been tested (introduced) on a national scale for the first time in 1998 (for 
implementation in 1999), when all local employment offices had to quantify the man-
datory national policy goals of the PES. This quantification process was carried out in 
a small number of local ‘model offices’ by using a newly-developed ‘performance 
agreement process’ according to NPM-principles (whereas the majority of employ-
ment offices still used the traditional planning procedures). These model offices have 
already introduced two institutional cornerstones of internal PES reform (which can 
be traced back to 1994), the organizational model ‘employment office 2000’ and the 
management strategy ‘performance-oriented leadership’. 
5.2 Goals, targets and indicators 
The actual operational objectives and targets currently in use in the case study 
countries are summarized in Appendix A and compared schematically in Table 3 
above. There is a strong convergence in two specific types of policy targets: com-
bating long-term unemployment and youth unemployment, in which all four case 
studies and Germany have current targets (see Table 3). Filling of vacancies (in 
number or percentage) was another common target in 2000 in Austria, France, Great 
Britain as well as in Germany, but not in Sweden, where such a target was, however, 
used in the previous years before. Otherwise much overlap but also important differ-
ences can be observed. For example, only Austria and Sweden have targets for the 
number of disabled in measures. Surprisingly, only Germany and Austria have 
targets relating to the reintegration of women in the labour market. France is one of 
the few countries without any target on improving PES services in 2000, although 
there was such a target in the previous year, and Germany is the only country with 
targets for placements in apprenticeships and combating illegal employment, which 
reflects the particular responsibilities of the PES in these areas in Germany. This 
diversity is not surprising since targets in MBO systems represent a necessarily 
limited number of current policy priorities, which reflect national policy concerns, or 
areas in which performance is deemed to need improvement, but also special 
responsibilities of the PES in a national institutional system. 
A related problem is that the actual definitions of the targets in terms of indicators 
also vary greatly even where there is a common objective. For example, targets for 
combating long-term unemployment are sometimes defined in terms of reducing 
flows into long-term unemployment (A), reducing the number of very long-term un-
employed through placements (F, GB), reducing the average number of the (very) 
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long-term unemployed ( S), outflows from long-term unemployment into work (A , D) 
as well as minimising inflows into long-term unemployment (A, D). 
In terms of the types of indicators used, there are a number of noteworthy 
similarities and differences. All three of the four case study countries as well as 
Germany use, to a large extent, labour market indicators (e.g. number of or flows into 
long-term unemployment) rather than indicators based merely on PES process or 
programme uptake (A = 4 of 10; F =3 of 11; D= 3 of 10; S = 2 of 10) whereas by 
contrast the ES in Britain relies almost exclusively placement indictors in defining 
targets (6 of 8). In summary, the differences in definition and operationalisation 
reflect national choices but also in particular differences in the type of data available 
from national monitoring systems.  
In general terms, labour market indicators (based on PES administrative data on 
registered unemployment and unemployment flows) appear to be more appropriate 
for defining objectives than programme uptake, which is still frequently used (see 
Table 4), since programmes are merely a means of reintegration rather than the 
ultimate objective. On the other hand, labour market indicators are affected by many 
factors in addition to PES activities and ALMP programmes are the principal instru-
ments under the control of the PES – in addition to placement services - for achieving 
these goals. The PES as an organization can be justifiably concerned with the uptake 
and targeting of these expensive labour market interventions.  
5.3 Institutional aspects: planning and implementation process 
The process of arriving at operational objectives and targets differs, sometimes 
markedly, from country to country. In general there are three principal actors: (1) the 
government or ministerial level, (2) the national PES organization and its head office, 
and (3) the subordinate regional and local PES offices. The actual process of 
formulation of targets differs in particular in the degree of hierarchy and centralization 
with which it is carried out. Although there is a range of empirical cases there appear 
to be two ideal typical types:  
First, an agency model in which policy is the business of the ministry and the 
PES enjoys relatively little autonomy and is largely seen in the more modest role of 
an implementing agency. In this MBO-type targets are clearly defined by the govern-
ment and only national target levels are negotiable with the PES. The relationship 
between the PES head office and regional and local offices is correspondingly more 
centralized and hierarchical with targets allocated to subordinate units typically based 
on more or less automatic formulas.  
Second, a ‘self-administration’ model of a legally autonomous PES labour market 
authority, typically frequently with the participation of the social partners in its 
governing board. In this model the PES plays a strong role in design of labour market 
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policy, and not just in implementation. In other words, although the political 
responsibility of the Ministry for labour market policy is uncontested, the PES has a 
‘strong voice’ at governmental level. Furthermore, in this model the PES board and 
its head office have a greater degree of discretion in planning and implementing 
labour market policies, including defining strategic objectives and targets. Within the 
PES organization, the competencies are typically more devolved or decentralised 
across the unit levels; the subordinate levels have as a rule a strong influence on the 
definition of target levels, and may even define their own regional or local targets.  
In empirical terms, the British Employment Service appears closest to the first 
ideal-type; whereas Austria seems to be rather typical for the second type. Sweden 
and France are cases not easy to classify, as they combine features of both ‘ideal-
types’. France is a complicated intermediate case: Despite its formal autonomy, 
France’s ANPE functions more like a governmental agency since Ministerial influence 
is high. On the other hand, the Ministry appears to exercise less direct influence on 
the operational planning of ANPE than is the case in Great Britain: Governmental 
influence is exercised primarily through the medium-term performance agreement 
(‘progress contract’) contract, which provides clear policy guidance for ANPE. 
Therefore, the annual planning of objectives and targets is done more autonomously 
by ANPE. By contrast, in Great Britain, there are prolonged negotiations (over sev-
eral months) between ES experts and the Ministry before agreement is reached on 
annual objectives and target levels. On the other hand, in Sweden, the operational 
(quantified) targets are defined by the government, even though the Swedish labour 
market authority appears to be more strongly integrated into the policy making 
process at governmental level. In other words, Sweden has strong elements of the 
agency model, which are even underlined now, since governmental interferences into 
AMS seem to be growing. Austria’s national planning process, finally, is char-
acterised as a complex mix of expert planning and stepwise decision making in the 
various AMS bodies and committees, guaranteeing, among other things, the 
inclusion of the social partners.  
In this context, Austria is the only country among our case studies in which the 
(aggregate) national target level of the PES is not defined ex ante by the national 
head office or by the Ministry. It is rather the sum of the negotiations between the 
head office and each of the Land offices, which take into account economic trend 
estimates, insights from past experience, and policy changes desired by the AMS’s  
National Board (Vorstand). However, the Länder have a comparatively strong voice 
in PES (target) planning, which is also reflected in their representation in the planning 
working group (see above). 
The important role of the Land PES in Austria is evidenced by a number of 
characteristics: Planning and implementation of national labour market policies by 
MBO is, to a large extent, based on the working programmes of the Land PES. They 
are also responsible for operative planning of labour market policies including target 
levels, as well as budgeting and controlling of the local (RGS) employment offices. In 
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addition, they have their own Land targets, which provides them with a certain de-
gree of regional flexibility. Summing up, the implementation of the Austrian MBO 
system is strongly decentralised. Also the planning process is strongly institutional-
ised in the regions, but the central definition of goals implies of course limits to 
regional discretion. 
The same is probably true in Sweden, where the county PES (LANS) are 
involved in defining the levels for various targets which are negotiated with the head 
office. On the other hand, the regional influence is also limited, since several national 
target levels are fixed (in percentages) and cannot be changed or negotiated. A field 
where the counties have a much stronger degree of discretion than in MBO planning 
is the internal organization, management and work practices of the PES offices in 
their county. Since there are no central regulations imposed, the organizational 
models of PES are said to vary considerably. This is an interesting contrast to 
Germany, where local PES have large autonomy in policy-mix and design of active 
measures (which was increased by 1998 reforms), but the organizational model is 
centrally determined through the national headquarters; at the end of 2002, all 
employment should have implemented the new organizational model ‘Employment 
Office 2000’. 
5.4 Performance assessment  
Performance assessment is a decisive stage in MBO since it will determine whether 
any and what kind of consequences follow from (relatively) good or bad performance. 
Moreover, the MBO model stresses not merely post hoc performance assessment 
but continuous ’real time’ monitoring of performance in order to identify and correct 
performance shortfalls. The impact of performance assessment is not, however, 
‘automatic’, it depends in particular on performance incentives for individuals and 
operating units. Moreover, performance assessment will be probably more accepted 
and ‘legitimate’ when it is clear and understandable. In this section we compare and 
discuss the forms of performance assessment practiced by these countries within 
their MBO-cycle. 
First of all, all four case study countries (and also Germany56) have an obligatory 
stage of performance assessment built into the MBO-approach, on basis of the final 
results. In three of them, Great Britain, France, and Sweden, there is a strong em-
phasis on on-going performance monitoring by the head office, but not in Austria be-
cause of the much more decentralized philosophy of the MBO system.  
In Great Britain, performance assessment is highly institutionalised in a central 
Jobcentre Performance Unit at head office and in regular meetings between the 
                                            
56  Local PES offices are also obliged to report annually on their ‘reintegration balance’, i.e. 
programme uptake and outcomes and the costs of measures, which is a parallel approach to 
performance assessment entirely decoupled from the controlling system being introduced.  
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different organizational levels. At the national level, ES performance (achievement of 
target levels) is reviewed quarterly by the Ministry. At regional, district and local 
jobcentres’ level, performance is reviewed monthly by the respective higher unit 
level. Furthermore, individual managers and employees’ performance are considered 
in individual end-of-year reviews. In the ES the emphasis is strongly on on-going 
performance assessment based largely on quantitative information on performance 
against targets and real time response to problems rather than on post hoc 
assessment of performance (e.g. in Austria) or regular qualitative policy reviews of 
regional (county) performance as carried out in Sweden. In Austriaperformance 
assessment for the last period or budget year is conducted primarily at the outset of 
the new planning cycle for MBO at the first meeting of the ‘planning working group’ in 
Spring. The national head office is less interested in frequent controls of the regions 
(Land offices) during the course of the year; but the Land offices, on the other hand, 
carry out a tight control of their local offices.  
In the French ANPE, monitoring and the follow-up of results were decisively 
improved in 1995 by the establishment of the national controlling-unit, supported by 
regional ‘controllers’. The controlling reports worked out by this unit are fed into the 
various (monthly, quarterly or semi-annual) follow-up meetings at national, regional 
and delegation level. The French and the British cases illustrate the importance of a 
strong controlling unit, at least in MBO systems with a high degree of centralization 
and strong emphasis on on-going performance monitoring to achieve priority national 
performance targets. 
In Sweden (like in France), personal exchange in assessing unit performance is 
maintained by a relatively high density of follow-up meetings between the various 
institutional levels. However, the end-of-the-year ‘county exams’ are now most 
important and correspond closely to the ideal-typical MBO-concept of a final 
evaluation.  
Comparing the criteria for assessing performance in the four countries, it is not 
surprising that everywhere the degree of attainment of the operational targets is most 
important. However, target level achievement is usually not an exclusive criterion. For 
example, in France quality of services (measured e.g. by quality certification of the 
local PES offices or surveys on PES quality) has been recently emphasised. In 
Austria, too much reliance on the quantified targets was recently criticised which led 
to revisions and supplements of the MBO approach, for instance the process controls 
in the business area placement/counselling. In Great Britain, quality performance 
standards for service delivery are a second pillar of performance management 
(supplementing the targets of the ES performance agreement). Sweden gives us a 
somewhat contrasting picture, since the service- and quality-related targets have 
been downplayed at the national level recently (withdrawal of these PES-internal 
targets in 2000, see country-section for details). This can be explained by the in-
creased political pressure to achieve the priority policy target of unemployment re-
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duction on the one hand, on the other hand on the PES intention to simplify the target 
structure of the MBO-system. 
Performance incentives  
Sweden is the only country of the four cases where performance pay is not an insti-
tutionalised component of the performance management approach.57 The traditional 
egalitarian culture prevented individualised incentives so far (and notwithstanding 
some salary differentials), even if, according to interviews, the younger generation 
was more open-minded in this regard.  
By contrast, the PES organizations in France, Austria and Great Britain have 
schemes of performance pay in use. These schemes share the feature of being 
primarily a single, annual bonus payment at the end of the year. A second feature 
shared: The level amounts of these bonuses is not very high in any of these coun-
tries, but seems to achieve its incentive function, but for rather psychological reasons 
of becoming individually rewarded. However, whereas this ‘signal effect’ was 
reported to be very strong in Austria, the incentive function of the bonus seems to be 
much lower in Britain, due to other, more general problems of the ES’ payment 
structure (see country section). 
Moreover, the payment schemes differ in formal terms: in Austria there appears 
to be somewhat more discretion at regional/local level about the terms of distributing 
the individual bonus, whereas in France and Britain qualification for incentive pay is 
more standardised (e.g. individual performance ratings in both countries). Further-
more, in Austria and France, the bonus payment schemes represent (different) mixed 
types of unit-based and individualised performance, whereas the British system is 
fully individualised. 
Another incentive that cannot be overestimated is clearly the impact of good or 
bad performance on the individual career options. This is a particularly strong 
incentive for leading managers and directors of local and regional PES offices who 
will either get the opportunity to ascend in the hierarchy or who might become, in the 
negative case, transferred or even terminated, although - in contrast to the private 
sector - the civil service system in most countries place clear limits on individual 
sanctions. Probably the ‘career effect’ is the most important incentive in all the four 
case countries. 
                                            
57  So far, performance pay is not a theme in the German PES, either.  
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5.5 Benchmarking: comparing performance and identifying good practice 
If benchmarking is to be successfully implemented, the scope and limits of 
comparability should have to be identified and accepted in advance. This is par-
ticularly the case for performance comparisons across similar units like regional em-
ployment offices. The approach to benchmarking used varies considerably across 
countries. Systematic performance comparison and benchmarking models play a 
significant role in Austria and Britain, to some extent also in Sweden, but are of 
minor, if any importance in France. In Germany there are plans to introduce bench-
marking across the local PES offices (in the context of the ‘reintegration balances’ 
required of PES offices since 1998), which are being intensively debated, but still far 
from realisation. 
In France, some initial but modest steps have been taken to promote 
organizational learning in ANPE, including the dissemination of best practice in 
selected fields. Besides some recommendations to transform ANPE into a ‘learning 
organization’, the exchange of best-practice examples in the implementation of 
certain active programmes seems to be most noteworthy. This exchange seems to 
aim at providing a ‘coaching’ function for those local offices not yet adept at 
management by MBO principles. In summary, at the present time ‘best-practice’ 
approaches can only be found in parts of the ANPE, i.e. they are rather an exception 
than the rule. 
In Sweden, as was outlined in more detail in the country section, the explicit aim 
of increasing organizational learning - which is highlighted in benchmarking 
approaches - was a PES target stressed for a couple of years, but has lost 
importance in the year 2000. Related topics such as quality management and 
customer satisfaction have not received attention or been supported by the new 
government either, which led to a decline of interest in these themes in the PES head 
office. In sum, these developments bring about the apparent paradox that Sweden 
seems now to be moving away from the international trend towards quality and 
benchmarking approaches. Benchmarking in the sense of comparing performance 
and looking for better practices seems thus to take place mainly by informal 
communication between PES directors and managers.  
In Austria we found that benchmarking is, in the first instance, being established 
at the intermediate PES level of the Länder and not at the national level. Although we 
have only closely examined the Balanced Scorecard model in Upper Austria, one will 
probably find other (similar or different) benchmarking approaches in other Austrian 
regions. An appealing aspect of the Balanced Scorecard approach includes its 
adaptability to different contexts, units and even individual employees. The second 
advantage can be seen in measuring aggregate or balanced, i.e. multi-dimensional 
performance. Third, the electronic version seems to be a practical management tool, 
easy to understand and to handle.  
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Despite the in general rather centralised performance management model in 
Britain, benchmarking by the ‘Toolkit approach’ is institutionalised at the local, district 
and regional levels of the ES, where the performance information of the Toolkit 
serves as a ‘hands-on’-management tool. However, not only the Toolkit itself but also 
the benchmarks used are national values based on Jobcentre size bands provided 
by the Jobcentre Performance Unit at head office, so there remains a centralised ele-
ment in this approach. Furthermore, local results are transmitted monthly from local 
to district level, and aggregated results from district level to the region. They are also 
used as the basis for unit performance awards. 
The most positive feature of the ‘Toolkit’ appears to be that it establishes and 
refers to comparable units instead of comparing ‘incomparable’ units in so-called 
‘league tables.’ Secondly, it relates placement activities and target attainment in a 
model of just a few inputs, activities and outputs which make it, thirdly, easy to 
understand and to handle, and provides insight into how processes affect outcomes.  
Comparing the British ‘Toolkit’ with the Upper-Austrian ‘Scorecard’, both 
instruments appeal as attractive ‘street level tools’ for managing quantified 
objectives. At the same time, both instruments apply underlying assumptions 
concerning causal relationships between PES activities and target levels achieved. 
Therefore, it is correct to regard both as benchmarking tools, since they deliver at 
least partial explanations for performance differences. The Balanced Scorecard in its 
multi-dimensional design is even more complex in this regard than the placement-
focussed British Toolkit, but it is also more complicated (among other things, 
weighting issues arise from ‘scoring’). 
However, on the other hand, a main shortcoming of both the Balanced 
Scorecard and the Toolkit model is that they do not control for factors beyond PES 
control, e.g. labour market structure and size, demand etc. In other words, these 
instruments are management tools but not evaluation models: For this reason, the 
‘explanatory power’ for (rigid) performance comparison and benchmarking remains 
somewhat limited. This is however, not such a problem from a ‘hands-on’ 
management point of view, and as long as the inherent limits are recognised. 
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Part IV: Summary and General Conclusions  
1. Principal Findings 
What kind of general lessons can be drawn from the findings of this comparative 
study of performance management in PES organizations? First, we reconsider our 
empirical findings in light of the more theoretical issues on management by 
objectives discussed in Part I of our study. Finally, we offer some concluding 
recommendations on MBO-type PES management systems. 
In Part I of this report, we distinguished three sets of issues that strongly affect 
MBO applications: 1) Prerequisites and pitfalls of successful MBO 2) Design features 
of goals, operational objectives and performance indicators, and 3) Decentralization 
and policy discretion. In this section we summarize our empirical findings with regard 
to these issues.  
Prerequisites and pitfalls of successful MBO 
Our study generally confirms the observations in the performance management lit-
erature on the four different ‘prerequisites and pitfalls of successful MBO’: 1) The 
importance of PES and government commitment to MBO; 2) the need to maintain a 
relative autonomy of the PES from the ministerial level and the related problem ad 
hoc intervention; 3) density of rules and regulations may conflict with MBO, and 4) 
MBO itself has costs and may produce ‘red tape’ and bureaucratic structures.  
The commitment of PES top management and government is essential for MBO 
success. In all our four national case studies (Austria, France, Sweden, Great Britain) 
there is a strong commitment to the MBO system at the PES leadership and 
governmental levels. In most cases the introduction of MBO and related quality 
management approaches in the PES was part of a broader commitment at the gov-
ernmental level to modernization of the public service not limited to the PES (e.g. 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark). In a number of countries (e.g. France) 
experience with privatisation of public sector enterprises has been an important 
model for reforms in the PES. The principal motives for introducing MBO are en-
hanced public accountability as well as with improved efficiency and effectiveness of 
the PES organization.  
In contrast to other countries, in Germany the initiative for the introduction of 
performance management and related organizational reforms came largely from 
within the PES itself. In fact, the German PES has been an innovator in public sector 
reform in Germany. The relatively slow pace of the German reforms may be partly 
explained by the need to develop consensus within the tripartite German PES. 
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However, it should also be noted that the reform tempo has considerably accelerated 
during the last two years.  
Commitment of top management is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
MBO-success: To be really effective MBO systems are particularly dependent on the 
existence of a strong central controlling unit, in particular in the initial phase to 
produce some ‘reform drive’ (which is confirmed by other insights from public sector 
reforms, see Oppen 1999). Our case studies showed, for example, that MBO in 
France and Sweden was not really very meaningful until such a unit was established, 
and performance management in the British employment service is strongly 
dependent on such a unit. A central controlling unit (attached to the executive office 
of the AMS board) also plays a major role in co-ordination and policy planning in 
Austria. In this context, the Austrian and Swedish examples indicate that such a 
central controlling unit is not necessarily in contradiction to decentral competencies in 
operative planning and implementation; to the contrary. 
The necessary ‘relative autonomy’ of the PES from the ministerial level is not ad-
verse to the appropriate political control of the PES, which in the case studies ex-
amined ranges from tight ministerial control (e.g. the UK) to considerable independ-
ence in the implementation of broad policy guidelines (e.g. Austria). The practical 
problem is rather government adherence to the time-schedule of the MBO policy 
cycle (which typically lasts from 18 months to two years, including the planning and 
decision-making phase) and abstention from ad hoc intervention. 
In all the case study countries there was evidence for what we have termed 
‘principal’ (vs. ‘agent’) problems. For instance, there were several instances of gov-
ernment failure to agree some or all of the annual targets even before the start of the 
current planning year. Moreover, ad hoc interventions during the course of an annual 
agreement have repeatedly been disruptive for PES operations. For example, the 
high priority given to the ‘New Deal’ by the British government has led to the 
introduction of special targets, administrative structures, and the earmarking of 
resources for this programme (i.e. less flexibility in implementation for the Employ-
ment Service). In Austria and Germany there have been election-year increases in 
funding for labour market programmes. Since such ad hoc interventions are not inte-
grated in the MBO process, the additional workload remains undocumented and its 
impact on performance unclear. These shortcomings in the practice of MBO are 
normal frictions that experienced PES organizations cope with pragmatically; never-
theless they are a disturbance and, at some point may undermine the credibility and 
effectiveness of the MBO process.  
Both the Austrian and the Swedish experiences demonstrate that MBO is 
inconsistent with the high density of generally binding rules and regulations 
characteristic of traditional public administration. In both countries there was an initial 
sharp reduction in administrative regulations, although in Sweden ‘counterten-
dencies’ can now be observed as detailed programme descriptions increasingly im-
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pede flexible solutions to reach different targets. Moreover, a large number of 
countries still use some performance indicators based on programme uptake, the 
provision of specific services, or other ‘inputs’, although a ‘pure’ system of manage-
ment by objectives would specify only labour market or placement goals and leave it 
up to the PES and its operating units to determine ‘how’ the objectives are to be 
achieved. On the other hand, management by rules still has an important place in 
some types of specialized and highly regulated PES operations, for example, the 
administration of unemployment benefits. In this case there is no real conflict be-
tween MBO and rule-oriented administration since timely and accurate administration 
of benefit entitlements can be an additional operational objective.  
The relationship between classical management by objectives and quality 
management deserves special attention. On the one hand, insofar as quality 
management relies mainly or only on detailed prescriptions of service standards and 
internal processes (which is considered as out-of-date in the advanced quality 
debate, see Oppen 1998), it tends to impose a national standardization on PES 
service delivery, which impedes dynamic quality improvements and may constrain 
the development of approaches more suitable to local needs. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on quality management is in our view an important response to the 
perceived shortcoming in the original quantitative emphasis in MBO systems (e.g. in 
Norway), and hence a useful complement to management by objectives. It should be 
noted that only a few countries still emphasize mainly service standards and quality 
certification (e.g. France and Britain); an increasing number of countries (e.g. Austria; 
B-Flanders, Denmark, Norway) put now more emphasis on the EFQM-principles of 
self-assessment, guided by the dynamic criteria of relative improvement as well as 
quality of results (e.g. customer satisfaction). If quality management is conceived as 
a ‘moving target’ that has to be re-defined again and again, it is a very useful tool in a 
comprehensive performance management strategy.   
MBO also entails costs as well as benefits, including the establishment of new 
types of organizational structures. Most importantly, it requires a major investment of 
time and organizational resources in an adequate management information and 
controlling system, although modern information technology lowers the costs and 
reduces red tape in the collection and processing of data. The conflict of interest 
inherent in the principal-agent structure of MBO-type systems requires that 
systematic effort be devoted to validation of the key indicators generated for the 
management information system (cf. the British example on placement data, section 
III.2.5). Nevertheless, managers have to be aware of the possible critical point of 
diminishing returns to increasing intensity or frequency of controls. Moreover, the 
emphasis on quantitative targets, if handled improperly, may lead to ‘numbers 
fetishism’, i.e. pursuing target levels as an end in itself, on the one hand, or ‘creative 
bookkeeping’ on the other. 
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Design features of goals, operational objectives and performance indicators 
PES organizations with MBO-type systems use a relatively small number (8 to 10) of 
priority operational objectives and targets, which corresponds to the model depicted 
in the theoretical literature on performance management. In Great Britain and France 
the number of targets used has in fact been reduced as the MBO system has 
matured; in both countries there is, in addition, systematic observation of a large 
number of key indicators not included in the actual priority targets. The diversity and 
complexity of the objectives pursued was considered to be a particular problem in 
Sweden. The Austrian plan for a new ‘comprehensive controlling system’ also re-
flects dissatisfaction with the current system, which is regarded as being dominated 
by placement and counselling targets that do not adequately reflect the activities of 
other work units. The idea of assigning specific targets to each operating unit seems 
appealing as a complement to the present (labour market driven) MBO system, even 
although the higher overall complexity of the new approach may make it difficult to 
implement.  
The general consensus is that targets should be ‘stretching’, i.e. challenging, but 
still realistic. In countries with more hierarchical management styles (e.g. Britain, 
France, Sweden) national targets are allocated to the regional level in a top-down 
fashion based on some combination of formulae and bargaining. In other systems 
with a more decentralized style regional and local offices play a much stronger role in 
the setting of target levels. In particular in Austria, Denmark, and Germany regional 
target levels are agreed in a decentralized procedure rather than being assigned on 
the basis of national targets. Such a participatory management style may enhance 
acceptance if local managers and employees feel that their views are being taken 
into account. In these countries ‘national’ target levels represent merely an 
aggregation of the agreed regional targets. On the other hand, where the PES is ob-
ligated to meet set national targets, there is correspondingly little room for 
manoeuvre in setting regional targets.  
One of the main practical problems of MBO implementation in PES organizations 
is the development of good performance indicators that measure adequately 
appropriately (i.e. validly and reliably) the objectives aimed at. Most countries 
reported frequent problems with indicators. In addition to shortcomings in the data 
availability, a particular problem reported is that of finding easy-to-measure and 
understandable indicators. These findings are largely consistent with other studies 
(e.g. Niklasson and Tomsmark 1997). In our view, therefore, the development of 
‘good indicators’ remains a moving target: for instance, indicators have to be adapted 
due to changing policy goals or, sometimes, abolished as responses to observed 
moral hazard or other implementation deficits.  
The appropriate time frame of planning and implementation is another critical 
design feature of MBO. In some PES organizations the planning and implementation 
process takes place largely on an annual basis (Great Britain), while in others the 
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annual MBO policy cycle is integrated in a broader, multi-annual policy framework 
(e.g. France). Short-term policy cycles are less prone to external disruption (e.g. 
through unanticipated changes in ministerial priorities or in the economic environ-
ment), but the efficiency and effectiveness of the MBO process may be impaired due 
to too frequent shifts in goals and objectives. In contrast to annual policy cycles, long-
term planning provides a stable policy environment for PES implementation but may 
be too inflexible and hence ultimately fail. Our findings suggest that a combination of 
medium-term and annual planning in which annual operational objectives are agreed 
on the basis of medium-term goals is the most practicable solution for reconciling 
strategic (i.e. long-term) and flexibility concerns. There is, moreover, a certain 
‘functional equivalence’ between explicit medium-term systems of performance 
management (e.g. in Austria) and annual systems that maintain stable goals and 
objectives with only incremental changes over successive years (e.g. Sweden). The 
latter approach also appears to have been adopted in Germany, although the 
performance management system is still too new to draw any definitive conclusions. 
By contrast the recent high rate of change in operational objectives and targets in the 
British annual MBO cycle appears to have been unnecessarily disruptive for PES 
operations.  
Decentralization and policy discretion 
Our third set of issues are concerned with ‘decentralization and policy discretion.’ We 
have observed two clearly different models of PES performance management: the 
more centralized and hierarchical agency model and the more decentralized self-
administration model. Based on the evidence we have examined there is no clear 
reason to regard either the more centralized agency model or the more decentralised 
labour market authority model as being inherently superior. What is clear, however, is 
that each model has its essential elements and the features of the two different 
model types cannot be arbitrarily combined. For example, the agency model entails a 
strong separation between policy and implementation, a national level ‘agency’ 
agreement, top-down allocation of targets to the regions, centralized controlling etc. 
Although we cannot ‘recommend’ one particular model, it seems clear that the choice 
of a PES performance management must be compatible with the broader institutional 
context, for example, the style of public administration, existing patterns of 
decentralization in state institutions, and the role of the social partners in policy-
making.  
It is clear that agency problems, especially moral hazard, are endemic to the per-
formance management approach with its strong emphasis on achieving quantitative 
targets. For example, evidence from our case studies suggests that there are strong 
incentives for ‘street level’ programme managers to find a practical solution to get the 
‘numbers’ that are ‘needed’. This is possible due to interpretative leeway in applying 
definitions and entering data into the management information systems. Total control 
is an illusion, even with the best possible control mechanisms, and is, moreover, 
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counter-productive because of decreasing flexibility and rising costs. A high degree 
of staff acceptance of the performance management approach and of the targets 
adopted is probably the best remedy for moral hazard. Agency problems and the 
costs of appropriate controls can be expected to be greater in more centralized PES 
MBO systems (and/or where the achievement of targets is linked to strong pay in-
centives) in contrast to those with a more participatory and consensual corporate 
culture. 
2. Concluding remarks 
Results-orientation and enhancement of public accountability will remain 
cornerstones of public sector modernisation and governance (and are not just a 
fashion trend) for which performance management systems are an important tool. 
For this reason, it is quite likely that MBO systems will become more widespread in 
European PES (and other OECD countries) in the near future than is already the 
case. However, the possible benefits of MBO are not automatic, but will depend on 
good design and implementation features.  
The main benefit of using management by objectives is clarification of priorities, 
according to the majority point of view of the PES in this study. Performance 
management fosters ex ante and ex post reflection by the PES on its activities and 
achievements. Enhanced public accountability and legitimacy of the PES is still 
another important argument for MBO as the PES is assessed on the basis of 
transparent and agreed performance targets. The (continuous) comparison of results 
with targets is also a powerful management tool for directing organizational activities. 
Although we encountered no systematic evaluations of MBO-type management 
reforms, there was a widespread conviction in the PES organizations surveyed that 
performance management had improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the PES. 
If introduced or applied, MBO should be based on principles of ‘good-practice’ 
and the avoidance of typical pitfalls. In light of our evidences, good MBO practice 
includes: 
- use of a limited number of clear and understandable targets 
- providing employee participation to guarantee the commitment of regional and 
local PES staff to the performance management system  
- reduction in the density and complexity of administrative rules and directives 
- a reliable, flexible, and ‘real-time’ management information system for monitoring 
progress toward targets 
- fair and transparent procedures for assessing and rewarding performance 
- complementary quality management approaches. 
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This list of ‘good practices’ is by no means exhaustive but highlights some of the 
most important ones that have emerged from the study. Use of a small number of 
goals directs PES activities by setting priorities; proclaiming too many goals dilutes 
priorities and deprives the organization of focus. Commitment to MBO at all 
organizational levels is essential to make it work and to avoid typical pitfalls like moral 
hazard. The reduction and simplification of administration rules is a crucial step in the 
introduction of MBO, and flexibility in implementation can decline again as a result of 
new programme regulations if not ‘defended’ by MBO protagonists.  
A real-time and user-friendly management information systems is an essential 
prerequisite for monitoring PES performance and for ‘inter-unit benchmarking’. It 
should be emphasized, however, that the management information system derives 
its value primarily from its usefulness to users at all levels of the organization. Its 
usefulness depends in particular on the frequency of data reporting, the 
appropriateness and transparency of the performance indicators selected, and the 
ready availability of the data at all PES levels. Data-based assessment of 
performance needs to be supplemented by personal exchange and dialogue in order 
to achieve the right combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information. 
An important insight concerning fair and transparent performance assessment in 
benchmarking operating units is that target achievement should only be one element. 
Explanations for shortfalls in performance should be taken into account, without 
giving up the relevancy of target levels. In other words, reaching the quantitative 
targets has to be taken seriously, but the target level is not everything. Sometimes, 
the observation of the efforts undertaken and relative improvements may be more 
important and appropriate than meeting a particular numerical target perfectly well. 
Moreover, consideration of the point of view of regional and local managers in 
assessing performance raises not only commitment to MBO, but may also improve 
the information base and the assessment process.  
A related issue is the ‘right’ form of performance incentives. Bonus payments, as 
our case studies have shown, do not need to be high to affect individual’s behaviour. 
It seems that the main effect of such incentive schemes is that they foster 
comparison of individual or unit performance with that of others and thus complement 
benchmarking on PES targets. Moreover, the development and use of operative 
benchmarking tools (like the Austrian and British examples) should be encouraged, 
even if those instruments cannot solve all the methodological problems of 
comparability. In this context, it should also be emphasized that performance 
management is not a substitute for evaluation research.  
Finally, remember strong arguments for combining quality management and 
MBO approaches: First, the quality approaches correct for over-emphasis of 
quantitative targets. Second, though useful as a first step, an exclusive reliance on 
the quality standards and certification (quality assurance) approach has to be 
rejected. By contrast, TQM and EFQM are not static but dynamic approaches with 
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their emphasis on service and customer orientation, continuous improvement, 
detection of cost drivers, and self-assessment (involvement and empowerment) of 
staff. 
99 
Bibliography 
I. PES documents and related sources 
Austria: 
AMS 1997, 1998, 1999. Geschäftsberichte 1997, 1998, 1999, Wien: AMS. 
AMS 1998. Richtlinie für das MitarbeiterInnengespräch im AMS, Wien: internes Arbeitspapier erstellt 
von H. Buchinger. 
AMS Vorstand 1998. Verwaltungsratsitzung am 10.11.1998 Top 6: Arbeitsmarktpolitische Ziele 1999. 
AMS Vorstand 1999a. Verwaltungsratsitzung am 29.06.1999 Top 4: Längerfristiger Plan 1999-2002. 
AMS Vorstand 1999b. Arbeitsmarktpolitisches Controlling 1999: 1.-3. Quartal, internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS 1999a. Arbeitsmarktpolitisches Controlling 1999: 1.- 3. Quartal, vorgelegt vom Büro des 
Vorstandes (Wilk/Galehr). 
AMS 1999b. Vereinbarte BVS-Prozeßziele und –indikatoren für das Jahr 2000: Einigung mit den 
Fachbereichen BVS der LGS am 3.12.1999, Wien, internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS Bundesgeschäftsstelle 2000. Jahresbericht des fachlichen Controllings in der 
Arbeitslosenversicherung 1999, Wien, internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS 2000a. Konzept für eine neue gesamtheitliche Zielsteuerung im AMS: Ergebnis des Workshops 
am 16.3.2000, Wien: internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS 2000b. Überblick über die Entwicklung des Client Monitoring Systems (CMS), Wien: internes 
Arbeitspapier. 
AMS 2000c. AMS-Dienstleistungen, Wien: internes Arbeitspapier erstellt von H. Buchinger und H. 
Böhm. 
Galehr, C und E. Haider 2000. Projektplan zur Entwicklung der „Arbeitsmarktpolitischen Ziele 2001“ 
des Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, internes Arbeitspapier im Auftrag des Vorstandes. 
Wilk, M. und C. Galehr 1999. Projektplan zur Entwicklung der „Arbeitsmarktpolitischen Ziele 1999“ des 
Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich, im Auftrag des Vorstandes. 
inforMISEP No. 49, 65, 66, 67/68. 
Upper Austria 
AMS Oberösterreich 1999. Geschäftsbericht 1998, Linz: AMS. 
AMS Oberösterreich 2000a. Arbeitsprogramm 2000, internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS Oberösterreich 2000b. Einführung eines integrierten fachlichen Controlling aller Fachbereiche in 
Form einer Score Card im AMS OÖ: Balanced Score Card AMS OÖ, Excel-Datei. 
AMS Oberösterreich 2000c. Performance arbeitsmarktpolitischer Ziele 2000 zu Ende April: 
Management-Info für die RGS-LeiterInnen zur Einleitung von Vorbeugungs- oder 
Korrekturmaßnahmen, internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS Oberösterreich 2000d. CTR und IKS: AMS-Ziele, Landesgeschäftsstelle: internes Arbeitspapier. 
AMS Oberösterreich 2000e. Ziele 2000, Linz: AMS. 
AMS Tirol 2000. Ziel- und Arbeitsprogramm 2000, internes Arbeitspapier. 
100 
Belgium-VDAB 
Beheersovereenkomst tussen de Vlaamse Regering en de Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling 
en Beroepsopleiding 1999. 
InforMISEP No. 54, 60, 63. 
VDAB 1999a. Facts and Figures 1989-1999. 
VDAB 1999b. Annual Report 1999. 
VDAB 1999c. Jaarverslag. 
Denmark 
AMS 1999a. Effekten af indsatsen I aktivperioden. 
AMS 1999b. Sammenhaengen mellem kvalitet og effekt af indsatsen i aktivperioden. 
Arbejdsministeriet 1999. The Labour Market Reforms – A Status. 
Arbejdsministeriet 1997. Adult Vocational Training, Kopenhagen: Danish Ministry of Labour. 
Arbejdsministeriet 1996. The Danish Labour Market Model and Developments in the Labour Market 
Policy, Danish Ministry of Labour: Copenhagen. 
Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Economic Affairs 1999. National Action Plan for Employment 1999, 
Denmark. 
MISEP 1997, Basic Information Report: Denmark 1997. Institutions, Procedures and Measures, 
European Commission. 
Finland 
Ministry of Labour 2000. Finland’s National Action Plan for Employment, Helsinki: Labour 
Administration. 
Ministry of Labour 2000. Labour Market training in Finland. 
Ministry of Labour 1999. The Ministry of Labour: An expert on the labour market. 
Ministry of Labour 1998. Quality Guidelines: Labour administration quality strategy for 1999-2001. 
France 
ANPE 2000a. Manuel Contrôle de gestion. 
ANPE 2000b. Communiqués de presse 24. Feb. 2000, Paris: ANPE. 
ANPE 1999a. Programmation 2000, Paris. 
ANPE 1999b. Programmation 1999, Paris. 
ANPE 1999c. Contrat de Progrès entre l’État et l’ANPE. 
ANPE 1999d. Tableaux de bord : Resultats Nationaux, Atélier Reprographie de la Direction du Siège. 
ANPE 1999e. Tableaux de bord : Resultats Regionaux, Paris. 
ANPE 1999f. Bilans et évaluations : Les chiffres clés. 
ANPE 1999g. Rapport d’activité. 
ANPE 1998a. Programmation 1999, Paris. 
ANPE 1998b. Rapport d’activité. 
101 
inforMISEP, No. 49, 60, 62, 65, 66. 
Outin Matisse, J.-L. 1999. Le deuxième contrat de progrès entre l’Etat et l’Agence Nationale pour 
l’Emploi (1994-1998), Paris : CNRS-Université Paris I. 
Germany 
Bertelsmann Stiftung und Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2000. Leistungsorientierte Führung in der 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit: Zielvereinbarung mit dem Team im Rahmen der Gesamtsteuerung der 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit: Arbeitshilfe zur Durchführung von Zielvereinbarungen in Dienststellen 
der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Gütersloh/Nürnberg. 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1999a. Gesamtsteuerungsprozeß der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit für das 
Geschäftsjahr 2000. 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1999b. Werkbuch: Controlling in der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Referat 
Controlling, Führungsinformationen und Sonderaufgaben. 
Netherlands 
MISEP 1999. Basic Information Report: Netherlands 1999. Institutions, Procedures and Measures, 
European Commission. 
Norway 
Arbeidsmarkedsetaten 1998. Handbok for Mal-og Resultatstyring I arbeidsmarkedsetaten. 
Arbeidsdirektoratet 1998. Rapport Nr. 5: Brukerundersokelsen av arbeidsgivere med 
rekrutteringsbehov 1997. 
Arbeidsdirektoratet 1997. Nr. 4, Rapport. Brukerundersøkelsen 1997. En oppfølgingsundersøkelse av 
arbeidssøkernes erfaring med arbeidsmarkedsetaten. 
Directorate of Labour 1999. Annual Report 1998. 
Sweden: 
AMS 2000. Arbetsmarknadsverket i 2000-talet. Stockholm: AMS. 
AMS 1999. Arebtsförmedlingen pa 2000-talet. Stockholm: AMS. 
AMS 1995. Quality in the Swedish National Labour Market Administration, Solna: Swedish National 
Labour Market Board. 
ISEKen 2000. No. 3. Operational Focus and Objectives for 2000, Stockholm: Swedish National Labour 
Market Board (AMS International Secretariat). 
ISEKen 1999, No. 2. Operational Focus and Objectives for 1999, Stockholm: Swedish National Labour 
Market Board (AMS International Secretariat). 
ISEKen 1999, No. 3. Sweden’s Public Employment Service, Stockholm: Swedish National Labour 
Market Board (AMS International Secretariat). 
ISEKen 1999, No. 9. Management by Objectives within the Swedish National Labour Market 
Administration, Stockholm: Swedish National Labour Market Board (AMS International 
Secretariat). 
ISEKen 1999/2000. The Public Employment Service in the 21st century: a discussion process within 
the Swedish Labour Market Administration, Stockholm: Swedish National Labour Market Board 
(AMS International Secretariat). 
102 
United Kingdom: 
Employment Service 2000a. Operational Plan 1999-2000, London and Sheffield: Employment Service. 
Employment Service 2000b. Annual Performance Agreement 2000-2001, London and Sheffield: 
Employment Service. 
Employment Service 2000c. Quarterly Performance Report: Period Ending June 2000. 
Employment Service 2000d. ES Monthly Performance and Resources Report: July 2000, Jobcentre 
Performance Unit. 
Employment Service 2000e. The ES Diagnostic Toolkit 2000: Guidance. 
Employment Service 1999a. Annual Performance Agreement 1999-2000, London and Sheffield: 
Employment Service. 
Employment Service 1999b. Annual Report and Accounts 1998-1999, London: The Stationary Office. 
Employment Service 1999c. Diagnostic Tool Kit 99/00: Guide and Instructions, Sheffield (updated 
version for 2000). 
Employment Service 1998. Annual Performance Agreement 1998-1999, London and Sheffield: 
Employment Service. 
 
II. Research and other literature 
Al-Ani, A. 1994. Das Management von Total-Quality Programmen: Eine kritische Betrachtung, in: M. 
Hofmann and A. Al-Ani (eds.), Neue Entwicklungen im Management, Heidelberg: Physika, pp. 
305-324. 
Barnow, B. S. 1992. The Effects of Performance Standards on State and Local Programs, in: C. 
Manski and I. Garfinkel (eds.), Evaluating Welfare and Training Programs, Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, pp. 277-309. 
Behrenz, L., L. Delander and H. Niklasson 2000. Towards intensified local level cooperation in the 
design and implementation of labour market policies: an evaluation of some Swedish 
experiments and reforms, in: J. De Koning and H. G. Mosley (eds.), Active Labour Market Policy 
and Labour Market Transitions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming. 
Bovaird, T. 1996. Performance Assessment of Service Quality: Lessons from UK National Initiatives 
To Influence Local Government, in: H. Hill, H. Klages and E. Löffler (eds.), Quality, Innovation 
and Measurement in the Public Sector, Frankfurt a.M./Berlin: Peter Lang, pp. 37-64. 
Buchinger, E. 1998. Country Study Austria: Achieving ISO 9001 certification in a public employment 
service, Geneva, ILO: Labour Administration Branch, Document No. 49-1. 
Caiden, G. E. 1991. Administrative Reform comes of Age. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. 
Camp, R. C. 1989. Benchmarking - The Search for Industry Best Practices that Lead to Superior 
Performance, Milwaukee: Quality Press. 
Commission 1998a. Modernising Public Employment Services to support the European Employment 
Strategy, Commission Communication Draft, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial 
Relations and Social Affairs. 
Commission 1999a. Common Indicators for monitoring the Employment Guidelines, Directorate-
General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. 
103 
Commission 1999b. Monitoring the Employment Guidelines: Basic Performance Indicators, Report by 
the ELC expert group on employment indicators, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial 
Relations and Social Affairs. 
Courty, P. and G.R. Marschke 1995. Moral Hazard under Incentive Systems: The Case of a Federal 
Bureaucracy, paper prepared for the 7th Karl Eller Center Business/Academic Dialogue.  
Delander, L. 1991. Placement, Counselling and Occupational Rehabilitation in Sweden, Berlin: WZB 
discussion paper FS I 91-6, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Delsen, L. 1996. Employment Opportunities for the Disabled, in: G. Schmid, J. O’Reilly and K. 
Schömann (eds.), International Handbook of Labour Market Policy and Evaluation, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, pp. 520-551. 
Henriksson, M. 1996. Performance Indicators for Public Employment Services II: Swedish Workshop 
paper prepared for the WAPES workshop December 1-4, 1996. 
Hoffjan, A. 1998. Entwicklung einer verhaltensorientierten Controlling-Konzeption für die 
Arbeitsverwaltung, 2., aktualisierte Auflage, Wiesbaden: DUV. 
Horváth, P. 1994. Controlling, 5. Auflage, München: ... 
Join-Lambert, M.-T. 1997. Les institutions chargées de mettre en œuvre les politiques d’emploi, in : 
Politiques sociales, Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz. 
Kaplan, R. and D. Norton 1997. Balanced Scorecard. Strategien erfolgreich umsetzen, Stuttgart: 
Schäffer-Poeschel. 
Kaplan, R. and D. Norton 1992. The Balanced Scorecard: measures that drive performance, in: 
Harvard Business Review, 1992, No.1, pp.71-79. 
Legay, A. 2000. L’ANPE à l’épreuve du local, in: Travail et emploi, No. 81, pp. 41-51. 
Löffler, E. 1996. A Survey on Public Sector Benchmarking Concepts, in: H. Hill, H. Klages and E. 
Löffler (eds.), Quality, Innovation and Measurement in the Public Sector, Frankfurt a.M. et al.: 
Lang, pp. 137-159. 
Mali, P. 1986. MBO Updated. A Handbook of Practices and Techniques for Managing by Objectives, 
New York et.al.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Miranda, R. and A. Lerner 1995. Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy and the Privatization of 
Public Services, in: Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp.193-200. 
Morgan, C. and S. Murgatroyd 1994. Total Quality Management in the Public Sector, Buckingham: 
Open University Press. 
Mosley, H. G. and H. Schütz 2000. Implementation of Active Policies in the German Regions: 
Decentralization and Cooperation, in: J. De Koning and H. G. Mosley (eds.), Active Labour 
Market Policy and Labour Market Transitions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming. 
Mosley, H. G., T. Keller and S. Speckesser 1998. The role of the social partners in the design and 
implementation of active measures, Geneva: International Labour Office, Employment and 
Training Department, Paper no. 27. 
Naschold, F. 1995. Ergebnissteuerung, Wettbewerb, Qualitätspolitik. Entwicklungs-pfade des 
öffentlichen Sektors in Europa, Berlin: edition sigma. 
Naschold, F. 1996. Modernization of the State: Structural Reforms and Innovation Strategies of the 
Public Sector, in: F. Naschold and C. von Otter, Public Sector Transformation: Rethinking 
104 
Markets and Hierarchies in Government, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 3-
91. 
Naschold, F. and A. Arnkil 1997. Modernization of the Labour Market Organization - Scandinavian and 
Anglo-Saxon Experiences in an International Benchmarking Perspective, in: J.E. Dolvic and A. 
Steen (eds.), Making Solidarity Work? - The Norwegian Labour Market in Transition, Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press, pp. 279-341. 
Niklasson, H. and L. Tomsmark 1997. Zielsteuerung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Finland, Norwegen und 
Schweden, in: C. Riegler and F. Naschold (eds), Reformen des öffentlichen Sektors in 
Skandinavien, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 197–248. (first published 1994 as: 
Att malstyra arbetsmarknadspolitik, in: TemaNord 573, Kopenhagen.) 
OECD 1993ff. Public Management Developments. Survey 1993, Updates 1994, 1995, 1996. Paris: 
OECD. 
OECD 1997a. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Active Labour Market Policies: A Streamlined Public 
Employment Service, Paris: General Distribution Document GD(97)161. 
OECD 1997b. The Public Employment Service: Belgium. Paris: OECD. 
OECD 1998a. Local Management for more effective employment policy, Paris: OECD, Leed 
Programme, TDS. 
OECD 1999a. OECD Proceedings: Decentralising Employment Policy: New Trends and Challenges 
[The Venice Conference], Paris: OECD. 
Oppen, M. 1999. Qualitätsmanagement in sozialen Dienstleistungsorganizationen - Konzepte, 
Instrumente und Umsetzung. In: Archiv für Wissenschaft und Praxis der sozialen Arbeit, 30. Jg., 
H. 1, S. 292-318. 
Pollitt, C. 1990. Managerialism and the Public Services. The Anglo- American Experience, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Prager, J. 1994. Contracting Out Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector, in: Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 176-184. 
PUMA 1994a. Performance Management in Government: Performance Measurement and Results-
oriented Management, in: OECD, Public Management Occassional Papers No.3, Paris: OECD. 
Reichard, C. and A. Wegener 1994. Management by Objectives und Management by Results: Zur 
Entwicklung, Ausgestaltung und Bedeutung von zwei verbreiteten Managementkonzepten, 
Berlin: internes Arbeitspapier. 
Ridder, H.G. 1998. Materielle und immaterielle Leistungsanreize, in: S. Bandemer et al. (eds.): 
Handbuch zur Verwaltungsreform, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, pp. 191-199. 
Rodgers, R. and J.E. Hunter 1992. A Foundation of Good Management Practice in Government: 
Management by Objectives, in: Public Administration Review, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 27-39. 
Schütz, H., S. Speckesser and G. Schmid 1998. Benchmarking Labour Market Performance and 
Labour Market Policies: Theoretical Foundations and Applications, Berlin: Discussion Paper FS I 
98-204, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. 
Simonin, B. 2000. Rechercher un emploi quand on est au chômage, in : DARES, No. 16.1. 
Walwei, U. 1995. Brutto- und Nettoeffekte der Arbeitsvermittlung: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der 
Messung ihres Nutzens für Arbeitsuchende, Betriebe und die Volkswirtschaft, in: MittAB, No. 4, 
pp. 516-26. 
105 
Weber, J. 1994. Einführung in das Controlling, 5. Auflage, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel. 
106 
107 
Appendices 
108 
 
 
10
9 
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 A
 
 Sy
no
pt
ic
 T
ab
le
 o
n 
G
oa
ls
 a
nd
 O
pe
ra
tio
na
l O
bj
ec
tiv
es
 in
 M
B
O
-b
as
ed
 P
ES
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
 No
te
: I
f n
ot
 s
ta
te
d 
ot
he
rw
is
e,
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 d
ra
w
n 
fro
m
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 re
sp
on
se
s 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
do
cu
m
en
ts
. 
 Ta
bl
e 
A1
: A
us
tr
ia
 
 
G
oa
ls
/o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l t
ar
ge
ts
 a
nd
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 (2
00
0)
 
 1.
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 p
er
m
an
en
t e
xc
lu
si
on
 fr
om
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ys
te
m
 
2.
 
Su
pp
or
t o
f s
tru
ct
ur
al
  c
ha
ng
e 
3.
 
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t m
at
ch
in
g 
4.
 
Pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 y
ou
th
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
 
G
en
de
r m
ai
ns
tre
am
in
g 
as
 ‘c
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l’ 
go
al
 
 
 
Q
ua
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n 
re
fe
rs
 to
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
of
 re
gi
on
 (L
an
d)
 T
iro
l: 
•
 
N
ot
 m
or
e 
th
an
 7
66
 fl
ow
s 
in
to
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t (
 >
 1
 y
ea
r) 
•
 
Fl
ow
 fr
om
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
nt
o 
w
or
k 
= 
27
0 
•
 
Vo
ca
tio
na
l r
eh
ab
ilit
at
io
n 
m
es
ur
es
 fo
r a
nn
ua
l a
ve
ra
ge
 o
f 1
29
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 
ha
nd
ic
ap
pe
d 
pe
rs
on
s.
 
•
 
Fl
ow
 o
f w
om
en
 fr
om
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
nt
o 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
fte
r q
ua
lif
ic
at
io
n 
= 
12
75
 (t
ot
al
);s
ub
ta
rg
et
: j
ob
s 
la
st
in
g 
m
or
e 
th
an
 3
 m
on
th
s=
31
9 
•
 
Va
ca
nc
ie
s 
fil
le
d 
= 
27
 0
00
 
•
 
In
te
r-r
eg
io
na
l p
la
ce
m
en
t i
n 
to
ur
is
m
 in
du
st
ry
  =
 1
 2
08
 
•
 
Fl
ow
 o
f o
ld
er
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 (>
44
) i
nt
o 
w
or
k 
= 
9 
96
8 
•
 
Yo
ut
h 
(<
25
) f
lo
w
 in
to
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t  
(>
18
0 
da
ys
) =
 o
r <
 5
70
 
•
 
R
eg
io
na
l (
La
nd
) t
ar
ge
t: 
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
 fi
llin
g 
of
 re
gu
la
r (
i.e
. i
ns
ur
ed
) v
ac
an
ci
es
 =
 
9 
86
3 
 
  
 
110 
 Table A2: B
elgium
-VD
AB
 
 
G
oals/objectives 
O
perational targets and indicators (1999/2000) 
 1. 
O
ffer 
young 
people 
a 
new
 
start 
before 
reaching 
six 
m
onths 
of 
unem
ploym
ent 
2. 
O
ffer adults a new
 start before reaching 12 m
onths of unem
ploym
ent 
3. 
Active m
easures to prom
ote em
ployability 
4. 
Im
plem
ent the plan for integration into the labour m
arket  
(= an exam
ple of national policy goals based on supranational ones ) 
5. 
Im
plem
ent the Flem
ish plan for the young unem
ployed  
(= an exam
ple of com
plem
entary regional policy goals) 
 
 •
 
Jobseekers 
under 
25 
m
ust 
get 
a 
offer 
(job, 
vocational 
training, 
counselling) before the sixth m
onth unem
ploym
ent 
•
 
Jobseekers of 25 or older m
ust get a offer (job, vocational training, 
counselling) before the 12th m
onth unem
ploym
ent 
•
 
Providing, at least of 20%
 of the unem
ployed, by m
eans of active 
labour m
arket m
easures at PES-level, a chance into the labour m
arket. 
•
 
M
axim
ize 
the 
inflow
 
into 
pathw
ay 
guidance 
of 
the 
target 
group 
considered by European directive 1 
 
   
 
11
1 
Ta
bl
e 
A3
: D
en
m
ar
k 
 
G
oa
ls
/o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l t
ar
ge
ts
 a
nd
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 (1
99
9/
20
00
) 
 1.
 
Th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t b
oa
rd
s 
ar
e 
to
 s
ec
ur
e 
th
at
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
 –
 b
ot
h 
in
 th
e 
sh
or
t a
nd
 lo
ng
 ru
n 
– 
ge
t t
he
 n
ee
de
d 
la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e 
2.
 
LM
P 
ef
fo
rts
 a
re
 to
 s
ec
ur
e 
a 
be
tte
r t
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
in
 th
e 
la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t, 
gu
ar
an
te
ei
ng
 q
ui
ck
 a
nd
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
pl
ac
em
en
t i
n 
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e 
se
cu
re
 a
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 s
up
pl
y 
of
 q
ua
lif
ie
d 
la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e 
w
ith
in
 
ar
ea
s 
3.
 
Th
e 
re
gi
on
al
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t b
oa
rd
s 
m
us
t c
on
tri
bu
te
 to
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
an
d 
re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 lo
ng
 te
rm
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
4.
 
LM
P 
ha
s 
to
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
 th
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 th
e 
„s
ho
rte
st
 w
ay
“ b
ac
k 
to
 
re
gu
la
r w
or
k 
or
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
go
al
-o
rie
nt
ed
 a
nd
 ta
ilo
r-m
ad
e 
ef
fo
rt 
5.
 
In
 o
rd
er
 to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
th
e 
„w
ea
ke
st
 g
ro
up
s“
 o
f t
he
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
, 
th
e 
PE
S 
ha
s 
to
 c
o-
op
er
at
e 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 re
le
va
nt
 L
M
P 
ac
to
rs
 (o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
in
tro
du
ce
d 
in
 2
00
0)
 
6.
 
Au
gm
en
t t
he
 e
ffo
rts
 to
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
e 
jo
b 
op
po
rtu
ni
tie
s 
fo
r e
ld
er
ly
 
w
or
ke
rs
 (>
50
 y
ea
rs
) 
 
 
•
 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 v
ac
an
ci
es
 (
lo
ng
er
 t
ha
n 
5 
da
ys
) 
by
 x
%
 i
n 
co
m
pa
ris
on
 w
ith
 la
st
 y
ea
r. 
 
•
 
At
 le
as
t x
%
 o
f t
he
 r
eg
is
te
re
d 
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
(>
 5
 d
ay
s)
 h
av
e 
to
 c
om
e 
fro
m
 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 n
o 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 th
e 
PE
S 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r. 
•
 
A 
92
%
 o
f r
eg
is
te
re
d 
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
m
us
t b
e 
fil
le
d 
w
ith
in
 o
ne
 w
ee
k 
af
te
r 
th
e 
re
qu
es
te
d 
da
te
.1  
 
•
 
At
 l
ea
st
 x
%
 o
f 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s 
„a
ct
iv
at
ed
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 t
o 
th
e 
ea
rly
 n
ee
d-
or
ie
nt
ed
 
ef
fo
rt“
 
(i.
e.
th
os
e 
w
ith
 
a 
- 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
- 
sh
or
t 
du
ra
tio
n 
of
 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 a
t r
is
k 
of
 b
ec
om
in
g 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
) 
sh
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 m
ov
ed
 i
nt
o 
re
gu
la
r 
w
or
k 
or
 t
ra
in
in
g 
6 
m
on
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 
ac
tiv
at
io
n.
2  
•
 
At
 l
ea
st
 2
0%
 o
f 
al
l 
pe
rs
on
s 
ac
tiv
at
ed
 m
us
t 
ha
ve
 m
ov
ed
 i
nt
o 
re
gu
la
r 
w
or
k 
or
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 w
ith
in
 6
 m
on
th
s 
af
te
r t
he
 s
ta
rt 
of
 a
ct
iv
at
io
n.
3  
•
 
N
at
io
nw
id
e,
 a
t l
ea
st
 1
0 
90
0 
pl
ac
em
en
ts
 in
 „
pu
bl
ic
 jo
bt
ra
in
in
g“
 m
us
t b
e 
m
ad
e.
4  
•
 
A 
x%
-s
ha
re
 o
f a
pp
lic
an
ts
 p
ro
po
se
d 
to
 re
gu
la
r j
ob
s 
m
us
t b
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
 
pe
rs
on
s 
in
 a
ct
iv
at
io
n.
 
•
 
At
 le
as
t 8
0%
 o
f t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t g
oa
ls
 s
et
 in
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
ct
io
n 
pl
an
 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
ne
ed
 o
f t
he
 re
gi
on
al
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
•
 
Ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
ita
tiv
es
 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
th
e 
w
ea
ke
st
 
or
 
m
os
t 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
d 
gr
ou
ps
 
•
 
Lo
w
er
in
g 
th
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 o
f 
th
os
e 
ol
de
r 
th
an
 5
0 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r 
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
1   
Le
ve
l d
ef
in
ed
 fr
om
 1
99
6-
99
 b
y 
re
gi
on
al
 le
ve
l, 
in
 2
00
0 
de
fin
ed
 b
y 
M
in
is
try
/N
at
io
na
l L
ab
ou
r M
ar
ke
t C
ou
nc
il.
 
2   
Th
e 
pr
ec
is
e 
le
ve
l s
om
et
im
es
 s
et
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
try
 o
r t
he
 N
at
io
na
l L
ab
ou
r M
ar
ke
t C
ou
nc
il.
 
3   
Le
ve
l s
et
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
try
 o
r t
he
 N
at
io
na
l L
ab
ou
r M
ar
ke
t C
ou
nc
il.
 
4   
R
eg
io
na
l t
ar
ge
ts
 fo
r t
hi
s 
de
fin
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r. 
 
112 
Table A4: Finland 
 
G
oals/objectives 
O
perational targets and indicators (1999/2003) 
 1.The em
ploym
ent rate should be close to 70%
 in 2003 
2.Boosting the dem
and for labour and ensuring supply 
3.Em
ployee com
petence and coping at w
ork 
4.Incentives at the prevention of exclusion 
5.Prevention of discrim
ination and racism
 
 
 •
 
R
eduction of the average duration of vacancies; 90-94%
 of all job entries 
according to the day agreed 
•
 
Effectiveness of labour m
arket training (3 m
onths after program
m
e 
term
ination not unem
ployed)) 
•
 
N
um
ber of long-term
 unem
ployed 
•
 
Effectiveness of active m
easures (like labour m
arket training) 
N
otes: questionnaire, PES docum
ents and follow
-up queries / responses 
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 o
f a
no
ny
m
ou
s 
va
ca
nc
ie
s 
fil
le
d 
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T
able A
6: G
erm
any 
G
oals/objectives 
O
perational targets and indicators (2000) 
 1. 
O
pen and realize em
ploym
ent opportunities in a ‘m
arket- 
suitable’m
anner 
-Intensify registration of vacancies 
-Increase penetration of registration 
2. 
D
ecrease youth unem
ploym
ent 
-Im
prove acquisition of apprenticeships 
-Bringing young people into education (apprenticeship) and 
 em
ploym
ent 
3. 
D
ecrease long term
 unem
ploym
ent 
-Bringing m
ore long-term
 unem
ployed into em
ploym
ent 
-Preventing inflow
 into long-term
 unem
ploym
ent 
4. 
Im
prove com
patibility of job and fam
ily for w
om
en and m
en 
-O
ffering m
ore ‘m
obile tim
e’ as em
ploym
ent variant 
-Increase num
ber of placem
ents of those (fem
ale/m
ale) returning- 
 to-w
ork 
5. 
Social Security and labour m
arket regulation in order to avoid illegal 
em
ploym
ent 
-Increasing regulatory intervention tasks (‘ordnungspolitische 
 Aufgaben w
ahrnehm
en’) in order to m
aintain or create regular jobs 
-C
ustom
er friendly provision of benefits (U
nem
ploym
ent benefits, 
 unem
ploym
ent assistance, further training and child care benefit) 
  
 •
 
Placem
ents (>7days)/outflow
 of vacancies 
•
 
R
egistered apprenticeships 
•
 
Inflow
 of applicants into apprenticeships 
•
 
Inflow
 of youth >25 into unem
ploym
ent longer than 6 m
onth 
•
 
O
utflow
 of long-term
 unem
ployed in regular em
ploym
ent 
•
 
Inflow
s into long-term
 unem
ploym
ent 
•
 
Placem
ents of unem
ployed w
om
en and m
en in part-tim
e jobs over 7 
days 
•
 
Placem
ents of unem
ployed persons returning-to-w
ork into jobs over 7 
days (w
ithout ABM
/SAM
) 
•
 
Share of external site controls in suspicious branches 
•
 
Average duration of service delivery tim
e for these benefits 
(‘Bearbeitungsdauer’) 
 Supportive Indicators: 
•
 
O
utflow
 of registered vacancies/vacancies filled (supportive indicator) 
•
 
W
om
en’s share in placed unem
ployed and jobseekers, related to 
w
om
en’s share in stock of unem
ployed/jobseekers (supportive 
indicator) 
•
 
R
egistration rate of apprenticeships (supportive indicator) 
•
 
W
om
en’s share in outflow
 of the unem
ployed under 25, in relation to 
their share in all unem
ployed under 25 (supportive indicator) 
•
 
W
om
en’s share in long-term
 unem
ploym
ent in relation to w
om
en’s 
share in all unem
ployed (supportive indicator) 
•
 
W
om
en’s share in part-tim
e, in relation to their share in all part-tim
e 
seeking unem
ployed (w
ithout ABM
/SAM
) (supportive indicator) 
•
 
W
om
en’s share in placed persons returning-to-w
ork, in relation to their 
share in all persons returning-to-w
ork (supportive indicator) 
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   Table A8: N
etherlands 
 
G
oals/objectives 
O
perational targets and indicators (1999/2000) 
 
1. 
Placem
ent of unem
ployed (problem
 groups proportionally represented) 
2. 
Placing w
om
en, ethnic m
inorities, long-term
 unem
ployed 
3. 
Filling vacancies 
4. 
Successful reintegration plans 
 
 
•
 
N
um
ber of placem
ents 
•
 
Special categories placed in proportion to their percentage am
ong 
unem
ployed 
•
 
N
um
ber of vacancies filled (%
 registered offers, m
arket share) 
•
 
Trajectories for hard to place ending in placem
ent (80%
 w
ith job post 6 
m
onths). 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction rate em
ployers 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction rate jobseekers 
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  Table A10: Sw
eden 
 
G
oals/objectives 
O
perational targets and indicators (2000) 
 M
edium
 term
 goals 
1. 
R
educing open unem
ploym
ent to 4%
 by the end of 2000 
2. 
Increasing em
ploym
ent rate to 80%
 by 2004 
 Annual goals (1999-2000) 
3. 
Lim
iting duration of vacancies 
4. 
C
ounteract long-periods w
ithout regular em
ploym
ent 
5. 
R
educe long-term
 unem
ploym
ent 
 
 
•
 
80%
 tim
ely referral of candidates for vacancies 
•
 
70%
 em
ploym
ent rate for training program
m
e leavers 
•
 
R
educing very long-term
 unem
ploym
ent (>24 m
onths) to less than 
62 000 by end of year. 
•
 
R
educing long-term
 unem
ploym
ent count to less than 48 000 
•
 
Every long-term
 unem
ployed or at risk person to have personal action 
plan (job-seeker’s plan) of good quality 
•
 
All youth (>25) to receive job offer or program
 place before being 
unem
ployed 100 days 
•
 
Average of 56 000 persons em
ployed in special m
easures for 
occupational disabled 
•
 
The average subsidisation rate of w
age subsidies to em
ployers other 
than non-profit organisations shall not exceed 60 percent of the 
qualifying w
age cost 
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Appendix B:  Questionnaire Results for PES Organizations 
with MBO, Structured Response Questions 
 
Question 1: Does your public employment service currently use Management by Objectives 
or a similar type of „performance management“ in which policy objectives are formulated 
in advance as quantitative targets and progress toward these targets is monitored by a set of 
corresponding agreed performance indicators? 
 
Country Existence of MBO and year of introduction 
Austria Yes , since 1995 
B-Forem No 
B-Orbem No 
B-VDAB Yes, since 1985 
Denmark Yes, since 1994 
Finland Yes, since 1992 
France Yes, since 1990 
Germany Yes, since 1998 
Great Britain Yes, since 1991 
Greece No 
Ireland Only some elements, since 1998 
Italy No 
Luxembourg No 
Netherlands Yes, since 1997 
Norway Yes, since 1987 
Portugal Only some elements, since 1990 
Spain Only some elements, since 1994 
Sweden Yes, since 1997 
 
 
Question 3: What were the principal reasons for introducing a system of Management by 
Objectives in your PES organization? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Reason 1: Setting clearer 
national priorities in 
labour market policy 
and monitoring 
results 
Reason 2: 
Regulating the 
relationship between 
PES and ministerial 
level 
Reason 3: 
Improving the 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
regional and local 
offices 
Reason 4: 
Granting local 
offices greater 
freedom to adapt 
programs to local 
needs 
Reason 5: 
Other... 
Austria Yes Yes Yes Yes  
B-VDAB Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Denmark  Yes  Yes Yes 
Finland   Yes Yes  
France Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Germany Yes  Yes Yes  
Great Britain  Yes    
Netherlands  Yes Yes   
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Sweden Yes Yes Yes   
Total (Yes) 6 8 8 7 1 
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Question 5: Have the current operative targets changed in comparison with the previous 
planning period? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland Yes 
France Yes 
Germany Yes 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands  
Norway  
Sweden Yes 
Total (Yes) 8 
 
Question 6: Does your PES organization practice any form of multi-annual or medium 
term planning in its MBO management system? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark  
Finland  
France Yes 
Germany Yes 
Great Britain  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Sweden  
Total (Yes) 4 
 
Question 11: Are targets and indicators specified in any formal agreements (e.g. 
performance agreements, quasi-contracts, business plans etc)? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland Yes 
France Yes 
Germany Yes 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Sweden Yes 
Total (Yes) 10 
 
 
 121 
Question 12: Has the introduction of Management by Objectives been accompanied by 
decentralization and increased policy discretion for regional and local PES offices? / If 
„yes“, what form did decentralization take in your PES? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Has the introduction of MbO been 
accompanied by 
decentralization and 
increased policy 
discretion for local 
PES offices? 
Form of 
decentralization: 
Budget flexibility 
Form of 
Decentral.: 
Programme 
flexibility 
Form of 
Decentral.: 
Reduction of 
detailed rules 
and procedures 
for the local 
offices 
Form of  
Decentral.: 
Increasing the 
number of 
regional/local 
offices 
Form of 
Decentral.: 
Other 
Austria Yes Yes Yes Yes   
B-VDAB Yes Yes Yes    
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Finland Yes Yes  Yes   
France Yes Yes Yes    
Germany Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Great Britain       
Netherlands       
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Sweden Yes Yes  Yes   
Total (Yes) 8 8 5 6 0 1 
 
Question 13: Do the levels set in the operational targets at the beginning of the policy take 
regional or local circumstances and conditions into consideration?/ If „yes“, which factors 
are being considered? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Do the levels set in the operational 
targets at the 
beginning of the 
policy take 
regional or local 
circumstances 
into 
consideration? 
Considered 
factors: 
Labour market 
conditions 
Considered 
factors: economic 
development/ 
trend 
Considered 
factors: regional 
economic or 
structural policies 
Considered 
factors: PES`past 
performance 
Considered 
factors: regional 
PES and 
providers`capaciti
es to implement 
slots 
Austria Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
B-VDAB Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Denmark Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Finland Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Great 
Britain 
Yes Yes   Yes  
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Norway Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Sweden Yes Yes   Yes  
Total (Yes) 10 10 7 4 10 5 
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Question 14: Are operational targets adjusted (up or down) during the course of the MBO 
policy cycle in order to take unanticipated labour market changes into account? 
 
 Answer 
Austria  
B-VDAB  
Denmark  
Finland Yes 
France  
Germany  
Great Britain  
Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Sweden  
Total (Yes) 3 
 
Question 15: Have changes in government policy ever caused any problems for the MBO 
policy planning and implementation cycle after the targets had been set? 
 
 Answer 
Austria  
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark  
Finland  
France  
Germany Yes 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands Yes 
Norway  
Sweden  
Total (Yes) 4 
 
Question 16: Does the monitoring system cover all the agreed operational targets and 
performance indicators? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland Yes 
France Yes 
Germany Yes 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Sweden Yes 
Total (Yes) 10 
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Question 17: How frequently does the monitoring system report progress toward targets on 
agreed performance indicators from the regional or local level to the national PES office? 
[multiple answers possible] 
 
 Frequency: Weekly 
Frequency: 
Monthly 
Frequency: 
Quarterly 
Austria  Yes  
B-VDAB  Yes  
Denmark   Yes 
Finland   Yes 
France  Yes  
Germany  Yes  
Great Britain  Yes  
Netherlands   Yes 
Norway   Yes 
Sweden  Yes  
Total (Yes) 0 6 4 
 
Question 18/19:Is the monitoring system for labour market services.../ Are monitoring data 
on progress toward operational targets be improved? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Is monitoring system computerized? 
Is monitoring system 
based on a specially 
designed internal 
electronic data 
network? 
Is monitoring system 
not computerised, but 
based on traditional 
administrative 
records? 
Is monitoring system 
integrated with cost 
controlling enabling 
expenditure to be 
related to service 
outputs at the 
regional and local 
levels? 
Are monitoring data 
on progress toward 
operational targets 
disseminated across 
all PES levels? 
Austria Yes   Yes Yes 
B-VDAB Yes Yes   Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes   Yes 
Finland Yes    Yes 
France Yes Yes   Yes 
Germany Yes    Yes 
Great Britain Yes  Yes  Yes 
Netherlands Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Norway Yes Yes   Yes 
Sweden Yes Yes   Yes 
Total (Yes) 10 6 1 2 10 
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Question 21:Is monitoring used as „early warning system“ leading to immediate policy 
intervention in case of under-performance?/ If „yes“, what kind of policy interventions are 
applied? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Is monitoring used as „early warning 
system“ leading to 
immediate policy 
intervention in case of 
under-performance? 
If „yes“: 
Kind of policy 
intervention: 
Correction of 
objective 
If „yes“: 
Kind of policy 
intervention: 
Increasing / 
reallocation of 
funding 
If „yes“: 
Kind of policy 
intervention: 
Increasing personnel 
If „yes“: 
Kind of policy 
intervention: 
Other 
Austria Yes  Yes   
B-VDAB Yes  Yes Yes  
Denmark Yes Yes Yes   
Finland      
France Yes    Yes 
Germany Yes    Yes 
Great Britain Yes     
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes   
Norway Yes  Yes   
Sweden Yes  Yes  Yes 
Total (Yes) 9 2 6 1 3 
 
Question 22: Does your organization’s system of Management by Objectives include an 
obligatory stage of performance assessment, on basis of the final results? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland Yes 
France Yes 
Germany Yes* 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Sweden Yes 
Total (Yes) 10 
 
Notice: * Even though Germany responded ‘No’ to question 22, the stage of performance assessment 
was mentioned and described within Germany’s response to question10. For this reason, we have 
corrected the answer here. 
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Question 25:What are the practical consequences of good (bad) local PES performance, if 
any? [multiple answers possible] 
 
 Consequence: 
Individual 
performance 
based pay 
Consequence: 
Bonuses for 
succesful work 
units 
Consequence: 
Higher budget 
allocations 
Consequence: 
Additional 
personnel 
Consequence: 
Non-monetary 
achievement 
awards 
Consequence: 
No specific 
consequences 
at all 
Consequence: 
Other 
Austria  Yes   Yes   
B-VDAB  Yes   Yes   
Denmark       Yes 
Finland  Yes      
France Yes Yes      
Germany     Yes   
Great Britain Yes Yes   Yes   
Netherlands Yes      Yes 
Norway      Yes  
Sweden      Yes  
Total (Yes) 3 5 0 0 4 2 2 
 
Question 26: Are the performance indicators and results of performance assessment 
publicized throughout the organization? / Are they available to the press and public? 
 
 Are the performance indicators and results of performance assessment publicized throughout the 
organization? 
Are they available to the press and public? 
Austria Yes Yes 
B-VDAB Yes Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes 
Finland Yes  
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Great Britain Yes Yes 
Netherlands Yes  
Norway Yes Yes 
Sweden Yes  
Total (Yes) 10 7 
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Question 27: Is there a systematic attempt to identify, publicize, and transfer „best 
practice“ between the subordinate units of the PES organization („benchmarking“)? 
 
 Answer 
Austria Yes 
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland  
France  
Germany Yes 
Great Britain Yes 
Netherlands Yes 
Norway Yes 
Sweden Yes 
Total (Yes) 8 
 
Question 28: Have there been any systematic evaluations of the performance management 
activities or reforms in your organization? 
 
 Answer 
Austria  
B-VDAB Yes 
Denmark Yes 
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Great Britain  
Netherlands  
Norway Yes 
Sweden  
Total (Yes) 3 
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3. Setting goals and objectives 
•
 
G
oal definition 
•
 
M
inistry of Labour defines the overriding labour m
arket goals  
•
 
Annual planning of goals under participation of M
inistry, the AM
S headquarter and 
regional (Land) PES organizations  
•
 
O
bjectives setting 
•
 
D
evelopm
ent of operational w
ork program
m
es is m
ain responsibility of the Land PES  
•
 
D
evelopm
ent of perform
ance indicators
 
•
 
D
evelopm
ent PI’s: all organizational levels of M
inistry and AM
S are involved 
•
 
Strong determ
ination of goals and targets through the ‘concerted’ m
edium
-term
 plans 
4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
C
om
prehensive 
•
 
M
onitoring reports are available quarterly 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, if significant deviation from
 the target track 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
C
lient m
onitoring system
 is being set up 
•
 
D
evelopm
ent of a quality m
anagem
ent system
 applying TQ
M
-EFQ
M
-standards 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
The ‘planning delegates’ from
 national PES, the regional PES and the M
inistry reflect 
on targets, the planning process and the w
orking program
m
es of the previous period 
at the outset of the new
 planning period. 
•
 
Sm
all perform
ance pay com
ponents as consequence of assessm
ent 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
Benchm
arking m
ainly responsibility of the regions (Länder); benchm
arking w
ithin 
rather than across the regions 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends  
•
 
D
esign features and feasibility of the planned ‘com
prehensive controlling system
’ still 
under debate 
8. Special rem
arks 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
Full 
•
 
Technical standards 
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, som
etim
es if necessary  
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
VD
AB conducts em
ployer satisfaction surveys tw
ice a year 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Annual evaluation of target attainm
ent by Flem
ish governm
ent and VD
AB 
•
 
PES bonus paym
ent for successful w
ork units/departm
ents and non- m
onetary 
achievem
ent aw
ards. 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
VD
AB tries to identify and transfer ‘best-practice’ in internal audits, w
orkshops, 
discussions betw
een the staff of local offices 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
Introduction of standardized benchm
arking techniques 
•
 
Q
uality vs. quantity debate 
8. Special rem
arks 
•
 
Balanced scorecard is currently in developm
ent 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
The m
onitoring system
 covers all operational targets and perform
ance indicators. 
•
 
Bi-annual and annual m
onitoring reports 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, as a rule by the N
ational Labour M
arket Authority 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service quality 
controls 
•
 
See above 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Frequent visits of N
ational LM
 C
ouncil to regional councils, and AM
S to regional PES 
respectively 
•
 
Evaluations and assessm
ent also on grounds of annual controlling reports 
•
 
R
egional boards w
hich have a budget surplus are allow
ed to transfer the am
ount to 
the budget of the next year, regions w
ith a budget deficit m
ay be “cut dow
n” 
•
 
Budget bonuses for successful units 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
Process, result and ’best practice’, benchm
arking, e.g. ....  
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
Better balance betw
een the different expectations from
 the central and regional level 
is considered necessary, w
hich is to be achieved w
ith the new
 results-oriented 
contract 
8. Special rem
arks 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
Full coverage of operational targets and perform
ance indicators 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
N
o 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
Yes, com
prehensive custom
er feedback system
, including e.g. service standards 
satisfaction surveys etc.  
•
 
PES self assessm
ent and organizational developm
ent (internal quality m
anagem
ent) 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Largely based on w
ritten exchange on grounds of the m
anagem
ent reports; explicit 
review
 m
eetings seem
 not to take place 
•
 
U
ntil recently, neither a priority order of goals/targets nor explicit em
phasis on 
attainm
ent of target levels; only ‘lax’ m
onitoring of target attainm
ent w
hich stood, 
how
ever, in som
e contrast to the practices of perform
ance pay  
•
 
Budget-bonus paym
ent for local em
ploym
ent offices for (over) attainm
ent of targets  
•
 
Perform
ance pay com
ponents for individual PES m
anagers („officials“), too  
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
Testw
ise PES „inter-unit benchm
arking“ addressing quality of internal services 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
D
issatisfaction 
w
ith 
the 
‘old’ system
 of m
anagem
ent by results due to several 
w
eaknesses and criticism
s (e.g. M
BR
-system
 deficient in directing PES activities; 
over-em
phasis on results led to neglect of quality, indicator problem
s) has been 
leading to a re-organization of PES perform
ance m
anagem
ent em
phasizing quality 
aspects and the involvem
ent of different interest groups 
8. Special rem
arks 
•
 
Turn tow
ards a m
edium
-term
 perspective of the perform
ance m
anagem
ent system
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•
 
D
evelopm
ent of perform
ance Indicators
 
•
 
O
n national level: definition w
ith help of the C
ontrolling-section of AN
PE 
4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
Full; m
onthly progress reports 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, e.g. in form
 of provision of additional staff or an external adviser. 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
Yes, annual control of the service quality and the quality label 
•
 
AN
PE conducts custom
er satisfaction surveys yearly (so called ‘quality-barom
eters’) 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
C
om
bined w
ith planning process w
hich is based on co-ordination betw
een the different 
levels. (R
egular m
eetings: e.g. m
onthly m
eetings of regional directors) 
•
 
Perform
ance assessm
ent consists also in the evaluation of the m
ulti-annual progress 
agreem
ent and in the assigning of aw
ards to staff m
em
bers and units of the AN
PE 
(“prim
e d’intéressem
ent” and “prim
e de résponsabilité). 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
The developm
ent of a learning organisation is announced in ‘C
ontrat de Progrès’ 
•
 
So far only lim
ited dissem
ination to exchange ‘best practice’. 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
G
ood application of M
BO
 dem
ands further training and experience of local m
anagers 
w
ith this type of m
anagem
ent 
8. Special rem
arks 
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•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
N
ot yet as standard established, but introduction planned 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
C
om
pulsory reports, planning and review
 m
eetings 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
O
ver the m
edium
-term
, perform
ance com
parison to induce com
petitive PES-
benchm
arking 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
Acceptance and im
plem
entation problem
s of organization reform
 
8. Special rem
arks 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
C
om
plete  
•
 
Q
uarterly and annual ES perform
ance reports and accounts  
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh, but som
ew
hat inflexible w
ith respect to short-term
 changes 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, reallocation of resource w
ithin region and w
ithin districts if necessary 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
Q
uality certificates (e.g. charter m
ark aw
ard) and public service standards  
•
 
Service standards system
atically m
onitored by m
ystery shoppers 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Q
uarterly follow
-up progress reports on achievem
ent of perform
ance against targets 
by the chief executive vis-a-vis the M
inistry 
•
 
W
ithin the ES there are m
onthly discussions w
ith the C
hief Executive and D
irector of 
Jobcentre 
Services 
on 
progress 
tow
ard 
targets 
and 
joint 
m
eetings 
of 
senior 
m
anagem
ent from
 head office w
ith the regional directors at w
hich perform
ance and 
progress tow
ards targets are discussed 
•
 
Perform
ance pay as a consequence 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
D
evelopm
ent of benchm
arking tools for system
atical com
parison of jobcentre 
perform
ance 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
U
pgrading of IT system
; further developm
ent of quality m
anagem
ent 
8. Special rem
arks 
•
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•
 
O
bjectives setting 
•
 
N
egotiations betw
een the regions and the national level (top-dow
n-bottom
-up planning)  
4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
Full coverage of the agreed operational targets and perform
ance indicators; w
ith cost 
controlling devices; quarterly m
anagem
ent reports at regional and national level 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes  
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
Annual national custom
er satisfaction surveys w
ith detailed regional and local inform
ation, 
(even though regional inform
ation in jobseekers’ survey is still rather general) 
•
 
Pilot-surveys (experim
ents) in several regions to im
prove m
easurem
ent m
ethods on 
custom
er satisfaction 
•
 
Also PES ‘internal custom
er’ surveys (e.g. m
easurem
ent of PES-internal com
m
unication) 
•
 
Local standardization of services on base of quality handbook provisions 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Basis of perform
ance assessm
ent are national PES perform
ance reports sent to the 
M
inistry; these national reports are based on quarterly reports and discussions about 
results attainm
ent betw
een the national director and each of the regional PES directors.  
•
 
The m
ost im
portant criteria for perform
ance assessm
ent are the PES m
arket share, the 
‘m
arket-reach’ and the ‘perform
ance rate’ in placem
ent. R
esults of the ‘reintegration 
trajectories’, but also local production costs are relevant, too. 
•
 
Annual individual assessm
ent of regional PES directors through the national director  
•
 
Individual perform
ance based pay at regional level 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
First steps tow
ards com
parisons of the results across regions 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends  
•
 
In 2001/2002, the PES w
ill be divided in an organization to provide basic services (as part 
of the integrated 'C
entres For W
ork And Incom
e’ (C
W
I) and an organization providing 
specialized reintegration services to the unem
ployed and services to em
ployers on a 
m
arket basis. In effect the D
utch PES is being privatised to a large extent.  
8. Special rem
arks 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
C
om
prehensive 
•
 
Technical standards 
•
 
H
igh 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, dependent on the issue at stake, interventions possible by all the three m
ain 
adm
inistrative levels: M
inistry of Labour and G
overnm
ent Adm
inistration, the 
D
irectorate of Labour, county em
ploym
ent offices  
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service 
quality controls 
•
 
U
niform
 service standards everyw
here in the country are being guaranteed to the 
custom
ers 
•
 
The quality system
 is built upon the ISO
 9001-standard; basic concepts are: routines, 
quality control, quality m
easurem
ent and assessm
ent. 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
Top-level: quarterly dialogues betw
een the M
inistry and  the D
irectorate of Labour  
•
 
Betw
een the PES levels: largely based on w
ritten exchange and on m
onitoring reports; 
(m
eetings recently introduced, experim
ental stage) 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
The aim
 is to m
ake ‘best-practice’ com
m
on practice. 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
M
easurem
ent problem
s; deficits of perform
ance indicators 
8. Special rem
arks 
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4. M
onitoring system
 
•
 
C
overage of instrum
ents/indicators 
•
 
C
om
prehensive 
•
 
M
onthly , quarterly and annual m
onitoring (som
e results are only quarterly available) 
•
 
Technical standards  
•
 
H
igh, but still need for further connection of different databases 
•
 
Policy interventions due to m
onitoring results 
•
 
Yes, if necessary 
•
 
C
ustom
er satisfaction surveys and other service quality 
controls 
•
 
Yes, but now
 som
ew
hat less im
portant 
5. Perform
ance assessm
ent approach  
•
 
‘C
ounty exam
s’ and telephone and result conferences and various other form
s of 
assessm
ent, e.g. 
•
 
M
ore form
alized review
 m
eetings betw
een the county and the local em
ploym
ent 
offices 
•
 
C
ounty review
 m
eetings (every 15 m
onths) 
•
 
R
eview
 m
eetings betw
een AM
S and the M
inistry of Econom
y (quarterly) 
6. B
enchm
arking approaches 
•
 
R
ather inform
al approaches, e.g. on self-initiative across local PES offices 
7. M
ajor problem
s /trends 
•
 
R
eturn of m
anagem
ent by rules instead m
anagem
ent by objectives?  
8. Special rem
arks 
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